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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two-Thousand-Six was a year in which the opaque investment 
pools commonly known as “hedge funds”1 provided frequent headline-
fodder through scandals,2 congressional testimony,3 and the collapse of 
Amaranth Advisors,4 a nine billion dollar hedge fund implosion that 
 1. Alfred Winslow Jones is credited with having coined this term to described a 
pooled investment portfolio typically composed of a combination of long and short 
equity positions, and operated under the strategy that the short positions would 
presumably counter-balance the long positions in a manner that would offer capital 
growth opportunities while insuring, or “hedging,” against any significant risk of loss, 
irrespective of the market’s direction.  Today, Mr. Jones’s coined phrase better 
describes the legal management structures of investment pools rather than the 
investment strategies employed, and these pooled investments typically issue 
unregistered securities in “private offerings,” which, in general, are privately held by a 
restricted number of “accredited” investors, and which in 2006 experienced record 
capital inflows of roughly $126.5 billion.  These pooled funds are typically either single 
or multiple strategy vehicles that employ an array of investment approaches ostensibly 
designed to generate above-market returns, including the hedge fund adviser’s quest for 
the premium compensation known in the industry as “alpha.”  See David A. Vaughan, 
Partner, Dechert LLP, Comments for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Roundtable on Hedge Funds—Selected Definitions of “Hedge Fund” (May 14-15, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2007); see also Ted Gogoll, What’s Driving the Hedge Fund Boom?, 
BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Oct. 13, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
investor/content/oct2006/pi20061013_353103.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2006); 
Complaint, Goldstein v. SEC, No. 1:04CV02216, 2004 WL 3633837 at 17 (D.C. Cir. 
Dec. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Goldstein Complaint]; Stephen J. Brown, Keynote Address 
at the PACAP/FMA Meeting, Melbourne, Australia, July 7, 2000, Hedge Funds: 
Omniscient or Just Plain Wrong, NYU Stern School of Business (Mar. 9, 2001), 
available at  http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sbrown/omniscient.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 
2006). 
 2. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/16/business/16hedge.html 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2007); see also Katherine Burton and David Scheer, Sandell Asset 
Management Draws SEC Scrutiny for Short Sales, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 31, 2006, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=funds&sid=a 
JoinHyJ.iyQ (last visited Feb. 25, 2007). 
 3. See, e.g., Paul Tharp, Senate Raises Heat on Funds in Panel Grilling, N.Y. 
POST, Dec. 6, 2006, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/12062006/business/ 
senate_raises_heat_on_funds_in_panel_grilling_business_paul_tharp.htm (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2007) (“Wall Street is stacked tighter than ever against the little guy because 
secret investment pools that operate freely outside securities laws can actually rig stock 
trading, according to Senate testimony.”).
 4. See, e.g., Christopher S. Rugaber, Senator Urges Hedge Fund Transparency, 
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exceeded the financial scope of the Long Term Capital Management 
Asian currency debacle.5  Yet despite these swirling scandals and 
controversies, many of the broader equity indices established record 
levels and the domestic capital markets barely blinked.  Among the 
luminaries of the 2006 hedge fund universe was Phillip Goldstein, a 
former New York City municipal employee6 who is now the activist 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE (AP), Oct. 18, 2006, available at http://www.chron.com/ 
cs/CDA/printstory.mpl/ap/fn/4268516 (last visited Oct. 18, 2006). 
[Senator] Charles Grassley [R-Iowa] said in the letter that ‘tens of millions of 
Americans may be unwittingly exposed to hedge fund investments’ through public 
and private pension plans that invest in hedge funds. As a result, significant future 
losses at hedge funds could put many workers’ retirement security at risk, Grassley 
wrote, and could cause losses at the federal pension insurance agency, the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corp. 
Id.; see also Jennifer McCandless, Pension Fund to Replace Advisor Post-Amaranth, 
FIN. NEWS (UK), Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.financialnews-
us.com/?page=ushome&contentid=1045677634 (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) (“The San 
Diego County Employees Retirement Association, the Californian pension plan, is 
looking to replace the investment consultancy that recommended it put money in 
Amaranth Advisors, a move which lost the fund more than $100m (€79.6m); Dane 
Hamilton, UPDATE 3-San Diego pension fund sues Amaranth, REUTERS, Mar. 30, 
2007, available at http://today.reuters.com/misc/PrinterFriendlyPopup.aspx?type=etf 
News&storyID=2007-03-30T195343Z_01_N30441455_RTRIDST_0_ 
AMARARANTH-PENSIONFUND-UPDATE-3.XML (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).  
The suit against Amaranth stated that: 
Amaranth repeatedly and “falsely misrepresented” that it was a “multi-strategy hedge 
fund” that invested in six different sectors, the suit said. “Instead [it] operated as a 
single-strategy natural gas fund that took very large and highly leveraged gambles and 
recklessly failed to apply even basic risk management techniques” “We are 
disappointed that SDCERA has chosen to undertake meritless litigation that will 
inevitably reduce its own recovery and, potentially, the recovery of other investors,” 
said Amaranth attorney David Boies of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP in a statement. 
Id. 
 5. See, e.g., Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-
Term Capital Management—How One Small Bank Created a Trillion-Dollar Hole, 
(Fourth Estate Publishing 2001); see also 1999 Report of the President’s Working 
Group (“PWG”) on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of 
Long-Term Capital Management (April 1999), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 
2007). 
 6. See Jay Loomis, Activist Investing on the Rise, THE JOURNAL NEWS, Feb. 18, 
2007, available at http://www.thejournalnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/200702 
18/BUSINESS01/702180320/1066 (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (“[Phillip Goldstein] 
previously worked 25 years as a civil engineer for New York City.”); see also 15 U.S.C. 
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manager of a group of pooled investments operating under the moniker 
“Bulldog Investors.”7  Mr. Goldstein took the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) to task in a successful challenge8 of the so-called 
“Hedge-Fund Rule.”9  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit was apparently persuaded by Mr. 
Goldstein’s definitional theory as to the term “client,”10 and vacated the 
§ 78m(f)(2). 
 7. See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see generally 
http://www.bulldoginvestors.com/. 
 8. See, e.g., Statement of Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals in Phillip Goldstein et al. v. SEC (Aug. 7, 2006), available at 
http://sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-135.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2006); see also 
Amanda Cantrell, SEC Faces Hedge Fund Deadline, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 4, 2006, 
available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/08/04/markets/hedge_returns/ (last visited Jan. 
2, 2007). 
 9. The Respondent SEC apparently took umbrage with the Goldstein petitioners’ 
use of this phrase because it created apparent confusion in that the Rule itself governed 
hedge fund investment advisers, rather than the funds under management.  See Brief of 
Respondent at 5 n.1, Goldstein v. SEC, No. 04-1434 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2005), 
available at 2005 WL 1636146 [hereinafter SEC’s Appell. Brief] (“[P]etitioners’ 
pervasive references to the ‘Hedge Fund Rule’ create a misleading impression.”).  
Despite these comments by the SEC in brief, the Goldstein court adopted the phrase 
coined by the petitioners and used it throughout its opinion, including in its ruling 
statement.  See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874, 877, 880-81, 883-84 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (“The petition for review is granted, and the Hedge Fund Rule is vacated and 
remanded.”) (emphasis added). 
 10. Goldstein Complaint, supra note 1 at ¶ 17, contended that in order to determine 
whether a hedge fund adviser was eligible for the “private adviser” exemption, one 
must first interpret the essence of the definition of the term “client,” and discern the 
legislative intent of the statutory construction within the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 (the “Advisers Act”) of the term “client.”  The Goldstein petitioners asserted the 
legislative intent was consistent with that articulated in the 1985 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985), and that it necessarily (albeit somewhat 
circularly) turns on whether an adviser “directly” provides “personalized advice attuned 
to a client’s concerns.”  The Goldstein Complaint further asserted that, with respect to 
the 1985 “safe harbor” provision that afforded most hedge fund managers the “private 
adviser” exemption at issue in Goldstein v. SEC, the SEC 
proposed the safe harbor rule to make clear that it would not take the position that the 
limited partners of a limited partnership are ‘clients’ of the general partner, as long as 
the general partner provided advice to the limited partnership and did not provide 
individualized personal investment advice to the limited partners [and t]he safe harbor 
rule thus reflected not only the universally accepted meaning of the term ‘client,’ but 
also Congress’ desire to regulate only those persons who render personalized 
investment advice attuned to a client’s concerns. 
Goldstein Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 22 (emphasis added). 
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entire investment adviser registration regime as “arbitrary.”11
The SEC correctly noted in its brief that when the Advisers Act was promulgated, 
Congress did not establish how one could (or should) count “clients” for the purposes of 
the “private adviser” exemption, suggesting that the Goldstein petitioners’ asserted 
notion that the meaning of “client” was somehow “universally accepted” was somewhat 
disingenuous.  SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 9, at 2.  In fact, the SEC presented a 
plausible interpretation of the term that, despite the history of the SEC’s previous use of 
“client,” could have possibly persuaded Congress to amend the Act.  Id. at 2-3 (“[T]he 
proper construction of the statute might well require an adviser to count as its clients the 
investors whose assets were brought under management through an investment vehicle 
operated by the adviser, rather than counting only the vehicle itself.”) (emphasis added).  
Moreover, the SEC specifically “recognized in proposing the [1985] safe harbor that ‘a 
different approach could be followed in counting clients.’”  Id. at 3 (quoting Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 956 (Feb. 22, 1985), 50 Fed. Reg. 8740, 8741 (Mar. 5, 1985) 
(JA 001, 002)).  The same year that the SEC adopted the “safe harbor” for general 
partners of investment limited partnerships, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lowe v. 
SEC, 472 U.S. 181(1985).  The SEC correctly noted in its final brief that the discussion 
in Lowe regarding “‘personalized’ versus ‘impersonal’ advice . . . is solely for the 
purposes of determining which type of publishers fall within the definition of an 
investment adviser.”  SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 9, at 17, 34-36 (citing Lowe v. 
SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1985).  According to the Goldstein petitioners’ definitional 
theory of the case, the Rule’s “look through” method of counting “clients” was 
inconsistent with legislative intent, with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term 
in Lowe, and with the SEC’s prior use of the term.  The Goldstein court identified past 
instances of SEC interpretations of the term “client” that substantially undermined the 
government’s theory of that case.  See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1) (“[T]he Commission has interpreted this 
provision to refer to the partnership or entity itself as the adviser’s ‘client.’”).  The 
Goldstein court also specifically noted with regard to the definition of “investment 
adviser,”that 
[h]edge fund general partners meet the definition of “investment adviser” in the 
Advisers Act [which itself defines] “investment adviser” as one who ‘for 
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, 
Id.  The Goldstein court also acknowledged that such hedge fund partners “usually 
satisfy the ‘private adviser exemption’ from registration in § 203(b)(3) of the Act.”  Id.  
See also SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 9, at 5 n.1; Opening Brief of Petitioner in 
Goldstein v. SEC, No. 04-1434, 2005 WL 1666937 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2005) at 16, 25, 
38-39 (citing Advisers Act Release No. 983, Definition of “client” of Investment 
Adviser for Certain Purposes Relating to Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 29,206 
(July 18, 1985)) [hereinafter Goldstein Opening Brief]; see also Edward Pekarek, 
Pruning the Hedge: Who is a “Client” and Whom Does an Adviser Advise?, 12 
Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 913 (2007). 
 11. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Pekarek, supra 
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Apparently emboldened by his appellate victory, Mr. Goldstein 
again tilted at regulatory windmills months later and petitioned the SEC 
to exempt his “Bulldog” hedge funds from certain portfolio reporting 
requirements.12  This Article analyzes Section 13(f) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Mr. Goldstein’s effort to avoid the Section 13 
reporting regime through an intellectual property and due process 
theory.  Mr. Goldstein has asserted that compulsory disclosure pursuant 
to Section 13(f) is an unconstitutional regulatory taking in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment because he contends that his hedge fund portfolio 
positions are trade secrets.  Mr. Goldstein, however, has reportedly 
admitted his petition is merely a “pretext for a lawsuit,”13 and that 
petition failed to articulate the substance of these purported trade secrets 
with the required measure of particularity to properly assert a trade 
secrets claim.  “Bulldog’s” October 24, 2006 petitioned to the SEC for 
an order pursuant to §13(f)(2) of the Exchange Act of 1934 that would 
exempt the “Bulldog” funds from the reporting requirements embodied 
in Rule 13f-1(the “Goldstein Application” or the “Application”) is also 
flawed due to the absence of any demonstration that he or his “Bulldog” 
funds utilized “reasonable efforts” to ensure that the portfolio holdings 
at issue remained secret.  Mr. Goldstein’s trade secret theory is also 
note 10. Iowa Senator Charles Grassley has introduced a terse, two page bill aiming to 
amend Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act titled, “The Hedge Fund Registration Act 
of 2007” which effectively seeks to replace the term “client” with “investor” in order 
reverse the effect of the court of appeals ruling in Goldstein, and expressly authorize the 
SEC to compel hedge fund advisor registration.  A copy of the Grassley Bill is available 
at http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2007/05152007.pdf (last visited May 21, 2007). 
 12. A copy of the Goldstein Application for 13F Exemption filed with the SEC on 
October 24, 2006 is available at http://nakedshorts.typepad.com/nakedshorts/files/ 
request_for_exemption_from_rule_13f1.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2007) [hereinafter 
Goldstein Application]. 
 13. See Victorious Goldstein Aims For A Second Regulatory Win, 
FINALTERNATIVES.COM, Sept. 13, 2006, available at 
http://www.finalternatives.com/node/403 (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).  Describing Mr. 
Goldstein as: 
The man who more or less single-handedly (with an assist from the federal courts) 
killed the Securities and Exchange Commission’s hedge fund registration requirement 
has seemingly developed a taste for blood.   Phillip Goldstein of Bulldog Investors, 
who filed the registration suit against the SEC, is taking aim at the regulator’s 
portfolio disclosure requirement. . . .  According to Goldstein, the rule forces funds to 
give up their trade secrets, and “investors are relying on your trade secrets to earn 
money.”  He said he would seek an exemption from the requirement as a pretext for a 
lawsuit, since the SEC is unlikely to take the bait and make his fund an exception. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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significantly undermined because he and his funds have made public 
disclosures that could eliminate any trade secret status, which, among 
other facts and issues discussed herein, erode the theory of the Goldstein 
Application to such an extent that the SEC may properly deny the 
requested relief. 
II. GOLDSTEIN SEEKS SECTION 13(F) HEDGE FUND  
PORTFOLIO DISCLOSURE EXEMPTION 
For approximately three decades, institutional investment 
managers,14 including certain hedge fund managers, broker-dealers, 
banks, and insurance companies have been required to file disclosure 
statements with the SEC on Form 13F if they possess investment 
discretion over at least $100 million worth of certain designated equity 
securities listed on domestic exchanges or quoted on Nasdaq.15  These 
 14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(5)(A) (“For purposes of this subsection the term 
‘institutional investment manager’ includes any person, other than a natural person, 
investing in or buying and selling securities for its own account, and any person 
exercising investment discretion with respect to the account of any other person.”).  Id.  
See also Division of Investment Management: Frequently Asked Questions About Form 
13F, May 2005, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2006).  A more elaborative definition is available on this website: 
An institutional investment manager is an entity that either invests in, or buys and 
sells, securities for its own account.  For example, banks, insurance companies, and 
broker/dealers are institutional investment managers.  So are corporations and pension 
funds that manage their own investment portfolios.  An institutional investment 
manager is also a natural person or an entity that exercises investment discretion over 
the account of any other natural person or entity.  For example, an investment adviser 
that manages private accounts, mutual fund assets, or pension plan assets is an 
institutional investment manager.  So is the trust department of a bank.  A trustee is an 
institutional investment manager, but a natural person who exercises investment 
discretion over his or her own account is not an institutional investment manager. 
Id. (citing Exchange Act §§ 3(a)(9), 13(f)(5)(A)). 
 15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1).  Section (f) states that: 
Every institutional investment manager which uses the mails, or any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce in the course of its business as an institutional 
investment manager and which exercises investment discretion with respect to 
accounts holding equity securities of a class described in subsection (d)(1) of this 
section having an aggregate fair market value on the last trading day in any of the 
preceding twelve months of at least $100,000,000 or such lesser amount (but in no 
case less than $10,000,000) as the Commission, by rule, may determine, shall file 
reports with the Commission in such form, for such periods, and at such times after 
the end of such periods as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe, but in no event 
shall such reports be filed for periods longer than one year or shorter than one quarter.  
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disclosures reveal to the public certain aspects of a non-exempt 
investment manager’s portfolio holdings in a “snapshot” format,16 as 
authorized by Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 
articulated by SEC Rule.17
The disclosures required by non-exempt investment managers are 
to be submitted to the SEC on the proscribed Form 13F.18  Disclosures 
must be filed no later than forty-five (45) days after the close of each 
calendar quarter,19 commencing with any quarter within any calendar 
year during which the investment manager maintained discretion over a 
minimum of $100 million worth of Section 13(f) securities holdings.20  
The securities holdings to be disclosed on Form 13F are specifically 
identified on a “13(f) securities list” published quarterly by the SEC.21
Phillip Goldstein, SEC gadfly and Pleasantville, New York-based 
Such reports shall include for each such equity security held on the last day of the 
reporting period by accounts (in aggregate or by type as the Commission, by rule, may 
prescribe) with respect to which the institutional investment manager exercises 
investment discretion (other than securities held in amounts which the Commission, 
by rule, determines to be insignificant for purposes of this subsection), the name of the 
issuer and the title, class, CUSIP number, number of shares or principal amount, and 
aggregate fair market value of each such security. 
Id. 
 16. See id.  The snapshot format is comprised of the following: 
Such reports shall include for each such equity security held on the last day of the 
reporting period by accounts (in aggregate or by type as the Commission, by rule, may 
prescribe) with respect to which the institutional investment manager exercises 
investment discretion (other than securities held in amounts which the Commission, 
by rule, determines to be insignificant for purposes of this subsection), the name of the 
issuer and the title, class, CUSIP number, number of shares or principal amount, and 
aggregate fair market value of each such security. 
Id. 
 17. Rule 13f-1 under § 13(f) of the Exchange Act; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1. 
 18. Rulemaking for Edgar System, Exchange Act Release No. 40934, 68 SEC 
Docket 2814 (Jan. 12, 1999), available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/34-40934.htm (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2007).  On January 12, 1999, the SEC required institutional investment 
managers to file reports on Form 13F with the SEC via EDGAR, the SEC’s electronic 
filing system.  See also 17 C.F.R. § 249.325. 
 19. Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment 
Managers, Exchange Act Release No. 15461 (Jan. 5, 1979), available at 1979 WL 
173407 [hereinafter Final Rule 1979]. 
 20. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1). 
 21. The “Section 13(f) securities,” as defined by Rule 13f-1(c) [17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13f-1(c)], are made available to the public pursuant to § 13(f)(3) of the Exchange 
Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(3)]; see also SEC List of Section 13 F Securities, 3rd Quarter, 
FY 2006, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13f/13flist2006q3.pdf. 
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investment manager for the “Bulldog” hedge funds, revealed to 
BusinessWeek his intent to challenge the 13F disclosure requirement 
with an application to the SEC, not for mere confidential treatment but 
rather seeking a full exemption from Section 13(f) disclosure 
requirements.22  Seemingly sanguine from his widely reported victory in 
the D.C. Appellate Circuit, which vacated the “arbitrary” registration 
requirement for certain hedge fund managers pursuant to the so-called 
“Hedge Fund Rule” on June 23, 2006.23  The “Bulldog” made good on 
his threat with the Goldstein Application.24
The Goldstein Application asserted that the very information 
required to be disclosed in a Form 13F is a protectable private property 
interest subject to the boundaries of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.25  The Application further contends that the SEC 
 22. Karyn McCormack, Do Hedge Funds Hold ‘Trade Secrets’?, BUS. WK, Sept. 
12, 2006 (Bulldog Investors’ Phillip Goldstein says yes, and he’s preparing to launch a 
battle with the SEC over its 13F disclosure rule).  See also Judith Burns, UPDATE: 
Hedge Fund Manager Goldstein Takes On SEC Again, MORNINGSTAR/DOW JONES 
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 24, 2006. 
 23. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2004).  The so-called “Hedge Fund Rule” 
specified that for purposes of § 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 
(2005), investment managers were required to count as “clients” the shareholders, 
limited partners, members, or beneficiaries of the fund in order to determine whether 
the adviser was eligible as a “private” fund adviser for exemption from SEC registration 
requirements.  Id.  See also Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Pekarek, 
supra note 10. 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f). 
 25. See McCormack, supra note 22. 
[Q:] Do you think you’ll win?  Why would you file this if you don’t think you have a 
chance? 
[A:] I think we have a chance.  We have a good case.  I thought we were going to win 
the hedge fund lawsuit.  The judges are human beings.  Are they going to see it your 
way?  Are they going to try to find a way to give the SEC a victory?  If you go on the 
merits, I think we’ll win. That’s the same thing I said about the hedge fund case. 
Anybody that actually read our briefs [on the hedge fund lawsuit] thought we had a 
good case. But they nevertheless thought we were going to lose because they thought 
the court would say the SEC is the expert, let them do what they want. Thankfully, the 
court didn’t. Whether hedge funds register is not the biggest issue in this country. But 
it’s important that you know that the federal courts are incorruptible. Really, to a large 
extent, they are [parenthetical in original]. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also, Cantrell, SEC Faces Hedge Fund Deadline, 
supra note 8: 
Jedd Wider, a partner in law firm Morgan Lewis, also believes it is highly unlikely 
that the SEC will appeal to the Supreme Court, but that doesn’t mean the agency will 
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disclosure requirements embodied in Section 13(f) (and Rule 13f-1 
thereunder) are nothing more than a regulatory “taking” that deprives his 
hedge funds of due process, and that the SEC is constitutionally obliged 
to compensate his “Bulldog” funds for the allegedly unconstitutional 
appropriation of private property.26
This Article details the background of Section 13(f) legislation, the 
purposes and public benefits of the disclosures required by the Rule at 
issue, details notable market participants’ confidential treatment requests 
for their portfolio disclosures, evaluates arguments made in the 
Goldstein Application regarding the putative trade secret status of the 
“Bulldog” hedge fund holdings, and the related due process challenge to 
Section 13(f) reporting regime.  Furthermore, it concludes that 
Goldstein’s attack of the Section 13 reporting regime is unavailing for 
multiple factual and legal reasons. 
III. PROMULGATION OF SECTION 13 AND RULE 13-F 
Congress granted the SEC broad authority to implement the Section 
13 reporting requirements with ample regulatory and public policy 
purposes.  The 1934 Securities Exchange Act was amended in 1975 to 
include subsection (f) to Section 13 of the 1934 Act,27 which “authorizes 
the Commission to require the disclosure of certain institutional 
abandon its plans to regulate hedge funds.  ‘A tremendous amount of time and energy 
and focus was spent by the SEC over the past several years on this issue,’ said Wider. 
Id.; see also Goldstein Application, supra note 12; and, U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Id. 
 26. See McCormack, supra note 22.  Goldstein told BusinessWeek magazine, 
“Where does the government have this authority to make people disclose what basically 
are trade secrets—the source of their earnings power—without paying for it?  Of 
course, no one pays for it and there’s no way to know what it’s worth.”  See also 
Goldstein Application, supra note 12. 
 27. Senate Conference Report of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, to 
accompany S. 249, S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 87 (1975) [hereinafter Conference Report]; see 
also Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended in various sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
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portfolio holdings and transactions.”28  Congress also noted that one of 
the “important purposes of the bill . . . [was] dissemination of the 
institutional disclosure data to the public.”29  Among the primary 
objectives of the amended Section 13 was to empower the SEC to 
“create a central depository of historical and current data about the 
investment activities of institutional investment managers,” with the 
intent to advance the spirit of disclosure in the U.S. securities markets.30  
The SEC was specifically granted “ultimate authority” for 
administration of the institutional disclosure program by the amended 
Section 13.31  Implementation of the amended Section 13 advanced at 
least two significant regulatory and policy objectives: (i) it placed 
responsibility for “gathering, processing, and disseminating the 
institutional disclosure data” with one federal agency, and (ii) it 
dramatically improved the availability of “factual data about large 
investment managers,” for federal and state regulatory agencies, other 
institutional investment managers, and the public.32
Despite Goldstein’s dubious contentions that no valid reasons exist 
for the disclosure regime,33 Congress articulated completely sound bases 
for amending Section 13.  Legislative rationale for promulgation of the 
13(f) reporting regime included reasoned considerations which focused 
on disclosure and transparency of information, the very foundation of 
U.S. securities law.  Specific legislative concerns included the increasing 
trend toward voluntary34 and required disclosures35 by banks and other 
corporate fiduciaries;36 the material increase (in the mid to late 1960s) in 
 28. Id. at 77-78. 
 29. Id. at 87.  It was this Amendment which amended “Section 13 of the Securities 
Exchange Act by adding a new Subsection (f), which would authorize the Commission 
to require the disclosure of certain institutional portfolio holdings and transactions.”  Id. 
at 77-78. 
 30. See Conference Report, supra note 27, at 85 (arguing that it will “permit 
reasoned discussion and decisions about the influence and impact of the large 
institutional investment managers on the securities markets”). 
 31. Id. at 85 (citing § 13(f)(4) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(4) (2002)). 
 32. Id. (arguing that “the lack of such data has prevented and inhibited careful 
consideration by interested persons of the public policy implications”). 
 33. See, e.g., Goldstein Application, supra note 12. 
 34. Id. at 80. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (arguing that the growing trend of voluntary disclosure began in 1971, e.g. 
banks began disclosing details of their larges securities transactions and holding by their 
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the sheer volume of securities held and traded by institutional 
investment managers;37 the absence of any centralized data depository 
regarding institutional portfolio transactions and holdings; and growing 
concern about potential adverse effects “upon the securities markets, the 
trust department); see also id. (stating that the Comptroller of the Currency in 1974 
required disclosure of certain securities transactions and holding by certain national 
banks); see also id. (stating that President Nixon’s Commission on Financial Structure 
and Regulation in 1971 recommended that “all corporate fiduciaries” be required to file 
a report of holdings and other information, with the appropriate regulatory agency).  
The “Hunt Commission” recommended in 1971 that all corporate fiduciaries be 
required to file with the appropriate regulatory agency a report detailing:  (1) the twenty 
largest stock holdings, in terms of market value, unless they do not exceed $10 million; 
(2) all holdings which constitute 5 percent or more of the outstanding shares of a 
corporation registered with the SEC; (3) dollar values with respect to each holding 
broken down into categories reflecting the degree of voting responsibility; (4) 
interlocked officers or directors with portfolio companies where the bank had sole 
voting responsibility; and (5) instances where the bank voted against management.  Id.; 
see also id. (stating that a 1968 congressional report “recommended that bank trust 
departments annually disclose their aggregate holdings of securities and . . . proxy 
voting of those securities of corporations . . . registered with the SEC.”).  In 1968 
the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House Committee on Banking and 
Currency issued its staff’s report on Commercial Banks and Their Trust Activities:  
Emerging Influence on the American Economy (90th Cong., 2d Sess., Comm. Print 
1968), which recommended that bank trust departments annually disclose their 
aggregate holdings of securities and their proxy voting of those securities of 
corporations which were registered with the SEC. Section 12 of the Banking Reform 
Act of 1971.  (H.R. 5700, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)) would have required all 
insured banks to report annually to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation all 
securities held in a fiduciary capacity (aggregated without regard to investment 
responsibilities) and all voting authority, indicating the extent and manner exercised. 
Id. 
 37. See Conference Report, supra note 27, at 77-79 (“The Institutional Investor 
Study also concluded ‘that the course of future developments could not be accurately 
gauged, or reasoned regulatory policies be determined, without a continuing flow of 
such information.’”).  The SEC study concluded that future and historical growth of 
Institutional Investment Managers necessitated continuous timely collection of 
information about equity security markets’ institutional holdings and tradings.  Id.  
Based upon the SEC’s study, it “recommended that the Exchange Act be amended to 
provide it with authority to require reports and disclosure of securities holdings and 
transactions from all types of institutional investment managers.”  Id.  See also id. at 80 
n.3 (citing Report of the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and of the 
Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures of the Senate Committee 
on Government Operations.  Disclosure of Corporate Ownership, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Comm. Print 1973) (arguing that the need for disclosure by institutional investment 
managers of their securities holdings and transactions is the need for the management of 
individual companies to be able to identify the holders of their stock). 
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issuer of the securities, and the interests of individual investors.”38  Mr. 
Goldstein’s position that no legitimate government interests exist for the 
Section 13 disclosure regime simply lacks credibility. 
A. Section 13(f) Benefits Cited in Legislative History 
Congress forecasted that a variety of public uses and benefits would 
result from institutional disclosure and data dissemination.39  Those 
stated benefits included: (i) a “higher degree of [market] confidence;”40 
(ii) companies may have interest in acquiring 13F “data for subsequent 
sale to interested persons;”41 (iii) investors would find 13F holdings 
 
 38. Conference Report, supra note 27, at 77-78 (1975) (There was “no centrally 
located body of data. . . .  S. 249 would amend Section 13 of the Exchange Act by 
adding a new Subsection (f), which would authorize the Commission to require the 
disclosure of certain institutional portfolio holdings and transactions.”). 
 39. Conference Report, supra note 27, at 82-83. 
 40. Id. at 82.  Dissemination of data for public use about institutional investment 
managers may stimulate a higher degree of confidence in the integrity of the securities 
markets: 
Many people believe that it is not possible to make informed investment decisions on 
a security without information related to the likely market activity and the degree of 
institutional concentration in the security.  Institutional concentration may suggest a 
number of things to a variety of investors.  For example, to some it may be a good 
sign because it may suggest that sophisticated investors believe the security is a good 
investment.  To others, it may be a danger sign indicating a potential depressing 
“overhang,” market illiquidity, or high price volatility.  That different investors may 
draw different conclusions from the data is not important; rather, what is important is 
that information about the securities holdings and certain transactions of institutional 
investment managers be available to all investors—both institutional and individual—
so that they can all have it, whatever its relative usefulness in making their 
independent judgments. 
Id. 
 41. See id.  Firms with computer processing capabilities may be interested in 
obtaining institutional disclosure data for subsequent sale: 
Several such firms now offer to their subscribers an analysis of the investment data 
disclosed by registered investment companies and an analysis of the investment data 
disclosed by bank-managed common trust funds.  It is generally understood that many 
persons in the securities and banking industries find those analyses very informative 
and useful.  A number of pension fund managers subscribe to such services for 
assistance in planning their investment return objectives and evaluating the investment 
performances of their investment manager.  Interpretation of the institutional 
disclosure data by private service firms and institutional investment managers would 
tend to sharpen competition among investment managers by providing consumers 
with detailed comparative data about their investment activities.  As levels of 
investment through institutional investment management intermediaries rise, 
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helpful to “track[] institutional investor holdings in their investments;”42 
and (iv) issuers would find “institutional investor holdings useful 
because much of their shareholder list may reflect holdings in ‘street 
name’ rather than beneficial ownership.”43  Congress apparently 
expected these and other benefits from disclosure to be realized by the 
market, issuers, investors, and the general public. 
According to Congress, various benefits were also expected to flow 
to regulatory agencies from 13(f) disclosures, including: (i) data to 
develop standards and protect the public interest;44 (ii) SEC analysis of 
the “characteristics of institutional investment managers,” and “impact 
of institutional investment managers on the securities markets;”45 (iii) 
block trading data to evaluate “market-making and specialist functions, 
and differences in discounts obtainable in various markets;”46 (iv) 
regulatory ability to “identify areas for close attention during 
examinations or inspections by the regulatory agency;”47 and, v) 13F 
data to benchmark “comparisons of one institutional investment 
especially in view of the new pension reform legislation, the need for such 
information becomes increasingly important. 
Id. at 82-83. 
 42. Rulemaking for Edgar System, Exchange Act Release No. 40,934, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 23,640 (Jan. 12, 1999). 
 43. See id. 
 44. Conference Report, supra note 27, at 83. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. at 84 (noting an additional “phenomenon related to a national market system 
in the increasing amount of block trading”).  The Institutional Investor Study Report 
concluded that the combination of block trading with investment management was 
troublesome because of the potential conflict of interest when a block trade assembler 
has accounts over which it exercises investment discretion and which participate in its 
block trades.  Not only direct participants in the block trade, but also other investors 
trading in the same securities in the same and other markets, can be affected by block 
purchases and sales by large institutions. 
Institutional trading also has an impact on brokerage services and on the securities 
industry, and continuing information about equity securities transactions and 
securities holdings could be helpful in analyzing the extent to which institutional 
investment manager business:  (1) is distributed across or concentrated in various 
members of the securities industry; (2) affects commission rates; (3) affects the 
execution, clearance, and settlement functions of firms in the securities industry; (4) 
affects broker-dealer financial responsibility rules; and (5) affects or encourages the 
existence of any reciprocal practices. Many other such uses connected with 
implementation of the central market system may appear when the SEC has gained 
sufficient administrative experience with the institutional disclosure data. 
Id. 
 47. See id. 
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manager with comparable institutional managers such comparisons 
might focus on the relative avoidance or use of specific securities 
markets or any dramatically different choices, in the aggregate, of 
brokers for execution.”48  The SEC has also stated that “information 
required on Form 13F can be of value to the marketplace and investors 
in evaluating the demand for a stock, and assessing the motivations of 
those holding or recommending a stock.”49  Goldstein’s view that no 
legitimate reasons exist for the 13F reporting requirements is less than 
credible in the face of these many stated bases for the disclosure 
framework. 
B. Expanded Form 13F Filing Frequency 
Form 13F disclosures were initially required on an annual basis;50 
but the SEC increased the disclosure frequency51 when it adopted Rule 
 
 48. See id. 
 49. See In re Cabot Money Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37,573, 62 
SEC Docket 1562 (Aug. 15, 1996), available at 
http://sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia1577.txt (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). 
 50. Filing And Reporting Requirements Relating To Institutional Investment 
Managers, Exchange Act Release No. 14,852, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,700 (June 22, 1978) 
[hereinafter Final Rule 1978] (amending Parts 240 and 249 of Title 17 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations by adding §§ 240.13f-1 and 249.325).  The summary of Release 
No. 14,852 is as follows: 
The Commission announces the adoption of a rule and form governing the reporting 
requirements of institutional investment managers exercising investment discretion 
over accounts having in the aggregate more than $100,000,000 in exchange-traded or 
NASDAQ [n.a1] quoted equity securities. Under the rule, as adopted, such managers 
are required to file a report within 45 days after the end of each calendar year, 
identifying those securities, the aggregate amounts thereof held, the nature of such 
investment discretion and any voting authority. The rule and form will implement the 
institutional investment disclosure program as mandated by Congress and establish 
the Commission as the central repository for data concerning the influence and impact 
of institutional investment managers on the securities markets.  The Commission is 
also soliciting comments concerning the usefulness and burdens associated with 
quarterly reporting. 
Id. at *1. 
 51. See id.  The SEC announced: 
the amendment of Securities Exchange Act Rule 13f-1 [17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1] and 
related Form 13F [17 C.F.R. § 249.325], pursuant to Section 13(f) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. §§ 78a as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-29 (June 4, 
1975)] (the ‘Exchange Act’).  The amendment to the Rule and Form adopted today 
requires that institutional investment managers, subject to the reporting requirements 
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13-f and Form 13F in 197852 and required quarterly reporting.53  During 
the relevant rule making period, the SEC also considered potential 
ramifications on market competition which might arise from more 
frequent 13(f) disclosures, and noted that “requiring the filing of Form 
13F on a quarterly basis will not significantly burden competition.”54  
House Representative John Dingell wrote in 1998 that this 
under the Rule, file a report on a quarterly basis rather than annually as originally 
adopted on June 15, 1978, and announced in Exchange Act Release No. 14852 [43 FR 
26700].  Id.; see also Final Rule 1979, supra note 19.  The Final Rule provides: 
1. 17 C.F.R. Part 240 is amended by revising paragraph (a) of § 240.13f-1 to read 
as follows: 
§ 240.13f-1 Reporting by institutional investment managers of information with 
respect to accounts over which they exercise investment discretion. 
(a) Every institutional investment manager which exercises investment 
discretion with respect to accounts holding section 13(f) securities, as 
defined in paragraph (c) of this section, having an aggregate fair market 
value on the last trading day of any month of any calendar year of at least 
$100,000,000 shall file a report on Form 13F [§ 249.325 of this Chapter] 
with the Commission within 45 days after the last day of such calendar year 
and within 45 days after the last day of each of the first three calendar 
quarters of the subsequent calendar year. 
On February 5, 1979 the SEC amended the rules to require annual filing to be filed to 
quarterly.  See also Final Rule 1979, supra note 19 (“The amendments to Rule 13f-1 
and Form 13F require an institutional investment manager subject to the reporting 
requirements for a particular calendar year to file Form 13F within 45 days after the last 
day of such calendar year and within 45 days after the last day of each of the first three 
calendar quarters in the subsequent calendar year.”); see also id.  The SEC, pursuant to 
its authority set forth in Sections 13(f) and 23 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78m(f) and 78w] adopted amendments to Rule 13f-1 and Form 13F and amended 17 
C.F.R. § 240 which revised paragraph (a) of Section 240.13f-1. 
Id. 
 52. See Final Rule 1978, supra note 50.  The Rule, as adopted on June 15, 1978, 
required: 
[A]n institutional investment manager exercising investment discretion (as defined in 
section 3(a)(35) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78(c)(a)(35)]) with respect to 
accounts having more than $100,000,000 or more in exchange-traded or NASDAQ-
quoted equity securities on the last trading day of any of the twelve months of a 
calendar year must file annually with the Commission, and, if a bank, with the 
appropriate banking agency, within 45 days after the last day of such calendar year, 
five copies of Form 13F. The form requires the reporting of the name of the issuer, 
and the title, class, CUSIP number, number of shares or principal amount in the case 
of convertible debt, and aggregate fair market value of each such equity security held. 
The form also requires information concerning the nature of investment discretion and 
voting authority possessed. 
Id. at 2; see also Final Rule 1979, supra note 19. 
 53. Final Rule 1979, supra note 19. 
 54. Id. 
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“information . . . does not reveal much about the trading activities of 
hedge funds or the ways in which they raise capital or their risk 
profiles.”55  A determined investment adviser can overcome any 
perceived “burden” in most instances by employing sophisticated 
derivative hedging techniques to create or enhance portfolio opacity, and 
circumvent Section 13(f), because, “holdings of other options and 
derivatives need not be disclosed in one’s 13(f) filings.  As a result, 
hedge funds can use derivatives to accumulate large economic positions 
in portfolio companies without disclosure unless they become subject to 
the disclosure requirements under Section 13(d).”56
The SEC determined that any potential competitive burdens for 13F 
filers were necessary and appropriate in order to achieve proper 
legislative objectives, and would be outweighed by the benefits of an 
informed marketplace.57  The SEC perceived no “significant obstacle” 
or “undue hardship” from the regulatory regime and concluded that the 
quarterly filings requirement was a matter of public interest in 
furtherance of the protection of investors.58  At a minimum, increased 
13F filing frequency appears to be rationally related to legitimate 
government interests and the requirements should certainly pass 
“rational basis” muster. 
During the proposal period to increase the frequency of 13(f) 
disclosure intervals from annually to quarterly, the SEC received several 
comments which “argu[ed] in favor of quarterly rather than annual 
reporting.”59  The SEC also noted that numerous comments were 
received which expressed interest in receipt of quarterly 13(f) data,60 and 
 55. Letter from Rep. John D. Dingell to Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (Sept. 25, 
1998), available at http://www.house.gov/commerce_democrats/comdem/press/105ltr 
88.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 56. Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance 
and Corporate Control, 31 U. Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 06-16 
(2006), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ile/CorpRT0406/06%200721%20Kahan 
%20and%20Rock%20SSRN.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
 57. Final Rule 1979, supra note 19, at 12. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Final Rule 1978, supra note 50.  However, “most favored reporting annually 
rather than quarterly.”  Id.  See also id. (“Virtually all the responses to the 
Commission’s request . . . for public views on the frequency of reports were in favor of 
annual rather than quarterly reporting.”). 
 60. See Final Rule 1979, supra note 19, at 2 (“[T]he Commission solicited 
comment on the usefulness and practicality of quarterly reporting.  The Commission 
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if quarterly reporting was not implemented, the data representing those 
periods “might be lost altogether thereby creating gaps in the continuous 
flow of information which may be utilized for future policy decisions.”61  
The SEC also received numerous 13(f)-related comments in 2004, when 
it adopted final rules regarding “Shareholder Reports and Quarterly 
Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment 
Companies.”62  As part of that proposed rule, the SEC again63 requested 
received 124 letters of comment during the comment period which expired on August 
31, 1978.”).  The general scope of comments related to the usefulness of information 
and the attendant costs: 
Many commentators felt quarterly information on the holders of common stock would 
be invaluable to a trading desk involved in block transactions and would facilitate the 
function of block trading and enhance the liquidity of the marketplace.  A number of 
commentators pointed out that quarterly reporting would provide a greater basis for 
comparison shopping among investment managers.  Such commentators emphasized 
that an evaluation of the investment philosophy and policies of a prospective manager 
is crucial in making an effective comparison and that such an evaluation is dependent 
upon a periodic examination of a manager’s investment decisions as reflected by his 
holdings and transactions.  Both corporations and financial reporting services asserted 
that quarterly reporting is needed to provide corporate treasurers with current 
information concerning institutions owning their own stock.  They pointed out that 
many stockholders take ownership in nominee or street name, making it difficult to 
trace such information and making it difficult to secure proxies on important corporate 
matters. 
The comments in opposition to the usefulness of quarterly reporting took issue with 
the assertions that more frequent reports would be of utility to block traders or 
enhance market liquidity.  Commentators opposed to quarterly reporting also disputed 
the usefulness of the reports as providing a basis for comparison among different 
investment managers.  In addition, opponents to quarterly reporting believed that 
information about stock ownership was either currently available or more properly 
required under the beneficial ownership reporting requirements. 
Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered 
Management Investment Companies, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 239, 249, 270, 277 (2004) 
[hereinafter Final Rule Shareholder Reports], available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8393.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).  In the 2004 request for comments, the SEC 
announced the following: 
We have also determined not to modify the reporting requirements for Form 13F, and 
stated that “concerns about predatory trading practices arising from Form 13F have 
surfaced recently in the context of the current proposal.”  Commentators have not 
presented concrete evidence that quarterly disclosure of aggregate holdings by 
institutional investment managers on Form 13F has resulted in such trading practices. 
Id. 
 63. Final Rule 1978, supra note 50, at 11;  see also Final Rule Shareholder 
Reports, supra note 62. 
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“comment[s] generally on whether more frequent portfolio holdings 
disclosure should be required. . . .”64  There can be little debate that 
great public interest has been expressed in the disclosed data and its 
related benefits. 
C.  Broker-Dealer Section 13(f) Disclosure Required 
Broker-dealers are not exempt65 from Form 13F disclosure 
requirements if they exercise investment discretion66 over aggregated 
Section 13(f) securities holdings worth at least $100 million,67 even 
 64. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release Nos. 8,164 and 47,023, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 25,870, 68 Fed. Reg. 160, 167 (Jan. 2, 2003).  
The SEC’s proposed rule: 
[N]ote[d] that currently, fund managers and other institutional investment managers 
exercising investment discretion over $100 million or more in certain equity securities 
must disclose information about portfolios that they manage on Form 13F within 45 
days of the end of each quarter.  Reports on Form 13F disclose a fund manager’s 
aggregate holdings in each security required to be reported; the holdings of each 
individual mutual fund or other account over which an investment manager has 
discretion are not broken out separately. 
Id.  The SEC also requested comment on the following: 
If we extended the time period for filing Form 13F to, for example, 60 days, would 
there continue to be a need for institutional investment managers to be able to request 
confidential treatment of filings on Form 13F on the basis of a manager’s ongoing 
investment strategy?  Are there other changes that should be made to Form 13F, such 
as, for example, modifying the $100 million filing threshold? 
Id. at 168. 
 65. SEC Division of Investment Management: FAQ About Form 13F (May 2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm (“Broker-dealers 
(including those that do not manage advisory accounts, but that trade their own account 
and/or act as a market maker) are required to file.  Broker-dealers are not exempt from 
filing Form 13F.”). 
 66. See id.  The definition of what constitutes ‘investment discretion’ is: 
A person exercises “investment discretion” with respect to an account if, directly or 
indirectly, such person (A) is authorized to determine what securities or other property 
shall be purchased or sold by or for the account, (B) makes decisions as to what 
securities or other property shall be purchased or sold by or for the account even 
though some other person may have responsibility for such investment decisions, or 
(C) otherwise exercises such influence with respect to the purchase and sale of 
securities or other property by or for the account as the Commission, by rule, 
determines, in the public interest or for the protection of investors, should be subject 
to the operation of the provisions of this chapter and the rules and regulations 
thereunder. 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(35) (2006). 
 67. Id. (“Section 13(f) securities are equity securities of a class described in Section 
13(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act.”).  See also SEC, List of Section 13F 
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though broker-dealers are technically excluded from the definition of 
“investment adviser” in Section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”).68  Broker-dealers who manage 
advisory accounts, trade proprietary accounts, execute block trades,69 or 
Securities, 3rd Quarter, FY 2006, Sept. 15, 2006, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13f/13flist2006q3.pdf (providing a list of 
13(f) securities). 
 68. Division of Investment Management: Frequently Asked Questions About Form 
13F, May 2005, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2005).  Defining an institutional investment manager as 
an entity that either invests in, or buys and sells, securities for its own account. For 
example, banks, insurance companies, and broker/dealers are institutional investment 
managers. So are corporations and pension funds that manage their own investment 
portfolios. 
An institutional investment manager is also a natural person or an entity that exercises 
investment discretion over the account of any other natural person or entity. For 
example, an investment adviser that manages private accounts, mutual fund assets, or 
pension plan assets is an institutional investment manager. So is the trust department 
of a bank. 
A trustee is an institutional investment manager, but a natural person who exercises 
investment discretion over his or her own account is not an institutional investment 
manager. 
Id.; see also NASD Frequently Asked Question – Institutional Holdings, available at 
http://holdings.nasdaq.com/asp/help/FAQ.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2006). 
 69. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act 
Release No. 40,760, 68 SEC Docket 2045, *11 (Dec. 8, 1998).  Block trading desks do 
not use established, non-discretionary methods of handling orders because: 
Block trading desks generally retain some discretion in determining how to execute a 
customer’s order, and frequently commit capital to satisfy their customers’ needs.  For 
example, a block positioner may “shop” the order around in an attempt to find a 
contra-side interest with another investor.  In some cases, the block positioner may 
take the other side of the order, keeping the block as a proprietary position.  While 
block trading desks do cross customers’ orders, these crosses are not done according 
to fixed non-discretionary methods, but instead are based on the block trading desks’ 
ability to find a contra-side to the order.  It may cross two customer orders, or it may 
assemble a block of several customer orders with completion dependent on its 
willingness to take a proprietary position for part of the block.  Execution prices, size 
of the proprietary position and agency compensation may all be part of a single 
negotiated deal. 
Id.; see also Edward F. Greene & Michael F. Rinzler, Third-Party Web Sites Offering 
Financial Instruments, in Current SEC and Cross-Border M&A Developments 284-85 
(Practicing Law Institute) 2000.  Further information on in-house block trading: 
In order to accommodate investors’ desires to make block trades, a number of 
registered broker-dealers maintain block trading departments.  Typically, block trades 
are privately negotiated transactions and are not auctioned on the exchange floor.  
Results of a privately negotiated block trade are made public after the consummation 
of the transaction.  The terms of the trade—number of securities traded and price per 
2007 HOGGING THE HEDGE? 1099 
 “BULLDOG’S” 13F THEORY MAY NOT BE SO LUCKY 
 
even those who act as market makers, are all generally considered 
institutional investment managers for Section 13 purposes70 and are 
required to file Form 13F quarterly.71
According to Congress, “[t]he SEC has the authority and 
responsibility to assure compliance by all broker-dealers with the legal 
requirements of the Exchange Act and of the rules which the SEC is 
authorized to promulgate under the Exchange Act.”72  Legislative 
history indicates that “institutional trading also has an impact on 
brokerage services and on the securities industry.”73  It is reasonable to 
conclude that the Section 13(f) securities disclosures are a necessary and 
appropriate measure used by the SEC to foster a safer and more 
informed securities market. 
share—are brought to the exchange floor to appear on the tape and to comply with 
Exchange Rule 394, which prohibits exchange members from engaging in off-board 
trading in shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Id.; see also Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 Duke L.J. 960, 987 n.136 (1985) (citing J. 
Cohen, E. Zinbarg and A. Zeikel, Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management, 88-
95 (4th ed., Irwin 1982) (1973)).
 70. See SEC Division of Investment Management: FAQ About Form 13F (May 
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm.  For purposes 
of securities exchanges’ reports: 
[T]he term “institutional investment manager” includes any person, other than a natural 
person, investing in or buying and selling securities for its own account, and any person 
exercising investment discretion with respect to the account of any other person. 
15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(5)(A) (2006).  The term “person” means a natural person, company, 
government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government.  15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (2006). 
 71. SEC Division of Investment Management: FAQ About Form 13F (May 2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm (last visited May 26, 
2007).  See also supra note 14. 
 72. Conference Report, supra note 27, at 22-23. 
 73. Id. at 84.  The committee noted: 
[C]ontinuing information about equity securities transactions and securities holdings 
could be helpful in analyzing the extent to which institutional investment manager 
business: (1) is distributed across or concentrated in various members of the securities 
industry; (2) affects commission rates; (3) affects the execution, clearance, and 
settlement functions of firms in the securities industry; (4) affects broker-dealer 
financial responsibility rules; and (5) affects or encourages the existence of any 
reciprocal practices.  Many other such uses connected with implementation of the 
central market system may appear when the SEC has gained sufficient administrative 
experience with the institutional disclosure data. 
Id. 
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1. Broker-Dealer Benefit or Detriment—Block Trading Disclosure 
Required 
Block trading74 currently represents more than half of all NYSE 
trading.75  Commentators have noted “quarterly data would provide 
information to brokers and institutional trading desks to facilitate the 
function of block trading and enhance the liquidity of the 
marketplace.”76  Disclosure of block trades pose a potential detriment to 
holders of those securities, at least to the extent that “[p]remature 
disclosure of a block position could cause harm (e.g., competitors could 
trade against the position and impede the block positioner’s ability to 
liquidate unobtrusively and without loss).”77  Nonetheless, this large 
segment of trading activity falls squarely within the Section 13 
disclosure framework. 
Congress and the SEC were apparently not persuaded that broker-
dealers deserved extra protection from potential competitive losses due 
to disclosure of large concentrated equity positions.  Legislative history 
 
 74. “A Block trade is a trade of 10,000 shares or greater.”  Nasdaq Monthly Market 
Activity Reports Definitions & Data Fields, available at  
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader/defincludes/MktActdef.stm (last visited Dec. 2, 
2006).  According to the NASD, a block trade is “a purchase or sale of a large quantity 
of stock, generally 10,000 shares or more.”  NASD Glossary of Terms, available at 
http://www.nasd.com/Resources/Glossary/NASDW_010868 (last visited Dec. 2, 2006). 
 75. Joel Seligman, Symposium on the Regulation of Capital Markets, Another 
Unspecial Study: The SEC’s Market 2000 Report and Competitive Developments in the 
United States Capital Markets., Feb. 1995, BUS. LAWYER, at 514. 
 76. Final Rule 1978, supra note 50. 
The Commission announces the adoption of a rule and form governing the reporting 
requirements of institutional investment managers exercising investment discretion 
over accounts having in the aggregate more than $100,000,000 in exchange-traded or 
NASDAQ [n.a1] quoted equity securities. Under the rule, as adopted, such managers 
are required to file a report within 45 days after the end of each calendar year, 
identifying those securities, the aggregate amounts thereof held, the nature of such 
investment discretion and any voting authority.  The rule and form will implement the 
institutional investment disclosure program as mandated by Congress and establish 
the Commission as the central repository for data concerning the influence and impact 
of institutional investment managers on the securities markets.  The Commission is 
also soliciting comments concerning the usefulness and burdens associated with 
quarterly reporting. 
Id. at 1. 
 77. Requests for Confidential Treatment Filed by Institutional Investment 
Managers, 17 C.F.R. Part 249, Release No. 34-22038, 1985 SEC LEXIS 1549, May 14, 
1985, at 12-13 (“Adoption of amendments to instructions to form.”) [hereinafter 
Requests for Confidential Treatment]. 
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suggests that Congress and the SEC were concerned about block trading 
activity and concluded that disclosure of information would be 
beneficial.  The Institutional Investor Study Report,78 conducted by the 
SEC and authorized by Congress79 concluded that “the combination of 
block trading with investment management was troublesome because of 
the potential conflict of interest when a block trade assembler has 
accounts over which it exercises investment discretion and which 
participate in its block trades.”80
Not only direct participants in the block trade, but also other 
investors trading in the same securities in the same and other 
markets, can be affected by block purchases and sales by large 
institutions.  Continuing information about large trades could be 
useful in analyzing, for example, market-making and specialist 
functions, and differences in discounts obtainable in various 
markets.81
2. Potential “Free Riders” and “Front-Runners” 
Some commentators have argued that the Section 13(f) reporting is 
ultimately more harmful than beneficial.  Fidelity Investments noted that 
frequent disclosure of an investment advisor’s account holdings gives an 
advantage to non-client investors, and would enable others to “discern” 
the advisor’s trading techniques and investments—”something the 
advisor naturally does not want revealed to other advisors.”82  Fidelity 
also suggested that: 
[T]o assess empirically the costs of front-running, the Commission 
take advantage of expertise in its staff who supervise the activities of 
broker-dealers in the secondary markets. It is undisputed that 
holdings information has value to traders - they would not pay to 
 
 78. The Institutional Investor Study Report (H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
1971).  This Study was “directed and staffed largely by professional economists drawn 
from outside the SEC staff.”  Id.  See Conference Report supra note 27, at 78. 
 79. Conference Report, supra note 27, at 78. 
 80. Id. at 84. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Letter from Eric D. Roiter, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Fidelity 
Investments, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Feb. 27, 2003), available at 
http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s75102/edroiter1.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
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have access to 13F information if it did not - although there is debate 
as to how much less valuable that information becomes with a long 
time lag.83
Fidelity also recognized that information garnered from Form 13F 
filings can help investors to better understand a fund and make informed 
investment decisions, and that brokers acting on behalf of their clients, 
make practical use of holdings disclosures.84  Fidelity further lobbied to 
enlarge the 13F reporting period time lag from forty-five to sixty days, 
because in Fidelity’s view the current time lag permits others “who wish 
to trade on such information to their own benefit and to the detriment of 
[Fidelity] fund shareholders.”85  The current disclosure regime, 
according to Fidelity, “facilitate[s] free-riding and front-running 
behavior,”86 which is ironically the same conduct Goldstein was accused 
of in a November 2006 civil action.87  Goldstein has unapologetically 
admitted that if information is available in the public domain, he intends 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (“The saying ‘put enough snapshots together and you have a movie’ 
expresses the risk involved in frequent disclosure, even with a time lag, as well as the 
benefit of such disclosure to those who want to fully understand a fund’s trading 
techniques.”). 
 86. Id.; see also David Edwards, Reverse Engineer Your Mutual Fund, 
THESTREET.COM, May 6, 2002, available at http://www.thestreet.com/funds/ 
mutualfundmondaydedwards/10020715.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2006) (“Generally, 
portfolio managers like to reveal as little about their strategies as possible to avoid Wall 
Street from ‘front running’ (taking positions in advance of a big order) their trades and 
to limit ‘free riding’ (one stock picker blindly copying another’s trades).”).
 87. Complaint at 7; RMR Hospitality & Real Estate Fund v. Bulldog Investors 
Gen. P’ship et al., Nov. 13, 2006, Ex-99.1, attached to RMR 8k, available at  
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1278038/000110465906076852/a06-
23938_4ex99d1.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2006). 
Before the Defendants Bulldog Investors General Partnership, Opportunity Fund, Full 
Value Fund and Opportunity Plus Fund (the ‘Goldstein Managed Funds’) make a 
significant investment in a Bulldog target such as RHR, Defendant Goldstein often 
personally purchases shares in the target companies. Then, as the Goldstein Managed 
Funds purchase large quantities of additional shares in those same target companies, 
the share prices of the target companies increase. By regularly engaging in these so 
called ‘front running’ activities, Defendant Goldstein is able to personally profit from 
his personal share purchases without regard to whether the Goldstein Managed Funds 
and their investors are able to profit. This practice is evidence of the unethical and 
inequitable conduct associated with the activities of Defendant Goldstein and his 
Bulldog business. 
Id. 
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to use it to gain whatever advantage possible, and claimed throughout 
the Goldstein Application that 13F data has become a cottage industry 
for stealing investment ideas.88
Possible by-products of 13F disclosures can include a price increase 
of disclosed stocks.  For example, shares of Black & Decker Corp. rose 
6 percent following a November 15, 2006 13F filing by activist hedge 
fund manger Bill Ackman of Pershing Square Capital, which disclosed 
that it owned 1.3 million shares of the power tool manufacturer.89  
Warren Buffet also commented in a 1984 Berkshire-Hathaway 
shareholder letter that revealing acquisition activity while in progress 
might result in a higher cost basis for that position.90  The available 
 88. See McCormack, supra note 22: 
There are services that say something like, why pay Carl Icahn or Warren Buffet their 
fees—why not just take their ideas and steal them and use them for yourself?  To me, 
it’s the same as somebody illegally downloading something from the Internet.  I 
admit, I do it myself.  I want to know what Carl Icahn is buying.  And if he has to file, 
I’m going to look. 
But I don’t think I have a right to demand that he tell me. Where does the government 
have this authority to make people disclose what basically are trade secrets—the 
source of their earnings power—without paying for it?  Of course, no one pays for it 
and there’s no way to know what it’s worth. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Ira Carnahan, Bet With the Pros, FORBES, May 13, 2002, 
available at 2002 WLNR 9085942: 
Institutions spend $50 billion a year selecting stocks.  Here’s how to tap their 
knowledge for free.  And you don’t have to limit your copying to funds available to 
the public.  Anyone hired to manage $100 million or more of stocks—and that 
includes hedge-fund operators—must file a 13F report on his holdings with the 
Securities & Exchange Commission within 45 days of the end of each quarter. 
Example: The 13F of hedgie Jeffrey Vinik, the famed ex-Magellan Fund manager, 
shows that as of Dec. 31, 2001 he was partial to housing stocks, including Clayton 
Homes and Champion Enterprises. 
You can check 13Fs on the Edgar service at [http://www.]sec.gov.  If you 
don’t want to mimic just one fund, you can check all institutions’ holdings of 
a stock by entering its symbol at [http://www.]multexinvestor.com.  The 
thing to look for is not a large percentage of ownership by institutions but a 
recent increase.  Stocks that institutions load up on outperform those they 
dump by 5% over the following year. 
Id.
 89. See Black & Decker (BDK) Jumps as Activist Investor Bill Ackman Discloses 
Stake, STREETINSIDER.COM, Nov. 15, 2006, available at http://www.streetinsider.com/ 
Insider+Trades/Black+&+Decker+(BDK)+Jumps+As+Activist+Investor+Bill+Ackman
+Discloses+Stake/1356623.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2006). 
 90. See, e.g., Chairman Warren Buffet, 1984 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway 
Shareholders, available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1984.html (last 
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confidential treatment application relief and the Section 13 reporting 
time lag mitigate risks related to “free riders” who might attempt to 
replicate a market participant’s securities acquisitions (or dispositions). 
IV. PUBLIC USES AND BENEFITS OF FORM 13F DATA 
As was expressly intended by Congress, data culled from 13F 
filings has become a significant facet of the “total mix” of information 
available to market participants, regulatory agencies, and the public in 
general.  A great deal of statistical analysis and market data 
interpretation might not have been otherwise possible absent the Section 
13(f) reporting regime. A wide variety of other entirely proper public 
uses of 13F data, many of which are discussed herein, would also have 
not been available to the securities market without the Section 13 
reporting requirements.  Nonetheless, the Goldstein Application 
incredulously insisted that the only reason for public disclosure is to 
facilitate “free riders,” who allegedly steal investment ideas. 
A. Data Service Providers and Form 13F Information Utility 
Market participants apparently do make investment interpretations 
based upon data gleaned from 13F filings.  In fact, an entire cottage 
industry of subscription data services exists and depends heavily upon 
the reporting requirements to assemble statistics used by sophisticated 
market professionals.  Thomson Financial, Inc. is among those 13F data 
providers, and investment industry professionals with information tools, 
data, and analysis through its “ShareWatch™” and “BondWatch™” data 
services,91 and derives holding statistics for its data services directly 
 
visited Dec. 20, 2006): 
If we decide to change our position, we will not inform shareholders until long after 
the change has been completed. (We may be buying or selling as you read this.) The 
buying and selling of securities is a competitive business, and even a modest amount 
of added competition on either side can cost us a great deal of money. 
Id. 
 91. See Response of the Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Investment 
Management, July 10, 2002, IM Ref.  No. 2002791136, Thomson Financial Inc., File 
No. 132-3, available at http://sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/thomson071002. 
htm#P18_1154 (last visited Dec. 2, 2006). 
ShareWatch is a comprehensive password-protected, web-based tool designed to help 
institutional broker-dealers target the buyers, owners and sellers of equity securities, 
for whom the broker-dealers seek to execute securities transactions.  Subscribers use 
this service to identify new business opportunities based on current holdings, and to 
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from 13F filings.92  Thomson’s services are marketed to “help broker-
dealers identify and communicate directly with buyers, owners, and 
sellers of securities for whom the broker-dealers seek to execute 
securities transactions.”93  Thomson’s data services are also for the 
“exclusive” use of; (i) the institutional sales and trading desks of 
registered broker-dealers to streamline their communication with 
institutional investors for brokerage services, and (ii) a small number of 
fund managers who use Thomson’s services to monitor the portfolio 
holdings of competing funds with similar investment strategies.94  The 
13F data provided by Thomson has become an integrated part of the 
“efficient market.” 
Various other services offer data interpretation for market 
participants based in part upon 13F information.  Wm. Smith & Co., is a 
registered broker-dealer and investment research firm that “provid[es] 
fundamental research . . . exclusively to institutional clients,” which 
utilizes “four catalysts” to develop its “stock ideas.”95  Two of the four 
data sources (“catalysts”) utilized by Wm. Smith & Co. are 13D and 13F 
filings.  TheStreet.com operates a subscription-based data service called 
Lionshares.com that utilizes institutional securities ownership.96  
communicate directly with customers and potential customers through Thomson 
Financial’s global network.  In this way, ShareWatch helps the institutional brokerage 
community structure communications with customers and prospects, as well as match 
research and investment ideas with the needs of professional money managers. 
Id. (requesting the SEC’s assurance that it “would not recommend enforcement action 
to the Commission under Section 203(a) of the Investment Advisers against certain 
unregistered investment advisers if they provide biographical and contact information 
about themselves to Thomson Financial Inc. (‘Thomson’) for inclusion in password-
protected Internet websites that Thomson maintains.”). 
 92. See id. 
As for the service’s content, the equity holdings information contained in the 
ShareWatch database is drawn from 13F and 5% beneficial ownership filings in the 
U.S., UK share register data, Asia/Pacific fund reports and other global portfolio and 
declarable stakes data. 
Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Wm. Smith & Co., available at http://www.hystead.com/design/WMSmith/ 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2006). 
 96. See TheStreet.com to Offer Institutional Ownership Data, 5 FIN. NET NEWS 32, 
Aug. 7, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 3905578: 
TheStreet.com has signed a deal with Lionshares.com, a New York-based 
provider of institutional securities ownership data.  TheStreet.com will 
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Lionshares.com’s information is “gathered from 13(f) filings.”97  And 
according to AMG Data Services (“AMG”) correspondence with the 
SEC, it employs information culled from registered investment 
companies (including 13F data) and EDGAR filings in a relational 
database that seeks to “calculate investor demand.”98  The insights that 
can be gleaned from 13F data, whether individualized or analyzed in the 
provide users of its free site with a smattering of data, but will reserve full 
use of Lionshares.com’s data base to users of its new site, 
TheStreetPros.com, which was launched last week.  The new Web site is 
designed to be a tool for financial professionals and active traders, said David 
Reilly, editor. Reilly said TheStreet.com chose Lionshares.com because it 
offered a cost advantage over competitors’ offerings. Other companies offer 
comparable tools to institutions via bulk subscriptions, which may cost from 
$50-80 per month per user, said an industry insider.  TheStreet.com pays 
significantly less, Reilly said, declining to be more specific.  TheStreet.com 
pays Lionshares.com a flat fee per subscriber to TheStreetPros.com. 
Currently, Lionshares.com, which offers retail and professional variants of its tools, 
provides data to clients including National Discount Brokers Group and E*Trade 
Securities.  NDB licenses the institutional caliber tool for its professional clients, 
whereas E*Trade offers the service to its retail clients through the password-protected 
area of its site.
The information Lionshares provides is gathered from 13[F] filings, which are 
required to be turned in quarterly to the Securities and Exchange Commission by all 
institutions that manage more than $100 million in equities.  Lionshares.com also 
offers the service directly to retail investors through its Web site 
(www.lionshares.com). 
Id.
 97. Id. 
 98. See Comment Letter, AMG Data Services, Feb. 14, 2003, Re: File No. S7-51-
02 Proposed Rule: Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Disclosure of Registered 
Management Investment Companies, EN 9, available at http://sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s75102/rladler1.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) [hereinafter AMG Comment 
Letter]; see also, Lone Pine Capital 13Fs, available at http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-
edgar?company=lone+pine&CIK=&filenum=&State=&SIC=&owner=include&action=
getcompany (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (revealing the manner in which AMG utilized 
13F data). 
AMG maintains a relational database of security holdings in 13F and open-end 
company semiannual filings required on EDGAR Reports describe historical activity 
in an individual security, a ranking of fund activity in that security and the nature of 
that activity, and a positioning of activity in that security relative to other portfolios 
holding that security and others with a common investment style.  Debt securities and 
non-domestic equities---sectors not disclosed in the 13F dataset--- can also be queried. 
Similar report types can be generated from the 13F dataset. Each security is identified 
and assigned industry, country, and currency codes, and can be related to other 
securities to build semiannual open-end and quarterly investment management 
portfolio datasets managed passively, actively, or created ad hoc. 
Id. 
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aggregate, ultimately provides greater market transparency, which is the 
touchstone of the U.S. approach to securities market regulation. 
AMG’s 2003 comment letter provided a detailed list of its “best 
customers” for Form 13F data that conspicuously included a number of 
investment managers.99  For example, among AMG’s clients is 
Forstmann-Leff, a 13F filer and boutique investment management firm 
serving high net-worth clients.100  Other AMG clients (who also file 
13Fs) include the Leuthold Group, “a division of Weeden & Co., LP, a 
Greenwich, Connecticut based institutional broker-dealer,”101 and the 
Greenwich-based hedge fund, Lone Pine Capital.102  AMG asserted that 
quarterly 13F filings increase transparency of portfolio activity and 
“empower[s] investors to make better informed decisions [and 
p]roviding responsible oversight of this kind will go far to protect 
investors and maintain the integrity of the securities markets.”103  While 
Goldstein contends that no plausible legitimate uses exist for Form 13F 
 99. See id. at n.9. 
Clients: Bank of America Securities; Barclays; BBV Latinvest Securities; Bear 
Stearns & Co.; Cantor Fitzgerald; Capital Growth Management; CIBC World 
Markets; Credit Suisse First Boston; Daiwa Securities; Deutschebank; Dresdner 
Kleinwort Wasserstein; Fidelity Management & Research; Forstmann-Leff; Goldman 
Sachs & Co.; Joint Library-International Monetary Fund/World Bank; J&W 
Seligman; JP Morgan Chase; Kingdon Capital; Lehman Brothers; Leuthold Group; 
Lone Pine Capital; Merrill Lynch; Moore Capital Management; Morgan Stanley; 
Prudential Securities; Salomon Smith Barney; Santander; Thomas Weisel Partners; 
Tiger Management; Toronto Dominion; UBS Warburg; Vinik Asset Management; 
Wachovia Securities; and Waddell & Reed. 
Id. 
 100. See AMG Comment Letter, supra note 98; see also Forstmann-Leff 13F-HR, 
available at 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/917297/000126967806000090/0001269678-06-
000090-index.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2006); see also Forstmann-Leff, available at 
http://www.forstmannleff.com/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (stating that Forstmann-Leff 
is “[a] boutiques investment management firm specializing in alpha-generating small, 
mid and large capitalization equity investment strategies.  Assets under management 
total over $2 billion.  Our clients include corporate & public pension plans, 
endowments, foundations, Taft-Hartley funds and high net worth individuals”). 
 101. AMG Comment Letter, supra note 98; see also Leuthold Group, available at 
http://www.leutholdgroup.com/about.cfm (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
 102. See Lone Pine Capital’s 13F filings, available at http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-
edgar?company=lone+pine&CIK=&filenum=&State=&SIC=&owner=include&action=
getcompany (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
 103. Id. 
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data, the information has without question become a component of the 
efficient market, as was the stated intent of Congress when it 
promulgated the reporting regime.104
B. Analytical Studies and Antitrust Actions 
The Goldstein Application contended that “all evidence indicates 
that 13F filings are used by the public for only one reason: to obtain, 
without compensation, the trade secrets of successful filers.”105  Despite 
the blustery rhetoric, Form 13F data quite clearly has an array of 
legitimate uses.  For example, a variety of academic studies have 
employed empirical 13F data: one such study analyzed the relationship 
between default probability106 and stock returns107 based in no small part 
on 13F disclosures; another analyzed 13F data to interpret insurance 
mutual fund performance;108 and a recent study evaluated merger-related 
 
 104. See Goldstein Application, supra note 12; Conference Report, supra note 27. 
 105. See Goldstein Application, supra note 12 (emphasis added). 
 106. Lorenzo Garlappi et al., Default Risk, Shareholder Advantage, and Stock 
Returns (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/finance/GSY-2005-09-
22.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (“Default risk is usually defined as the possibility 
that a company will not be able to meet its financial obligations in the future.”). 
 107. See id. at Abstract. 
Finally, because recent studies have found that institutional ownership of a stock can 
affect its market price efficiency (see, e.g., Gompers and Metrick (2001)), we examine 
the effect of institutional holdings in a stock on the relationship between default risk 
and stock returns. We obtain institutional holdings data from Thomson Financial’s 
13[F] database.  Since institutional holding data are reported on a quarterly basis, we 
form portfolios every quarter, and examine the average monthly returns during the 
next three-month period.). 
Id. at 26. 
 108. See Zuanjuan Chen et al., Prudent Man or Agency Problem? On the 
Performance of Insurance Mutual Funds Abstract, Univ. of Rhode Island, College of 
Business Administration, William A. Ome Working Paper, No. 2, 2005/2006, available 
at http://207.36.165.114/Denver/Papers/Inst.%20Ownership%20and%20Bid-Ask%20 
Spread.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006): 
Identifying Insurance Mutual Funds - The CDA dataset provides names of mutual 
fund management companies. Using a link provided by Thomson Financial, we 
identify those fund management companies in the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum 
13F Institutional Holding data (the ‘13F data’). In the 13F data fund management 
firms are further classified into the following categories based on their ultimate 
ownership: (1) banks, (2) insurance companies, (3) investment companies and their 
managers (mutual funds), (4) independent investment advisors (consisting mainly of 
large brokerage firms), and (5) others (including pension funds and university 
endowments). 
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arbitrage by way of 13F data analysis.109  Data culled from Form 13F 
filings is also a component of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) 
that is utilized in a variety of analytical studies.110  HHI concentration of 
Id. at 8. 
 109. Michah S. Officer, Are Limited Arbitrage Effects Detectable? Evidence From 
Merger Arbitrage, Univ. of Southern California, Marshall School of Business 
Department of Finance and Business Economics, Working Draft, Apr. 25, 2006, 
available at http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~officer/index_files/Limited_arbitrage_effects.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2006). The SEC requires that 
institutions with investment discretion over more than $100 million of investors’ 
money file form 13F to report their holdings of publicly-traded equity securities. 
While short-sales (of bidder stock, for example) are not included in these filings, long 
holdings of target stock should be for most large merger arbitrageurs (Except for 
instances in which arbitrageurs request an exemption from the SEC for the reporting 
of short-term arbitrage positions.) 
Id. at 13 and n.15. 
 110. Kose John and Diana Knyazeva, Governance and Conservatism in Investment 
Decisions (May 2006), available at http://robinson.gsu.edu/FEA2006/papers/ 
GovernanceConservatismInvestment.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (“We use a 
measure of institutional ownership concentration—Herfindahl index of institutional 
ownership stakes—based on the data from the Thomson Financial database of 13[F] 
filings.”); see also Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Performance (Sept. 22, 2006), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/ 
analytical/cfr/2006/oct/hedge_fund.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006); http://www.fdic. 
gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2006/oct/workshop.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (stating 
that one can “track down the 1st quarter-end holding date of the hedge funds in the 
target companies using 13F filings of the funds from Thomson Financial . . .”); Sergey 
S. Barabanov and Michael J. McNamara, Market Perception of Information Asymmetry: 
Ownership by Different Types of Institutions, Bid-Ask Spread, and Returns on Nasdaq 
Stocks, (Sept. 2003), available at http://207.36.165.114/Denver/Papers/Inst.%20 
Ownership%20and%20Bid-Ask%20Spread.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (“The CDA 
Spectrum database of 13F filings was obtained from Thomson Financial . . . .  The 
database provides common stock holdings by institutional fund managers filing 13F 
Reports with the SEC each quarter”); Amir Rubin, Simon Fraser, and Amri Barne, 
Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict between Shareholders (Oct. 13, 2005), 
available at http://www.olin.wustl.edu/jfi/pdf/csr.conflict.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 
2006) (“The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentration of the top 15 
institutional owners (as reported in 13[F]).”); Patrick Dennis and Deon Strickland, The 
Determinants of Idiosyncratic Volatility (Apr. 29, 2005), available at http://lcb. 
uoregon.edu/departments/finl/idio.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (stating that 13F is 
also used to determine time-series trends, fixed effect idiosyncratic volatility 
regressions, and is used in summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis); 
Amir Rubin and Simon Fraser, Political Views and Corporate Decision-Making: The 
case of Corporate Social Responsibility  (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.sfu. 
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ownership measurements that “account[s] for every institutional holding 
reported on the 13F disclosure form,”111 have been used by the U.S. 
Department of Justice in a number of antitrust actions.112  The Goldstein 
Application ignored the fact that an array of analytical techniques utilize 
13F data in order to make interpretations of mergers and other securities 
market activities, a fact that directly rebuts Goldstein’s obtuse and 
incredulous theory that no legitimate reasons exist for the Section 13 
disclosure framework. 
C. SEC Section 13(f) Enforcement 
A recent SEC securities fraud action against a hedge fund manager 
alleged 13(f) violations113 among a host of other alleged Advisers Act, 
 
ca/~arubin/A12Sep05.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) 
For institutional ownership, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
concentration of the top 15 institutional owners gathered from Schedule 13F filings. 
This is defined as ∑15i=1 h2i  where hi is the percentage ownership of institution i.  
Shleifer and Vishney (1986) show that institutions have a greater influence when they 
are large shareholders, and Black (1992) shows they have a greater influence because 
they can form a coalition. Therefore, we use a measure that illustrates the 
concentration of institutional ownership. 
Id.; see also LilyQiu, Which Institutional Investors Monitor? (Oct. 2003), available at 
http://icf.som.yale.edu/pdf/seminar03-04/publicv3.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
 111. Sergey S. Barabanov and Michael J. McNamara, Market Perception of 
Information Asymmetry: Ownership by Different Types of Institutions, Bid-Ask Spread, 
and Returns on Nasdaq Stocks, 1 (Sept. 2003), available at http://207.36. 
165.114/Denver/Papers/Inst.%20Ownership%20and%20Bid-Ask%20Spread.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
 112. See, e.g., U.S. v. Connors Bros. Income Fund et al., Case No. 1:04CV01494 
(D.C. Dist. Oct. 19, 2004) (“Using a measure of concentration called the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (“HHI”), which is defined and explained in Exhibit A to the 
Complaint, the pre-transaction HHI was about 4200—well in excess of the 1800 point 
level for characterizing markets as highly concentrated.”); see also Dep’t of Justice 
Proposed Judgment in U.S. v. Connor Bros., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
atr/cases/f205900/205900.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
 113. Complaint at 35, SEC v. Sacane, No. 3:05cv1575-SRU (D. Conn. Oct. 12, 
2005), available at http://sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19424.pdf (last visited Feb. 
24, 2007); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Hedge Fund Officer Who Assisted 
in the Filing of False SEC Statements is Sentenced (Mar. 6, 2006) (indicating “‘[i]t is 
our hope that this prosecution will send a message to hedge fund operators that the 
federal government is watching,” U.S. Attorney [Kevin J.] O’Connor stated. “The 
failure to obey securities laws, especially by making false statements in SEC filings on 
which investors rely, is a serious crime. Violators will be vigorously prosecuted.”). 
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Exchange Act, and Securities Act violations.114  One of the defendants 
was “a registered representative associated with various broker-dealers 
registered with the Commission,”115 and others were investment advisers 
to two hedge funds.116  The SEC alleged the defendants orchestrated 
fraudulent schemes in order to manipulate the stock of two equity issues 
to “artificially inflate the performance and value of the hedge 
funds . . . which garnered increased fees.”117  According to the SEC, the 
defendants not only defrauded investors, but also “breached their 
fiduciary duties to their advisers [sic] clients through the undisclosed 
manipulation, which had the end result of increasing the fees received 
paid by the clients and in the funds holding high concentrations of two 
thinly-traded stocks that defendants had manipulated.”118  The 
investment adviser defendants allegedly filed false 13Fs that under-
reported119 the investment company’s ownership of the 13(f) issuers’ 
shares and concealed the concentrated position.120  Such undisclosed 
positions could be precursors to “pump and dump” schemes, and 
accurate 13F disclosure can alert investors to what might otherwise be 
lurking in the market’s shadows. 
The SEC also recently instituted administrative proceedings against 
the investment company Cabot Money Management,121 and its adviser, 
for “willful[] violations of Section 13(f)(1) and Rule 13f-1 
thereunder.”122  The defendants were required to disclose quarterly 
 114. See Complaint, supra note 113, at 2. 
 115. Id. at 4. 
 116. Id. at 1. 
 117. Id. at 1-2. 
 118. Id. at 2. 
 119. Id. at 26-27. 
 120. Id.  The complaint made several assertions, including: 
On February 14, 2003, Schmidt, on behalf of Durus and Sacane, filed electronically 
with the Commission a Form 13F, which contains Schmidt’s electronic signature, 
reporting Durus’ purported stock holdings as of December 31, 2002. 
. . . . 
Schmidt followed Sacane’s instructions and, as a result, on this Form 13F, Durus 
reported falsely that it owned 5,283,248 shares of Aksys stock as of December 31, 
2002. 
Id. at 26-27. 
 121. See In re Cabot Money Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37573, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1577, at 1 (Aug. 15, 1996), available at 
http://sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia1577.txt (last visited Nov. 11, 2006). 
 122. Id. at 3. 
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holdings via Form 13F within forty-five days of March 31, 1996,123 but 
did not file until roughly three (3) months after the deadline.124  Due to 
the defendants’ alleged failure to timely file the relevant Form 13F, 
investors of the publicly traded companies were improperly deprived of 
the subsequently and untimely disclosed information.125  The SEC 
emphasized that the congressional purpose of requiring Form 13F filings 
was to create a “central depository of historical and current data about 
the investment activities of institutional investment managers,”126 and 
further asserted: 
The importance of timely disclosure of such information is 
especially pronounced here, where the institutional investment 
managers’ holdings include a significant percentage of the 
outstanding securities of an issuer with a volatile stock 
price . . . These circumstances illustrate that the information required 
on Form 13F can be of value to the marketplace and investors in 
evaluating the demand for a stock, and assessing the motivations of 
those holding or recommending a stock.127
The SEC has also brought Administrative Proceedings against 
investment advisers who have failed to file required 13F disclosures.128  
The SEC has made clear through its enforcement efforts that the Section 
13(f) reporting requirements are a significant portion of the overall 
disclosure framework for the U.S. securities markets; and consistent 
with that position, has sought to sanction violators who attempt to evade 
 123. Id. at 2. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 3.  Information that should have been disclosed to investors in the 
quarterly filing includes: 
As of December 31, 1995, accounts over which Cabot Money Management and Lutts 
exercised investment discretion held 693,109 shares of Presstek, approximately 4.7 
percent of the total outstanding. As of March 29, 1996, that figure had increased to 
729,441 shares, or approximately 4.8 percent of the total outstanding. Those holdings 
accounted for more than 45 percent of the ‘Section 13(f) securities’ in accounts over 
which Cabot Money Management and Lutts exercised investment discretion as of 
December 31, 1995, and nearly 40 percent of the ‘Section 13(f) securities’ as of 
March 29, 1996. 
Id. 
 126. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 77-78 (1975)). 
 127. Id. at 3. 
 128. See In re Joel R. Mogy Investment Counsel, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
44268, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1941 (May 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44268.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
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the requirements to the detriment of the public. 
However, under certain circumstances the SEC has demonstrated 
that it is receptive to relaxing various requirements for legitimate 
purposes, and Form 13F data has been a factor in certain requests for 
exemption.  Examples of the SEC’s flexibility include use of 13F data to 
successfully support requests for exemption from registration 
requirements under Exchange Act Rule 10b-13,129 and companies have 
made use of Form 13F data to support requests for exemption from 
tender offer rules,130 which the SEC has granted on occasion.131
D. Civil Litigants Use Form 13F Data 
A publicly traded company utilized Section 13(f) securities 
information against an alleged “group of secretive and interconnected 
New York and offshore hedge funds and investment bankers.”132  The 
alleged securities manipulation by defendants, according to plaintiff 
Payless Shoesource, Inc., was orchestrated through “suspicious” Form 
 
 129. AMP Limited, SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 870709, at *2 (Sept. 17, 
1998). 
 130. Letter from William A. Groll, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, to the Office 
Chief, Office of Mergers and Acquisitions, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, July 
29, 2002, available at http://sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/saipem 
072902.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2006).  In an effort to gain exemption from tender 
offer rules, companies have used Form 13F data to support their requests as follows: 
  We are writing on behalf of our client, Saipem SpA (“Saipem”), to follow up on 
our recent conversations and to request that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the ‘Commission’) grant exemptive relief from the provisions of Rule 14d-10(a) and 
Rule 14e-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange 
Act”), with respect to the proposed tender offer in the United States by Saipem for 
securities of Bouygues Offshore S.A. (“Bouygues Offshore”) described in this letter. 
  In conjunction with the French standing offer that Saipem is required to make, 
Saipem would like to make an offer to acquire ADSs and Shares from holders resident 
in the United States, both to enable it to achieve the highest possible ownership 
through the offers, and to enable the U.S. holders to participate in the transaction on 
the same terms as holders outside the United States. Accordingly, it has undertaken an 
assessment of the level of ownership of Shares and AD[R]s in the United States to 
determine the applicability of the U.S. tender offer rules to the proposed offer. 
Id. at 1, 4. 
 131. Serono S.A., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 31116135, at *1-2 (Sept. 12, 
2002) (granting exemptions from Section 14(d)(5) of the Exchange Act and Rules 14d-
10, 14d-11 14e-5 under the Exchange Act). 
 132. Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Barington Cos. Equity 
Partners, L.P., 2004 WL 2079384 (D. Kan. May 11, 2004) (No.04-4045). 
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13F disclosures by a group allegedly engaged in an “ongoing 
manipulative and misleading scheme and course of conduct in 
purporting to nominate and solicit proxies for their hand-picked 
candidate for election to the Board of Directors of Payless.”133  Full and 
accurate 13F disclosure can serve to inform shareholders as to the 
possible motive and nature of potential board of directors candidates, but 
if market participants file false or misleading Forms 13F, the 
shareholder franchise can be compromised and candidates possibly 
elected under false pretenses. 
Class action litigants have also relied upon Form 13F data.  An 
uncertified class of short-sellers asserted a Section 10(b) (and Rule 10b-
5 thereunder) securities fraud claim against an investment adviser.134  
The short-seller plaintiffs alleged that defendant Durus Capital’s Form 
13F materially misrepresented its ownership in Aksys stock – claiming 
it only owned 5,283,248 shares of Aksys, when in fact it actually owned 
over 10 million shares (approximately 44 percent of Aksys common 
stock).135  Class action administrators have also utilized 13F data to 
identify eligible class member claimants in order to disburse settlement 
proceeds.136
The many methods which regulators, market participants, litigants 
and the investing public have all legitimately utilized 13F data seriously 
undermines Goldstein’s contention that no legitimate use for the 
disclosure requirements exists beyond “stealing” investment ideas.  
Beyond the citation of a handful of financial magazine articles 
describing the investment holdings of a handful of certain “celebrity” 
investment managers, Mr. Goldstein proffered no evidence whatsoever 
to show that the allegedly rampant idea theft that he claims is regularly 
perpetrated on Wall Street and Main Street even exists.  Moreover, the 
Goldstein Application made no measurable attempt to cogently 
 133. Id. at ¶¶ 57, 1. 
 134. Memorandum of Decision, Collier v. Aksys Ltd., 2005 WL 2603945 (D.Conn. 
Aug. 12, 2005). 
Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See, e.g., James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through 
Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial 
Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 
412 (2005) (citing Inst’l Shareholder Servs., Final Settlements for 2004, available at 
http://scas.issproxy.com/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2005)); see also James D. Cox and 
Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail To 
File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (2002). 
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distinguish why his hedge fund holdings should not have been subject to 
a confidential treatment application prior to his request for full 
exemption from the Section 13 reporting framework. 
V. SEC CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT 
A non-exempt investment manager may request to delay 13F 
disclosure137 through the filing of an application with the SEC,138 which 
delays and if granted, may altogether prevent disclosure of Form 13F 
data.  The confidential treatment remedy serves as a form of relief that is 
generally consistent with the confidentiality procedures for a variety of 
other federal agencies.139 confidential treatment applications are no 
 137. See SEC, Commission Notice: Re: Section 13(f) Confidential Treatment 
Requests (June 17, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/ 
guidance/13fpt2.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Commission Notice].  The 
SEC has laid the groundwork to delay 13F disclosures: 
Section 13(f)(3) authorizes the Commission to delay or prevent the public disclosure 
of information as it determines to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors. 
Congress specified two categories of securities information that the Commission, 
upon request, should exempt from disclosure on reports filed under Section 13(f): (1) 
information that would identify securities held by the account of a natural person or 
certain estates or trusts; and (2) information that would reveal an investment 
manager’s program of acquisition or disposition that is ongoing both at the end of a 
reporting period and at the time that the investment manager’s Form 13F is filed. The 
legislative history of Section 13(f) emphasizes the second of these categories in 
pointing out that: “[t]he Committee believes that generally it is in the public interest to 
grant confidential treatment to an ongoing investment strategy of an investment 
manager. Disclosure of such strategy would impede competition and could cause 
increased volatility in the market place.” 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 138. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (2006); see also Commission Notice, supra note 137, at 
n.1 (citing Brett D. Fromson, SEC Disclosure Exemption Questioned; 25-50 Money 
Managers, Firms Allowed to Keep Holdings Confidential, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1997, 
at C1 (noting “[f]ederal securities law requires large investors in the public markets to 
file quarterly reports on their holdings, which are known as 13F reports.  But the agency 
routinely allows investors to keep some of their positions confidential so they can more 
easily move into or out of stocks.”)). 
 139. For example, all of the following federal agencies have confidentiality 
provisions which are similar to the SEC provisions discussed herein: Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (15 U.S.C. § 2055); Copyright Office (37 C.F.R. § 202.20(d)); 
Environmental Protection Agency (42 U.S.C. § 7607(a)); Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8e); Food and Drug Administration (21 
U.S.C. §§ 331(j), 360j(c); 21 C.F.R. § 130.32); Occupational Safety and Health 
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longer routinely granted, and recent denials of high profile investors’ 
efforts to shield their equity portfolio holdings from public view have 
been widely reported; but even a denied confidential treatment 
application delays disclosure and increases the “stale” nature of the 
pertinent portfolio data because during the pendency of the confidential 
treatment application process, “the material for which confidential 
treatment has been applied will not be made available to the public.”140  
The bureaucratic advantage inherent in the confidential treatment 
application process invariably reduces any potential utility to the “free 
riders” of which Goldstein complains, and savvy market players have 
increasingly exploited this “red tape” delay.141
Administration (29 U.S.C. § 664); Patent and Trademark Office (35 U.S.C. § 122; 37 
C.F.R. § 1.14(b)); Postal Service (39 U.S.C. § 410); and the Social Security 
Administration (42 U.S.C. § 1306).  See also Conference Report, supra note 27, at 87. 
 140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2(c). 
 141. Commission Notice, supra note 137, at n.1 (citing Floyd Norris, A 
Misinterpretation of a Buffett Filing Stings Wells Fargo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at 
A1; Mixup Sheds Light on Confidential Stock Buys, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 25, 1997, at 
43).  13F filings allow the public to monitor institutional investors: 
The 13F filled out by big institutional investors and filed 45 days after the end of the 
quarter details portfolio holdings and is a big reason why America’s stock market is 
considered one of the most transparent in the world. 
Exclusions to 13F that allow certain investments to be shielded from public view are 
not requested often, according to SEC spokesman John Heine. 
That at least has been the case since the late Eighties when the SEC said it was 
tightening scrutiny and would deny requests for confidentiality unless a compelling 
case could be made for why the information should be withheld. 
Id.; see also, Miles Weiss, Warren Buffet Loses Appeal to Keep Holdings Secret, 
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 20, 2003, http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001 
&refer=news_index&sid=a.iXY.g37tbc (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). The SEC has also 
refused to allow the delaying in certain instances: 
Warren Buffett lost an appeal before the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
delay disclosure of certain stock holdings, part of an effort by the billionaire to 
prevent copycat investing.  As the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Buffett has 
argued that his short-term trading strategies qualify as intellectual property, and 
warrant an SEC filing exemption.  Publication of Berkshire’s holdings, Buffett says, 
lead to price movements that drive up his investment costs.  The SEC acknowledged 
in a decision released today that traders attempt to mimic Buffett’s stock selections. 
At the same time, the agency said Buffett had failed to show that complying with 
disclosure rules would cause Berkshire competitive harm.  “The SEC is saying if you 
want any special treatment, then the burden is on you to show how it harms you,” said 
Terry Nelson, a partner at Foley & Lardner in Madison, Wisconsin, who represents 
investment advisers.  “The public needs to know, the markets need to know, and 
deserve to know, what’s going on.” 
Id.; but see Gregory Zuckerman, Edward Lampert is in the Hunt -- Sears Chairman Has 
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Confidential treatment may be granted pursuant to Exchange Act 
Rule 24b-2.142  The pertinent analysis for a confidential treatment 
application includes evaluation of the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) exemption criteria,143 and often includes assessment of FOIA 
Exemption 4, which contemplates “Trade Secrets,” and/or “Commercial 
or Financial Information.”144  A prudent confidential treatment applicant 
will articulate the facts that relate to FOIA exemption criteria and the 
“applicable exemption(s) from disclosure under the Commission’s rules 
Sent Signals He’s Looking for Acquisitions – Is General Motors in His Sights?, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at C1. 
The following article reflects the difficulty of the Commission experiences in trying to 
follow the moves of all hedge fund managers: 
It isn’t easy to track Mr. Lampert’s moves. Like all hedge-fund managers he 
doesn’t publicize his investments. And while most big investment managers are 
forced to file so-called 13F filings after each quarter, listing their largest holdings, 
Mr. Lampert is one of a small handful who have obtained permission from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to delay releasing details of at least some of 
those holdings. 
Id. 
 142. Commission Notice, supra note 137.  The Commission Notice explains: 
The Commission’s Office of the General Counsel recently has advised the Division 
that Release No. FOIA-65 applies only to requests for confidential treatment 
submitted under the FOIA, 17 C.F.R. § 200.83 (1997), and not to confidential 
treatment applications made pursuant to Rule 24b-2 under the Exchange Act. 
Applicants filing under Rule 24b-2, therefore, should not fail to include relevant 
information in the confidential treatment application based upon a concern that the 
request itself may be disclosed. Investment managers should also request confidential 
treatment for the confidential treatment application itself under Rule 24b-2. 
Because confidential treatment applications which include a request for confidential 
treatment for the application itself, and which are granted, obtain at least the same 
degree of protection as the underlying securities positions, a request for the 
confidential treatment application made under the FOIA will be denied 
Id. at n.4. 
 143. Id. at n.3.  The Commission Notice details how a confidential treatment 
application may rely on an a FOIA exemption: 
Rules adopted by the Commission under the federal securities laws, including Rule 
24b-2 under the Exchange Act, require, among other things, that a confidential 
treatment application contain an analysis of the applicable FOIA exemption. For 
example, Exemption 4 of the FOIA states that “trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential may be 
withheld from disclosure.” 
Id. 
 144. See Dep’t of Justice, Freedom of Information Act Guide, May 2004, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/exemption4.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
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and regulations adopted under the Freedom of Information Act.”145  An 
applicant’s bases for confidentiality must be self-evident and “fully 
substantiated” within the confidential treatment application,146 and the 
requested confidentiality must be demonstrably within “the public 
interest.”147
Congress was mindful of the possible legitimate purposes served by 
confidential treatment when it amended the Exchange Act in 1975.  
Legislative history indicates that Congress considered it to be “in the 
public interest to grant confidential treatment to an ongoing investment 
strategy . . . [as] [d]isclosure of such strategy would impede competition 
and could cause increased volatility in the market place.”148  The 
granting of a request for confidential treatment will maintain secrecy, for 
a period of time, over “that portion of any report filed by an investment 
manager covering holdings or transactions which are part of a program 
of acquisition or disposition in which the investment manager is engaged 
both at the end of the reporting period and at the time the report is 
filed.”149  A successful confidential treatment applicant typically 
receives confidentiality for two broad categories of securities 
information: 
(1) Information that would identify securities held by the account of 
a natural person or certain estates or trust; (2) information that would 
reveal an investment manager’s program of acquisition or disposition 
 145. Commission Notice, supra note 137.  Confidential treatment applications are 
held to certain requirements: 
Confidential treatment application must include a description of the investment 
strategy used by the manager (whether it is an ongoing program of acquisition or 
disposition, block positioning, etc.), as well as an analysis supporting the applicable 
exemption.  A confidential treatment application that does not provide the Division 
with a sufficient basis to evaluate the request or that provides only conclusory or 
generalized information will be denied. 
Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.  The Commission Notice stresses the limited circumstances in which 
confidential treatment may be granted: 
Under the Exchange Act and the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), which set out 
the requirements under which the Commission may grant confidential treatment for 
Form 13F information, such treatment is available only in those instances in which an 
investment manager demonstrates in its confidential treatment application that 
confidential treatment is in the public interest. 
Id. 
 148. Conference Report, supra note 27, at 87. 
 149. Id. 
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that is ongoing both at the end of a reporting period and at the time 
that the investment manager’s Form 13F is filed.150
A confidential treatment request filed in accordance with the 
instructions pursuant to Rule 24b-2, if granted, extends confidentiality to 
all documentation submitted in connection with the confidential 
treatment request, including the application itself.151  Subsequent 
requests made to access the confidential treatment application, related 
documents, or the Form 13F data itself, by third parties pursuant to the 
FOIA, will be logically and summarily denied.152  There can be little 
doubt that Congress found that certain proprietary investment strategies 
may have merit and economic value, and that the confidentiality of those 
strategies was something worth protecting.  Confidential treatment 
relief, however, is the exception that the Goldstein Application 
apparently seeks to convert into the de facto rule. 
A. FOIA Request Denials and Exemption 4 
The SEC General Counsel’s office affirmed the SEC Freedom of 
Information Officer’s denial of FOIA requests where a Form 13F filer 
was granted confidential treatment.153  Such a FOIA request can be 
 
 150. Commission Notice, supra note 137. 
 151. Id.  The granting of confidentiality status to the confidential treatment 
application itself results from recent policy changes: 
This represents a change in the Division’s policy.  The Division is aware that Form 
13F filers previously may have had a concern that the confidential treatment 
application itself would not be afforded confidential treatment based upon a 1983 
Commission release stating that, in general, requests for confidential treatment are not 
protected under the FOIA. Release No. FOIA-65, May 5, 1983, 48 F.R. 21112.  The 
Commission’s Office of the General Counsel recently has advised the Division that 
Release No. FOIA-65 applies only to requests for confidential treatment submitted 
under the FOIA, 17 C.F.R. § 200.83 (1997), and not to confidential treatment 
applications made pursuant to Rule 24b-2 under the Exchange Act.  Applicants filing 
under Rule 24b-2, therefore, should not fail to include relevant information in the 
confidential treatment application based upon a concern that the request itself may be 
disclosed. Investment managers should also request confidential treatment for the 
confidential treatment application itself under Rule 24b-2. 
Id. at n.4. 
 152. The FOIA specifies the procedures for appealing a denial.  Id. at n.5 (citing 17 
C.F.R. § 200.80 (1997)). 
 153. Order Affirming Denial of Freedom of Information Act Request for 
Confidential Filing, Freedom of Information Act Release No. FOIA – 177, 9 SEC 
Docket 1043, 1991 WL 286669, at *1 (Aug. 29, 1991) (explaining that the SEC “relied 
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denied pursuant to FOIA Exemption 4.154  The SEC requires that a 
FOIA request “[a]t a minimum . . . must satisfy the requirements of 
FOIA Exemption 4 which protects ‘trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.’”155  Where confidentiality has been granted to a Form 13F 
filer, the SEC has stated its policy is to deny any FOIA request—not 
only for the securities holding information which has been granted 
confidential treatment—but also for the confidential treatment 
application and related documents which accompanied the confidential 
information.156
The FOIA and confidential treatment policies are not without 
critics, and some market participants deride the confidential treatment 
policies due to the enlarged time lag of Form 13F data disclosure 
attributable to the bureaucratic application process,157 and assert that 
confidential treatment policies create an unfair playing field for 
investors where “[s]ecret filings give unfair advantages to a few,” and 
that confidential treatment should be “abolish[ed].”158  Larry Feinberg, 
manager of the $500 million Oracle Partners funds, has argued that 
confidential treatment is inherently unfair, and quipped, “[i]f I’m going 
to pull down my pants in public I want everyone to pull their pants down 
upon Section 13(f)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(d), 
which provides the Commission with authority to delay or completely prevent 
disclosure of information filed with it on Form 13F by investment advisers”). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Division of Investment Management:  Frequently Asked Questions About 
Form 13F, Question 52 (May 2005), available at http://sec.gov/divisions/ 
investment/13ffaq.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2006) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2002)). 
 156. Commission Notice, supra note 137; see id. at n.5 (noting that “[t]he FOIA 
specifies the procedures for appealing a denial”). 
 157. See Debra Sparks, Does Warren Buffett Deserve Special Treatment? BUS. WK., 
Sept. 22, 1997, available at 1997 WLNR 4029680.  For example: 
Technimetrics Vice-President Cary Krosinsky says it’s ridiculous to allow 
confidential filings.  “Its not clear who’s getting confidential treatment at any point in 
time,” he says.  “Right now, for example, Warren Buffett has disclosed part of his 
holdings, but the other part remains confidential.  The most recent information about 
his confidential holdings is from Mar. 31, 1996.  That’s 15 months late.”  Everyone 
without special treatment has 45 days after the end of the quarter to file.  “That should 
be time enough for investors like Buffett as well,” says Krosinsky. 
Id. 
 158. Id. In fact, the SEC’s confidential treatment policy seems to be at odds with its 
very own purpose.  “Secret filings give unfair advantages to a few and fuel the harmful 
whisper circuit on Wall Street.  To keep the market truly open, the SEC’s job is to 
prevent unnecessary speculation, not create it.” Id. 
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too.”159
B. Risk Arbitrage Trumps Block Trading 
The SEC amended its Form 13F instructions in 1985 in an effort to 
“simplify” confidential treatment requests for certain risk arbitrage 
positions.160  Although trading strategies that utilize block positioning 
are among the categories the SEC may delay or prevent public 
disclosure of, such strategies have simply not been afforded the same 
confidential treatment status as risk arbitrage techniques.161  Block 
trading secrecy is important for brokers and specialists seeking to buy or 
sell an inordinately large position, especially in illiquid issues, and the 
arguably inconsistent 13F policies potentially exacerbate the problem.162
During the proposed Rule comment period, at least two broker-
dealers asserted that the SEC should include block positioning163 within 
the confidential treatment rubric, consistent with risk arbitrage 
confidential treatment requests.  These broker-dealers took issue with 
the SEC proposing the release position that the Form 13F reporting time 
lag was sufficiently mitigating, and noted that “block positions ‘involve 
transactions which are completed during a very short period of time.’”164  
These broker-dealers addressed the fact that block positions are 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Requests for Confidential Treatment, supra note 77, at *1 (explaining that 
the amendments to the Form 13F instructions “simplify the procedures for requesting 
confidential treatment of certain risk arbitration and limit the time for which 
confidential treatment of commercial information may be requested”). 
 161. See Commission Notice, supra note 137. 
 162. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Classical and Cross Insider Trading: Variations 
on the Theme of Rule 10B-5, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 109 (1990) (“Trades too large to be 
executed in the anonymity of the trading floor go through the more personal ‘block 
trading’ specialists or ‘upstairs’ brokers. In such cases, it is harder to maintain secrecy. 
Large-scale insider trading is thus likely to be discovered.”). 
 163. Requests for Confidential Treatment, supra note 77, at *12.  “A transaction 
involving 10,000 shares or more of an underlying security, or options or security futures 
covering such number of shares is generally deemed to be a block transaction, although 
a transaction of less than 10,000 shares could be considered a block transaction in 
appropriate cases.”  NASD, Inc., Form 19b-4 Proposed Rule Change, by National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. at 12 (Mar. 21, 2002), available at 
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rule_filing/nasdw_000418.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006). 
 164. See Requests for Confidential Treatment, supra note 77, at *12. 
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sometimes held for longer than forty-five days, and asserted that the 
SEC’s “assumption” that block positions held that long are “for 
investment purposes” was inaccurate.165  The broker-dealers insisted that 
block positioners should receive the same confidential protection as risk 
arbitrageurs, and emphasized the significant liquidity effects of block 
trading, similar to the market efficiency contributions of risk 
arbitrageurs.166  The SEC has acknowledged that block positioners do in 
fact “facilitate the operation of the markets by offsetting temporary 
imbalances in the supply and demand for securities,”167 yet were not 
persuaded by the broker-dealer block trading arguments.168
The SEC excluded block trading from the “simplified” confidential 
treatment proposal, as it believed that such trading typically “involve[s] 
transactions which are completed during a very short period of time,”169 
and that block positions still held at the quarter’s end, would likely “be 
disposed of by the date on which Form 13F is required to be filed (i.e., 
45 days later).”170  Blocks still maintained forty-five days later “would 
be presumed to be maintained for investment purposes, rather than as a 
block position.”171  While the SEC conceded that aspects of the broker-
dealer assertions had merit, it considered the possibility of a block trade 
requiring confidentiality to be aberrant considering the time lag for Form 
13F disclosures.  Combining the reporting time lag with the fact that 
only a “limited number of block positions [are] maintained for 45 
days, . . . [and] requests for confidential treatment of block position 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. SEC Concept Release: Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43037, 17 
C.F.R. § 240 (Oct. 20, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-
42037.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2006). 
 168. See Requests for Confidential Treatment, supra note 77, at *13.  For example, 
two broker-dealers argued that “premature disclosure of a block position could cause 
harm (e.g., competitors could trade against the position and impede the block 
positioner’s ability to liquidate unobtrusively and without loss), and that this likelihood 
of competitive harm is no less substantial than the likelihood of harm to a risk 
arbitrageur.” Id. at *12-13. 
 169. Id. at *12.  Rule 3b-9(c) of the Exchange Act defines a Qualified Block 
Positioner as a “dealer” who, among other things, acting as a principal, “engages in the 
activity of purchasing long or selling short . . . a block of stock with a current market 
value of $200,000 or more in a single transaction . . . and sells the . . . block as rapidly 
as possible commensurate with the circumstances.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-8 (2006). 
 170. Requests for Confidential Treatment, supra note 77, at *9. 
 171. See id. at *12. 
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data” the SEC has determined that such requests can be adequately 
addressed on a “case-by-case basis.”172
As a result, the amended Form 13F instructions173 specifically 
apply to risk arbitrage confidential treatment requests but exclude block 
traders.  Applicants seeking confidential treatment for block positioning 
(which may include broker-dealers and specialists)174 are required to 
provide full factual support for the requests,175 and must demonstrate a 
likelihood of competitive harm if the positions are disclosed.176  The 
Goldstein Application made no mention of the varying considerations 
made by the SEC regarding its evaluation of differing factors for 
confidential treatment Applicants, and barely recognized the available 
relief of confidentiality, presumably because it profoundly undermines 
the conclusory contention that Section 13 reporting requirements are 
unconstitutional regulatory “takings.” 
 172. Id. at *13. 
 173. See Form 13F General Instructions, available at http://sec.gov/about/ 
forms/form13f.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).  A Manager’s request for confidential 
treatment must include: 
If a request for confidential treatment is based upon a claim that the subject 
information is confidential, commercial or financial information, provide the 
information required by paragraph 2.a through 2.3. of this Instruction except that, if 
the subject information concerns security holdings that represent open risk arbitrage 
positions and no previous requests for confidential treatment of those holdings have 
been made, the Manager need provide only the information required in paragraph 2.f. 
. . . . 
[2.]f. For securities holdings that represent open risk arbitrage positions, the 
request must include good faith representations that: 
i.  the securities holding represents a risk arbitrage position open on the last day 
of the period for which the Form 13F report is filed; and 
ii.  the reporting Manager has a reasonable belief as of the period end that it 
may not close the entire position on or before the date that the Manager is 
required to file the Form 13F report with the Commission. 
If the Manager makes these representations in writing at the time that the Form 13F is 
filed, the Commission will automatically accord the subject securities holdings 
confidential treatment for a period of up to one (1) year from the date that the 
Manager is required to file the Form 13F report with the Commission. 
Id. at 2-3. 
 174. See Requests for Confidential Treatment, supra note 77, at *1 (noting that 
Forms 13F are required to be filed by “institutional investment managers exercising 
investment discretion over accounts having, in the aggregate, more than $100,000,000 
in exchange treaded or NASDAQ quoted securities”). 
 175. Id. at *8. 
 176. Requests for Confidential Treatment, supra note 77, at *12-13. 
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C. Confidentiality Requests and SEC Application Review 
Examples of the SEC’s recognition of the independent merits of 
confidential treatment applications abound.  Despite the recent trend 
towards a lower likelihood of confidential treatment for 13F filers, 
ample support exists for the position that the SEC continues to give due 
consideration to confidential treatment applications.  The SEC grants (or 
denies) individual requests based upon appropriate factors, and as noted 
herein, perhaps the most factor is whether the merits of an confidential 
treatment application demonstrate that confidentiality is a matter within 
the public interest.  The SEC has adopted a case-by-case scrutiny of 
confidential treatment applications that have produced varied results. 
1. End of Permissive Confidentiality—Bill Gates’s 
Cascade Investments, LLC 
Cascade Investments, LLC, a money management firm formed to 
buy stocks on behalf of Bill Gates, filed its first Form 13F in November 
1999, which publicly disclosed a portion of the Microsoft founders’ 
equity holdings.  Gates had previously obtained repeated confidential 
treatment grants for his entire portfolio (for successive one year 
terms).177  According to market analyst Fred Hult, “[a]ny disclosure of 
(Gates’s) positions [is] going to have an influence on the price of the 
stocks.”178  Kathyrn McGrath, former director of the SEC’s Division of 
 
 177. Miles Weiss, Money Has Its Privileges, Gates Broker Insists, MEMPHIS 
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Nov. 21, 1999, at C4, available at 1999 WLNR 4517835. The 
SEC permits: 
The SEC permits confidential treatment for information that would identify 
securities held by the account of a natural person or that would reveal an 
ongoing program of buying or selling by a manager. Confidentiality is also 
available for money managers who have open risk-arbitrage positions or who 
are engaged in trading of large blocks of stock. 
Id. 
 178. Id. (noting that Mr. Hult is an analyst with the Carson Group, Inc., a firm that 
tracks institutional stock ownership).  Explaining the reasoning behind keeping 
disclosure forms confidential:
Larson is seeking confidential status for Cascade’s entire portfolio. His 
argument may be that Cascade’s trading strategies would be disrupted by the 
media attention and investor scrutiny Gates receives. 
“It would be unfair because other people would start piling on,” said Ted 
Laurenson, a securities attorney at the law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 
Wharton & Garrison who works with a number of hedge funds. 
Id. 
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Investment Management stated that until that time, “institutions have 
been able to get confidential treatment with very little effort.”179  The 
permissive trend of granting confidential treatment came to a halt in 
1999 when the SEC indicated that in order to obtain confidential 
treatment in the future, the SEC would require “more detailed 
information on trading strategies from those seeking to keep their stock 
selections secret.”180
2. Denial of Incomplete Confidential Treatment  
Applications—Two Sigma Investments 
The SEC recently denied a confidential treatment application 
primarily because the applicant “failed to provide sufficient information, 
either in its [r]equests or in its [p]etition, to substantiate that confidential 
treatment [wa]s merited.”181  The SEC reasonably determined that it was 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.; see also SEC Letter to Confidential Treatment Filers, June 17, 1998, 
available at 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 643.  The SEC wrote the following: 
We are writing this letter to inform investment managers with Section 13(f) reporting 
obligations of the position of the Division regarding Form 13F confidential treatment 
requests. The Division’s position is that these requests can be granted only under 
certain limited circumstances. 
The Division is concerned that many Form 13F filers have concluded that confidential 
treatment of information contained on Form 13F will be granted automatically upon a 
superficial showing of need. Such a conclusion is erroneous. Under the Exchange Act 
and the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), which set out the requirements under 
which the Commission may grant confidential treatment for Form 13F information, 
such treatment is available only in those instances in which an investment manager 
demonstrates in its confidential treatment application that confidential treatment is in 
the public interest. As discussed more fully below, a confidential treatment 
application must be limited to securities holdings that fall into one or more of the 
narrowly defined categories established by legislation or by the Commission, and the 
bases for seeking confidential treatment must be fully substantiated in the confidential 
treatment application itself. The Division will deny any confidential treatment 
application that does not provide the Division with a sufficient basis upon which to 
evaluate the request. 
Id. at *2-3; see also Weiss, supra note 177 (indicating that “‘[y]ou can cook up all kinds 
of reasons, [to seek confidential treatment]’ said [Kathryn] McGrath, now an attorney in 
the Washington office of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius”). 
 181. Two Sigma Investments, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 52134, 2005 SEC 
LEXIS 1900, July 27, 2005, Order Denying Requests For Confidential Treatment, at *9.  
Denial was made “pursuant to Sections 13(f)(3) and (4) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (‘Exchange Act’), to deny the requests for confidential treatment of information 
for the calendar quarters ended December 31, 2002 . . . filed by Two Sigma 
1126 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
in the interest of the public and protection of investors to deny this 
apparently incomplete confidential treatment request.182  The SEC set 
forth the information that must be included in a complete confidential 
treatment application,183 and found that Two Sigma failed to provide 
information sufficient to substantiate its request.184  Two Sigma argued 
that it is “engaged in a program of acquisition and disposition that 
employs a statistical arbitrage investment strategy,” and that disclosure 
of its securities position would expose its investment strategy to “reverse 
engineering.”185  Two Sigma claimed that even partial reverse 
Investments, LLC (‘Two Sigma’) pursuant to Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act.” 
Id. at *1. 
 182. See id. at *1. 
 183. See id. at *5-6.  The SEC requires the following for a confidential treatment 
request: 
The Instructions require that a request that is based upon a claim that the subject 
information is confidential, commercial or financial information must provide 
supporting information in five specific areas: (1) a description of the investment 
strategy, including the extent of any program of acquisition or disposition; (2) an 
explanation of why disclosure of the securities would be likely to reveal the strategy; 
(3) a demonstration that the revelation of the investment strategy would be premature; 
(4) a demonstration that failure to grant the request for confidential treatment would 
be likely to cause substantial harm to the Manager’s competitive position; and (5) a 
statement of the period of time for which confidential treatment is requested. 
Rule 24b-2(b)(2)(ii) under the Exchange Act also requires that a request for 
confidential treatment of Form 13F information contain “a justification of the period 
of time for which confidential treatment is sought.” 
The Instructions also provide that a Manager may discuss each of the five areas listed 
above with respect to a class of holdings rather than with respect to each individual 
holding if “the Manager can identify a class or classes of holdings as to which the 
nature of the factual circumstances and the legal analysis are substantially the same.” 
The Instructions further provide that at the expiration of the period for which 
confidential treatment has been granted, a Manager may file a de novo request for 
confidential treatment that meets the requirements of the Instructions. 
Rule 430(b)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice (“Rules of Practice”) provides 
that a “person seeking review [of an action made pursuant to delegated authority] 
shall file a petition for review containing a clear and concise statement of the issues to 
be reviewed.”  Rule 430(b)(2) further provides that a petition for review shall “include 
exceptions to any findings of fact or conclusions of law made, together with 
supporting reasons for such exceptions based on appropriate citations to such record 
as may exist.” 
Id. at *5-6. 
 184. See id. at *7. 
 185. Id. at *7-8 (stating “[a]s the Division notes, Two Sigma fails to explain how 
public disclosure of a partial list of its securities positions (Form 13F does not require 
disclosure of all of a Manager’s holdings) would allow others to ‘reverse engineer’ Two 
Sigma’s investment strategy.”) 
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engineering would place it at “a competitive disadvantage in the 
market,” and that outcome would “undermin[e] [the] public interest.”186
Despite the aforementioned favorable consideration for risk 
arbitrage strategies, the SEC found that Two Sigma failed to provide 
adequate information regarding “basic characteristics of its investment 
strategy,” and further failed to demonstrate “how its strategy is applied 
to each security for which [it] is seeking confidential treatment,”187 and 
provided insufficient clarity as to how its investment strategy would, in 
fact, be revealed through public disclosure in a Form 13F.188  
Furthermore, Two Sigma did not support its conclusory claim of 
substantial harm from public disclosure,189 nor did it explain how 
 186. Id. at *7. 
 187. Id. (noting that “statistical arbitrage strategies may be based upon any number 
of different relative relationships among securities and that individual investment 
strategies will differ depending on the relationships on which they focus.”). 
 188. See id. at *8-9. The SEC found that: 
Two Sigma also fails to explain sufficiently how public disclosure of its securities 
positions would be likely to reveal its investment strategy for each of the securities in 
its Requests in light of the specific requirements of Form 13F.  We note that Form 
13F requires a Manager to report only the number of shares and market value of each 
position as of the close of trading on the last trading day of the quarter.  Because Form 
13F is not required to be filed until forty-five days after the last trading day of each 
quarter, disclosure of a security holding as of the last day of a quarter would not 
necessarily reveal a Manager’s current investment strategy.  We therefore find that 
Two Sigma has failed to provide us with a sufficient explanation of how public 
disclosure of its holdings would be likely to reveal its investment strategy for each of 
its holdings. 
Id. 
 189. See id. at *10-11. The SEC found that: 
Two Sigma fails to explain how reverse engineering by its competitors could be 
accomplished when Two Sigma is not required to disclose certain of its securities 
holdings on Form 13F.  Two Sigma’s failure to provide an explanation prevents us 
from being able to make an informed decision as to whether public disclosure of Two 
Sigma’s securities positions would be likely to cause Two Sigma substantial harm. 
Further, Two Sigma does not attempt to quantify the extent to which it could be 
harmed by disclosure, and thus does not demonstrate that it would be likely to suffer 
‘substantial’ harm to its competitive position. Two Sigma also does not provide any 
facts or analysis pertaining to any particular security for which it seeks confidential 
treatment to demonstrate that disclosure of its position in that security would likely 
cause substantial harm to Two Sigma’s competitive position.  We agree with the 
Division that additional information is necessary in order for us to be able to conclude 
that disclosure would result in substantial harm. As the Division noted in its Denial 
Letter, such information could include, among other things, discussion and analysis of 
relevant market conditions and the likely effect of disclosure on Two Sigma’s 
securities positions. 
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disclosure would “prematurely reveal its investment strategy.”190
The Goldstein Application, as discussed in greater detail below, is 
similarly inconclusive in terms of the purported trade secret status of the 
“Bulldog” portfolio holdings and offers scant support for the position.  
Goldstein offered no measurable insight into the valuation methods he 
employs, nor the strategies utilized in the management of the “Bulldog” 
investments.  And as described in detail below, the Goldstein 
Application is wholly lacking supportive facts and law to establish that 
anything that even resembles a trade secret exists in the components of 
his portfolio.  Beyond Goldstein’s assertions that there is apparent public 
interest in what various other “celebrity” investors are holding, he cited 
nothing to demonstrate that any specific risk of competitive harm exists 
sufficient to warrant confidential treatment of his 13(f) securities 
holdings, let alone sufficient to merit exemption from the disclosure 
framework. 
3. Public Disclosures by Form 13F Filers—Research Affiliates, LLC 
The SEC affirmed the denial of a confidential treatment application 
on November 15, 2006.191  The SEC determined that Research Affiliates 
 
Id. 
 190. Id. at *9. The SEC noted that: 
We note that revelation of a Manager’s strategy could be premature if, among other 
things, the Manager was still engaged in the strategy at the time of the required 
disclosure.  Two Sigma, however, does not demonstrate in its Requests and the 
Petition that its investment strategy with respect to any particular security was 
ongoing at the time of filing. For instance, as the Division notes, Two Sigma does not 
provide any transaction data showing purchases or sales of any of the securities from 
the end of a quarter through the date of filing.  Such failure to demonstrate that its 
investment strategy has not changed from quarter to quarter prevents us from 
concluding that Two Sigma’s investment strategy is ongoing and static and that 
disclosure of Two Sigma’s securities positions would be likely to prematurely reveal 
its investment strategy. 
Id. at *9-10. 
 191. Research Affiliates, L.L.C., Exchange Act Release No. 54,757 2006 SEC 
LEXIS 2657 at *5 (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/rules/other/2006/34-
54757.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2006) (affirming the denial of the Research Affiliates 
confidential treatment request).  The SEC found that Research Affiliates had not 
provided “sufficient information” justifying their request.  In characterizing the 
company’s request, the Commission stated: 
Research generally describes itself as providing investment advisory services based on 
proprietary indices that are used to build passive portfolios. Research states that its 
indices (‘Fundamental Indexes’) are based on a variety of alternative economic 
measures of the worth of an underlying company, such as revenue, sales, book value, 
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failed to show that disclosure of the information contained in its Form 
13F would cause it substantial competitive harm – largely because it had 
already publicly revealed its investment strategies.192  The SEC found 
that even if Research Affiliates had demonstrated it would be harmed – 
notwithstanding its public revelations – it failed to show “the likelihood 
that such harm would be substantial.”193
Phillip Goldstein’s widely publicized penchant for public 
interviews, proxy fights and protracted litigation all offer insight into the 
“Bulldog” investment method and its ostensibly “value” oriented 
strategy.  Any confidential treatment application by Goldstein might 
have been considered somewhat analogous to Research Affiliate’s 
public disclosure of its passive indices, at least in terms of Goldstein’s 
irascible “activist” strategies, leaving only the mix of actual securities 
held as potential “trade secrets.”  Mr. Goldstein’s Full Value Advisors, 
LLC filed an otherwise blank Form 13F-HR on or about May 10, 2007 
that noted confidential treatment was requested.194  Various Schedules 
cash flow and dividends, among others.  Research states that it has a patent pending 
on the method of creating and weighting the indices and related analytical processes.  
Research also has made publicly available a methodology paper that precisely 
describes how the Fundamental Indexes are calculated. Specifically, the methodology 
paper, among other things, specifies 11 steps to define the universe of stocks and 
generate portfolio weights for the Fundamental Indexes, defines the RAFI factors used 
to create the Fundamental Indexes (sales, cash flow, book value, and dividend 
distributions), and includes instructions for additions, removals, splits, and mergers. 
Id. 
 192. Id. at *6.  In other words, the Commission decided that by revealing their 
purported confidential information: 
Research itself already has disclosed how the Fundamental Index is composed and has 
provided information that would enable others to engage in an investment strategy 
based on Research’s purportedly proprietary index.  Research cannot argue that the 
strategy would be revealed prematurely by disclosure on Form 13F or that such 
disclosure would be likely to cause Research harm because Research already has 
disclosed its strategy. 
Id. 
 193. Id.  For example, Research Affiliates did not provide any quantitative data 
regarding the cost of developing or maintaining any of the indices even though such 
data should have been readily available to the company.  Id. 
 194. Mr. Goldstein’s colleague, Andrew Dakos, filed a blank Form 13F-HR with the 
SEC on or about February 6, 2007, on behalf of the “Bulldog” hedge fund, Full Value 
Advisors, LLC, for the fiscal quarter ending December 31, 2006, which does not 
disclose any of the fund’s holdings and does not indicate on its face that a confidential 
treatment request was made.  See http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1388269/ 
000138826907000006/thirteenf.txt (last visited May 26, 2007).  Mr. Dakos also filed a 
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13D and Proxy Forms 14 filed by Goldstein’s hedge funds, however, do 
shed light onto certain of his funds’ holdings, and tend to negate the 
blank Form 13F-HR with the SEC on or about May 10, 2007, for the subsequent quarter 
ending March 31, 2007, which notes at the bottom, “Confidential Treatment 
Requested.”  See http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1388269/000138826907000006/ 
thirteenf.txt (last visited May 26, 2007).  See also Dane Hamilton, Hedge funds step up 
challenge to SEC, REUTERS, May 17, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/ousiv/idUSN1739603520070517 (last visited May 18, 2007). 
[D]on’t look for any information from Bulldog Investors or Wynnefield Capital—
their so-called 13-F filings are largely blank. The two funds are leading a charge to 
overturn the rules that require them to file quarterly holdings information, maintaining 
that such disclosures are trade secrets. Both have applied to keep their holdings 
confidential, but expect regulators to turn them down, forcing a court battle. 
“We filed but it was blank,” said Phillip Goldstein, a veteran investor who heads the 
$300 million-plus hedge fund group Bulldog Investors and affiliate Full Value 
Advisors. “We haven’t heard back from the SEC.” 
. . . . 
“Frankly I think we will win,” said Goldstein of his latest effort. But he said “I suspect 
it will take a long time.”  Last year Full Value Advisors also asked for an exemption, 
but got no response from the SEC, he said.  If Goldstein succeeds and funds stop 
filing quarterly 13-F reports, investors could be denied an important investment tool: a 
quarterly window into what the world’s best investors are holding, at least as of a 
particular quarter’s end.  And evidence shows that information is closely followed. 




(last visited May 28, 2007).  The Dow Jones’ weekly “sister” publication to the Wall 
Street Journal took note of the fact that “Bulldog” filed blank Forms 13F: 
Phillip Goldstein takes the notion of confidentiality a significant step further: He 
argues that all institutional investors should be exempt from revealing their holdings, 
not merely Wall Street’s biggest fish.  Goldstein, head of Bulldog Investors in 
Pleasantville, N.Y., is seeking to overturn SEC rules requiring managers of more than 
$100 million to file quarterly reports, known as 13-Fs, about their positions.  Last fall 
the money manager, who oversees more than $450 million in several hedge funds, 
sought his own filing exemption, but received no response from regulators.  Now he 
has filed 13-Fs that are largely blank, hoping to force the issue into court. 
. . . . 
Quixotic as Goldstein’s current quest sounds, people are taking him seriously.  
“Normally, I advise against challenging the government,” says Ron Geffner, a former 
SEC prosecutor.  “These cases are less likely to be meritorious.  But I have previously 
underestimated Goldstein, and I’m not prepared to make the same mistake again.  
These 13-F filings seem to serve little purpose and are redundant in the web of 
information the managers disclose.” 
The SEC has yet to contact Goldstein about his blanks. 
Id. 
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contentions that his portfolio holdings are somehow secret.195
4. Failure to Demonstrate Substantial Likelihood  
of Harm—Berkshire Hathaway 
The SEC recently denied confidential treatment to Berkshire 
Hathaway because it determined that the company “failed to 
demonstrate a likelihood of substantial competitive harm from the 
disclosure of its acquisition program for two securities.”196  The SEC 
determined that Berkshire’s showing was inadequate because it failed to 
demonstrate how public disclosure of its investment strategy would 
impair its “ability to acquire or liquidate a securities position, in the 
context of the market for those securities.”197  The SEC did recognize 
 
 195. See Bulldog Investors Gen. P’ship’s Form 13D filings, available at 
http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001364773&owner= 
include&count=40 (last visited Dec. 14, 2006).  See also Opportunity Partners L.P.’s 
Proxy Form 14 filings, available at http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action 
=getcompany&CIK=0000896017&owner =include&count=40 (last visited Dec. 14, 
2006); see also Bulldog Investors, General Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial 
Ownership (Form 13D/A) (May 17, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/838133/000106762106000013/ third.txt (last visited Feb. 9, 2007) 
(revealing a series of specific trades between April 3, 2006 and May 17, 2006 (as 
opposed to reporting an aggregate position), including the individual size, date, and 
price of each respective trade by “Bulldog” during a sixty-day time period in the shares 
of ACM Managed Income Fund, Inc). 
 196. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,368, 2003 SEC 
LEXIS 1986 at *3-4 (Aug. 20, 2003). The SEC characterized the confidential treatment 
application as unspecific, explaining that: 
Berkshire essentially relies on general statements and exhibits involving other selected 
securities, indicating that revelation of Berkshire’s position in the securities which are 
the subject of their Petition would, because of its CEO’s (Mr. Buffett’s) reputation for 
successful stock selection, adversely affect Berkshire’s acquisition program. Berkshire 
argues that other market participants would on learning of Berkshire’s interest join in 
acquiring the stock, causing a material increase in the price of the stock, thus making 
pursuit of the acquisition program more costly. Berkshire provided a list of instances 
where disclosure of Berkshire’s positions in other securities was followed by 
increases in the prices of the securities in question. 
Id. 
 197. Id. at *4-5.  The SEC also stated that Berkshire did not justify the “requested 
one-year time period for confidential treatment.” Id. at *6-7.  Furthermore, the 
Commission re-affirmed the Division’s reasoning that it was appropriate to request 
additional information from Berkshire, such as (1) “discussion and analysis of the 
market conditions and the likely effect of disclosure, at the times in question for these 
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that there have been instances where temporary spikes in the market 
occurred upon disclosure of Berkshire-Hathaway’s “stock purchase and 
selling programs, acknowledging that Berkshire might be 
‘foreclose[d] . . . [from] increas[ing] its holdings in that security at 
prices Mr. Buffett concludes are attractive.’”198  Still, the SEC seemed 
hesitant to declare that disclosure would inexorably cause market 
disruption “so severe as to cause substantial competitive harm to 
Berkshire’s competitive position in all cases,”199 noting that such a 
finding would lead to a “virtual per se justification for confidentiality for 
Berkshire, without specification of limits or specific time frames for any 
acquisition (or sales) program.”200  Yet, Berkshire-Hathaway has also 
been granted confidential treatment.201  At a minimum, the bureaucratic 
securities;” (2) “more specific reasons for Berkshire’s assertion that its ability to acquire 
or sell these securities would be so adversely affected as to cause it substantial 
competitive harm;” (3) that Berkshire address both the status and expected duration of 
Berkshire’s programs in these securities; (4) information concerning matters such as 
“historical price of and an average daily trading volume for these securities;” and (5) 
“more specific description of the planned program of acquisition or disposition.”  Id. 
 198. Id. at *5 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., Quarterly Report filed by Institutional 
Managers, Holdings (Form 13F-HR/A), (Aug. 14, 2006), available at 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000095013406016077/0000950134-06-
016077-index.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2006) (listing securities holdings which were 
granted confidential treatment (expiring Aug. 14, 2006) on Form 13F (filed on May 15, 
2006) for period ending Mar. 31, 2006, and which were not included in the Mar. 2006 
13F due to their confidential treatment status).  But see Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 
Quarterly Report filed by Institutional Managers, Holdings (Form 13F-HR/A), (Oct. 27, 
2006), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000095013406019935/a 
24427a1e13fvhrza.txt (last visited Dec. 12, 2006) (reporting, on an amended Form 13F, 
the securities holdings which had been denied confidential treatment (on Aug. 20, 2006) 
for the quarter ending June 30, 2006 after a Form 13F was filed on Aug. 14, 2006).  
Berkshire filed a second amended Form 13F on Oct. 27. 2006 for the quarter ending 
June 30, 2006, “pursuant to a request for confidential treatment and for which 
confidential treatment is no longer warranted” reporting the securities holdings for 
Form 13F which had been filed on Aug. 14, 2006.  Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. Quarterly 
Report filed by Institutional Managers, Holdings (Form 13F-HR/A), (Oct. 27, 2006), 
available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000095013406019936/0000 
950134-06-019936-index.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2006); see also Berkshire 
Hathaway, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 50,206, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1794 (Aug. 17, 
2004), available at http://sec.gov/rules/other/34-50206.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) 
(denying confidential treatment requests for the quarters ended Dec. 2003 and Mar. 
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delay in processing Berkshire’s many confidential treatment requests has 
likely afforded it opportunities to quietly acquire (or dispose of) equity 
positions while the related confidential treatment requests were 
processed.  The Goldstein Application fell far below the aforementioned 
denied Berkshire’s confidential treatment application because of a 
wholesale absence of any particularized factual statements or evidentiary 
showing that competitive harm would result from the “Bulldog” funds 
filing Forms 13F. 
5. The “Small Handful Who Have Obtained  
Permission”—Eddie Lampert 
Eddie Lampert has filed numerous successful confidential treatment 
applications202 and his ESL hedge fund’s managing affiliate, RBS 
 
2004)  The SEC stated that the requests “are substantially similar to Berkshire’s 
confidential treatment request for the quarter ended Sept. 2002, which the Commission 
denied.”  Berkshire Hathaway, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1794, at *4; see also Berkshire 
Hathaway, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,368, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1986 (Aug. 20, 
2003), available at http://sec.gov/rules/other/34-48368.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) 
(affirming the Investment Division’s denial of Berkshire’s Sept. 2002 confidential 
treatment request); see also Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., Exchange Act Release No 
43,909, 2001 SEC LEXIS 182 (Jan. 31, 2001), available at 
http://sec.gov/rules/other/34-43909.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (declining to review 
denials of Berkshire’s Dec. 1999 and Mar. 2000 confidential treatment requests); see 
also Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., Exchange Act Release No, 43,142, 2000 SEC LEXIS 
1652 (Aug. 10, 2000), available at http://sec.gov/rules/other/34-43142.htm (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2006), (declining to review confidential treatment request denials (filed through 
a Form 13F) for the calendar quarter ended June 1999 and Sept. 1999). 
 202. See RBS Partners, L.P., Quarterly Report filed by Institutional Managers, 
Holdings (Form 13F-HR/A) (Aug. 16, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/860585/000095013406016341/0000950134-06-016341-index.htm (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2006) (for period ending Mar. 31, 2006); see also, RBS Partners, L.P., 
Quarterly Report filed by Institutional Managers, Holdings (Form 13F-HR/A) 
(amendment no. 2) (Aug. 16, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/860585/000095013406016341/d38918e13fvhrza.txt (last visited Dec. 13, 
2006) (explaining that “[p]ursuant to Rule 24b-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, as amended, confidential information has been omitted from this form 13f and 
filed separately with the Securities and Exchange Commission.”) (all caps omitted);  see 
also Douglas Scheidt, SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 643, at *5-6 
(June 17, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/ 
13fpt2.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2006) (saying that “[r]ule 24b-2 under the Exchange 
Act, . . . sets out the procedures for requesting confidential treatment for information 
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Partners, L.P.,203 has been granted confidentiality throughout the 
years.204  Lampert’s stealth investment approach requires his investors to 
lock-up their funds for at least five years (typical fund “lock-up” periods 
are between one and two years), and he “believes that secrecy is a key 
advantage for an investor,” even refusing to talk about details of his 
portfolio with his own investors.205
According to the Wall Street Journal “Lampert is one of a small 
handful who have obtained permission from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to delay releasing details of at least some of 
those holdings.”206  The delay effect for confidential treatment 
applicants was underscored by the Journal when it described Lampert’s 
recent amendment of a prior RBS Form 13F filing as a “little noticed 
move,” which revealed that “Lampert’s firm owned 1.754 million shares 
of GM at the end of 2005, and that it reduced that stake to 633,000 
shares of GM at the end of the first quarter of this year.”207  Upon the 
expiration of confidentiality treatment for those periods, Lampert had to 
amend those Form 13F filings.208
Lampert’s successful efforts in obtaining confidentiality have left 
market-watchers speculating on what firms his ESL Investments, Inc. 
might target next, and frustrated Michigan residents who watched 
required to be filed under the Exchange Act . . . .”). 
 203. RBS Partners, L.P., Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) 
(May 24, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1183200/ 
000089375006000184/0000893750-06-000184-index.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).  
Explanation of Responses No. 8, id., explains the relevant relationships as follows: 
RBS is the general partner of Partners and the managing member of Investors.  
RBSIM is the general partner of Institutional. Investments is the general partner of 
RBS and CBL and the manager of RBSIM.  Mr. Lampert is the Chairman, Chief 
Executive Officer and Director of Investments and the managing member of ESLIM. 
Id. 
 204. See RBS Partners, L.P., available at http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-
edgar?company=RBS+Partner&CIK=&filenum=&State=&SIC=&owner=include&acti
on=getcompany (last visited Dec. 13, 2006) for an index of SEC filings, including many 
confidential treatment applications. 
 205. Patricia Sellers, How Eddie Lampert Picks His Stocks, FORTUNE, Feb. 9, 2006, 
available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/03/news/companies/investorsguide_lampert 
_stockpicking/index.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2006). 
 206. Gregory Zuckerman, Edward Lampert Is in the Hunt Sears Chairman Has Sent 
Signals He’s Looking for Acquisitions—Is General Motors in His Sights?, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 19, 2006, at C1. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
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Lampert export K-Mart jobs to Illinois as it consolidated its operations 
with Sears.  Those Michigan residents presumably track Lampert’s 
trading of GM shares in an effort to discern what it might portend for the 
future of auto manufacturing jobs.209  This demonstrates yet another 
public benefit of Form 13F data, and other similar instances include 
critics decrying George Soros’s Halliburton holdings210 and the Yale 
University endowment’s investments in Halliburton, and Talisman 
Energy, which according to the Yale Daily News and the Yale Herald 
was “exposed as having ‘a not insignificant role’ in human rights 
violations in Sudan.”211
6. Broker-Dealers—Credit Suisse Confidential Treatment Success 
Suggests 13F System Efficacy 
Credit Suisse Holdings (USA),212 acting on behalf of Credit Suisse, 
Inc.,213 filed an amended Form 13F on December 5, 2006 that disclosed 
Section 13(f) holdings which had previously been confidential and 
withheld from the publicly available Form 13F filed on November 14, 
 
 209. See, e.g., “General Watch,” available at  http://www.generalwatch.com/gm 
shareholdernews.cfm (last visited Dec. 18, 2006),  General Motors’s website for 
shareholder news, as a way to track the movement of GM shares. 
 210. Posting of fight_truth_decay to http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/1522152/ 
posts (Nov. 14, 2005, 6:53:56 PST) (last visited Dec. 19, 2006) (posting on the FREE 
REPUBLIC NEWS/ACTIVISM message board thread titled, 13F Holdings Report: (George) 
Soros Fund Management L.L.C.). 
 211. Saqib Bhatti, University might hold Halliburton, YALE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 5, 
2004, available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/PrintArticle.aspx?ArticleID=25594 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (citing YALE HERALD, Nov. 15, 2002). 
 212. See Company Information: Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc., available at 
http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000036121&owner= 
include&count=40 (last visited Dec. 12, 2006), for Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), 
Inc.’s SEC filing index.  The company’s Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) 
number is 6212—listed as “Security Brokers, Dealers & Flotation Companies.”  See  
S.E.C. Division of Corporation Finance: Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) 
Code List, available at http://sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 
2006).  The Division of Corporate Finance uses the SIC code to denote a company’s 
type of business for the purpose of “assigning review responsibility for the company’s 
filings.”  SIC Code List. 
 213. See Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc., Quarterly Report filed by Institutional 
Managers, Notice (Form 13F-NT) (Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/36121/000003612106000008/sec_filing.txt (last visited Dec. 14, 
2006) (listing Credit Suisse as the entity filing the Form 13F on behalf of Holdings). 
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2006,214 “pursuant to a request for confidential treatment and for which 
that request is no longer necessary.”215  Credit Suisse has filed over 
thirty Forms 13F since June 16, 1999,216 including multiple amendments 
(Form 13F-HR/A) that suggest confidential treatment applications by 
Credit Suisse have been successful.217  For example, Credit Suisse filed 
a Form 13FCONP218 on February 15, 2005 for the period ending 
 214. See Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc., Quarterly Report filed by Institutional 
Managers, Holdings (Form 13F-HR) (Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/824468/000082446806000033/sec_filing.txt.  Credit Suisse Int’l 
filed a Form 13F-NT for the period ending Sept. 30, 2006, which stated, “other 
managers reporting for this manager: . . . Credit Suisse.”  Credit Suisse Int’l, Quarterly 
Report filed by Institutional Managers, Notice (Form 13F-NT) (Nov. 14, 2006), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1343079/000134307906000005/ 
sec_filing.txt.  The SEC permits subsidiaries or parent companies to file Form 13F if 
the companies have shared investment discretion; see also SEC Division of Investment 
Management, Frequently Asked Questions About Form 13F, May 2005, Question 46, 
available at http://sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).  
The website explained “shared-defined investment discretion” thusly: 
If you control another entity (or are controlled by another entity), you should report 
shared-defined investment discretion. This category includes parent corporations and 
their subsidiaries (e.g., a bank holding company and its subsidiaries), investment 
advisers and mutual funds that they advise, and insurance companies and their 
separate accounts. See Securities Exchange Rule 13f-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(b) 
(1999). 
For example, if you are a bank holding company, you are required to file Form 13F 
even though you may not be directly involved in the management of Section 13(f) 
securities.  Although your trust department or other subsidiary may handle that 
responsibility, you are deemed to have shared-defined investment discretion based on 
your corporate structure.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(b). 
 215. Credit Suisse First Boston, Quarterly Report filed by Institutional Managers, 
Holdings (Form 13F-HR/A) (Dec. 5, 2006), available at 
http://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/jsp/EDGAR_MainAccess.jsp#topAnchor 
(filing for reporting period ending Sept. 30, 2006 and noting entry dated “12/05/2006” 
if text “13F-HR/A for Credit Suisse – CIK 824468”).  Credit Suisse filed the Form 13F 
notice indicating that Credit Suisse “report[ed] for this manager.”  See Credit Suisse 
Holdings (USA), Inc., Quarterly Report filed by Institutional Managers, Notice (Form 
13F-NT) (Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36121/00000 
3612106000008/sec_filing.txt (last visited Dec. 12, 2006) (filing for period ending Sept. 
30, 2006). 
 216. See Company Information: Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc., available at 
http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000036121&type=& 
dateb=&owner=include&start=40&count=40 (last visited Dec. 12, 2006) for a filing 
index for Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See PRR FILING FORM TYPE INFORMATION , at 9 (Oct. 30, 2006), available at 
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December 31, 2004, which does not provide any information, but for the 
fact that the document referenced was filed in “confidential” paper 
format.219  Additionally, Credit Suisse filed an amended Form 13F (13F-
HR/A) on June 15, 2005 for the period ending December 31, 2004, 
“list[ing] securities holdings reported on the Form 13F filed on February 
14, 2005 pursuant to a request for confidential treatment and for which 
that request is no longer necessary.”220  To date, Credit Suisse has filed 
more than sixty-three other confidential treatment applications that 
successfully shielded its holdings from public view.221  The multiple 
http://sec.gov/nb/fttdreport.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2006) (listing descriptions of SEC 
forms).  Form 13FCON is a paper only filing which is designated as “confidential.”  It 
is described as “Confidential quarterly report of an institutional investment manager 
pursuant to Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”  Id. 
 219. See Credit Suisse Holdings, Confidential Quarterly Report of an Institutional 
Investment Manager, (Form 13FCONP) (Jan. 15, 2005), available at 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36121/999999999706015851/9999999997-06-01585 
1.paper (last visited Dec. 12, 2006) (filing for the quarterly period ending Dec. 31, 
2004). 
 220. See Credit Suisse First Boston, Quarterly Report filed by Institutional 
Managers, Holdings (Form 13F-HR/A) (June 15, 2005), available at 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36121/000003612105000024/csfb13fdec04amd4.txt 
(last visited Dec. 12, 2006) (filing for period ending Dec. 31, 2004) (“This Form 13F is 
being filed by Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc., on behalf of Credit Suisse First Boston, a 
Swiss bank (“CSFB Bank”), and its subsidiaries identified on this report.  The ultimate 
parent company of CSFB Bank is Credit Suisse Group.”). 
 221. Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc. has made numerous confidential treatment 
filings.  See Metaldyne Corp., Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Schedule 13D/A) 
(Nov. 24, 2006) (Amendment 2), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
745448/000134100406003132/nyc681186.txt (last visited Dec. 14, 2006) (The parent 
company of the Credit Suisse (the “Bank”) is Credit Suisse Group); Credit Suisse 
(USA), Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q ), at *8 (Nov. 14, 2006) (filing for the 
quarterly period ending Sept. 30, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/29646/000110465906074766/a06-23286_110q.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2006); 
Credit Suisse, Quarterly Report filed by Institutional Managers (Form 13F) (Nov. 13, 
2006), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1321482/000090395406000077/ 
form13f-a2_063006.txt (last visited Dec. 12, 2006); Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc., 
Quarterly Report filed by Institutional Managers, Holdings (Form 13F-HR/A) (June 15, 
2006 ), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36121/000003612105000024/ 
csfb13fdec04amd4.txt (Dec. 12, 2006) (filing for the quarterly period ending Dec. 31, 
2004 (on behalf of Credit Suisse First Boston)); Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc, 
Quarterly Report filed by Institutional Managers, Holdings (Form 13F-HR/A) (May 15, 
2004), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36121/000003612103000009/ 
csfb13fjun02amd4.txt (last visited Dec. 12, 2006) (filing for quarterly period ending 
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successes Credit Suisse and Lampert’s RBS have achieved in obtaining 
confidentiality for Section 13(f) holdings, is testament that the current 
reporting regime is effective, and that confidentiality is an available 
form of relief for market participants, including Mr. Goldstein’s hedge 
funds. 
VI. THE GOLDSTEIN APPLICATION FOR 13F EXEMPTION 
No known procedures or rules of practice yet exist to evaluate the 
unprecedented justification for Goldstein’s October 24, 2006 exemption 
request and, according to Mr. Goldstein, the SEC has not yet ruled on 
the Goldstein Application.222  The articulated basis for Goldstein’s 
exemption (or compensation) theory is that his unique combination of 
Section 13(f) equity holdings is, in and of itself, a form of intellectual 
property—a trade secret.223  While Goldstein’s various equity 
allocations may not rival the top-secret Coca-Cola formula224 or the 
June 30, 2002); see also Company Information: Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc., 
available at http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=00000 
36121&type=&dateb=&owner=include&start=0&count=40 (last visited Dec. 12, 2006); 
SEC Division of Investment Management, Frequently Asked Questions About Form 
13F, May 2005, Question 46, available at http://sec.gov/divisions/investment/ 
13ffaq.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).  Two Credit Suisse confidential treatment 
filings, among many others: Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc., Quarterly Report filed by 
Institutional Managers, Holdings (Form13F-HR/A) (Aug. 31, 2005), available at 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36121/000003612105000027/csfb13fdec04amd5.txt 
(last visited Dec. 12, 2006) (filing for the quarterly period ending Dec. 31, 2004). 
 222. See Hamilton, supra note 194 (“‘We filed [a Form 13F] but it was blank,’ said 
Phillip Goldstein, a veteran investor who heads the $300 million-plus hedge fund group 
Bulldog Investors and affiliate Full Value Advisors. ‘We haven’t heard back from the 
SEC.’”). 
 223. See, e.g., RESTATMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
 224. Morning Call: Hedge Funds Spill the Beans, Mark Haines Interview with 
Phillip Goldstein and David Marder (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 12, 2006) 
(unpublished transcript, on file with The Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial 
Law).  In response to Haines’s suggestion that the reporting requirement is merely a 
“snapshot” of his portfolio, Goldstein likens the “snapshot” to forcing Coca-Cola to 
release a percentage of its trade secret recipe: 
Well, that’s true.  If you are arguing is it could be worse because you could have to 
publish every trade, I agree, but that’s like saying that Coca-Cola doesn’t have to 
publish its entire formula, but just maybe like thirty percent of all the ingredients, and 
that is not so bad. 
Id. 
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Kentucky Fried Chicken “Colonel’s Secret Recipe”225 in terms of pop 
culture notoriety, some commentators have not taken the market 
maverick’s windmill-tilting lightly, though at least one legal expert has 
correctly noted that Goldstein’s latest battle is actually not with the SEC, 
but that this time he has picked a fight with Congress.226
 225. Lori Pizzani, Hedge Fund to Challenge SEC, Again: Denial of 13f Regulatory 
Exemption to Prompt New Lawsuit, MONEY MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVE, Sept. 18, 2006 
at 6 (“Goldstein likens the requirement of having to divulge his securities holdings to a 
restaurant whose chef has to publish his best recipes once the restaurant achieves a 
certain level of revenues. ‘Disclosure sounds good, but what we’re really talking about 
are trade secrets,’ he said.”). 
 226. See, Michael Maiello, Hands Off My Stocks: Portfolio picks are intellectual 
property, says hedge fund manager Phil Goldstein, who wants the SEC to stop 
requiring disclosure, FORBES, Dec. 11, 2006, at 58, available at 
http://members.forbes.com/forbes/2006/1211/058b.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).  
Discussing Goldstein’s reasoning behind petitioning the SEC for exemption from 
disclosure: 
But Goldstein, 61, is petitioning the SEC to get exempted from the disclosure law. His 
argument is novel: His investments, he says, are his intellectual property--trade secrets 
that the SEC shouldn’t force him to reveal any more than it would ask Yum Brands to 
put the recipe for KFC chicken into its annual report. He even contends the law 
violates the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment: Disclosing his holdings is a ‘taking’ of 
his property without just compensation. 
Id.; see also Jenny Strasburg, Goldstein Asks SEC for Hedge-Fund Filing Exemption 
(Update1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ajWZjtcAeRUM (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (“‘This 
time he’s not challenging the SEC, he’s challenging Congress,’ because 13F filings 
stem from the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Irwin Latner, a partner at New 
York-based Herrick Feinstein LLP, said in an interview.  ‘It’s clearly more of an uphill 
battle.’”); Corporate and Securities Law Blog, available at 
http://corpandsecuritieslawblog.typepad.com/my_weblog/funds/index.html (Jan. 10, 
2007) (noting that “[a]lthough the court has been more willing in recent years to see 
excessive regulation as a ‘taking,’ it’s still a hard claim to make.  But, nobody thought 
[Goldstein] would win in June either.”) (emphasis added); Posting of Daniel O’Neill to 
The Legal Infrastructure of Business, available at http://picker.typepad.com/legal 
_infrastructure_of_b/2006/11/do_hedge_funds_.html (Nov. 7, 2006, 21:16 CST) (“In 
comparison to Coke, why does the government have the authority to demand this trade 
secret vs. a formula by Coca Cola?  In comparison to Coke, why does the government 
have the authority to demand [Goldstein’s] trade secret vs. a formula by Coca Cola?”); 
N.Y. TIMES Dealbook, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/10/26/ 
hedge-fund-libertarian-finds-new-target/#more-8811 (Oct. 26, 2006, 11:53 EDT); 
Posting of Press to Trade Secrets Blog, available at http://wombletradesecrets. 
blogspot.com/2006/09/hedge-funds-and-trade-secrets.html (Sept. 15, 2006, 8:06 
EDT)(stating that Goldstein raised “some serious arguments in favor of his position”); 
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According to at least one online financial publication, 
FINalternatives, Goldstein reportedly admitted that his Application was 
merely the “pretext for a lawsuit,” and presumably yet another round of 
high-profile litigation with the SEC, certain to keep Goldstein’s name in 
financial headlines for years to come.227  Mr. Goldstein’s reported 
admission that the Application is just a ploy to lure the SEC into further 
litigation might be perceived by a reviewing tribunal as indicia of bad 
faith.  Despite that possibility, Goldstein seems undeterred and went on 
the offensive during a December 2006 CNBC televised interview, 
during which he seemed to suggest that the SEC somehow duped 
Congress into passing Section 13(f) and stated: 
[T]here is no [legitimate government] interest, because the funny 
thing is, when they passed this law, the SEC told Congress that the 
reason they needed the law [Section 13(f)] was that they were going 
to review this data and come up with regulatory initiatives.  That was 
thirty-one years ago, and the SEC admitted that they do not look at 
the data so essentially you are making filings for no good reason at 
all . . . .228
The SEC did indicate the data would be used for policy 
development,229 and this Article is replete with valid regulatory and 
Greg Norton, Naked Shorts, available at http://nakedshorts.typepad.com/ 
nakedshorts/2006/10/goldstein_plead.html (Oct. 26, 2006) (noting sardonically in an 
entry titled Goldstein pleads the Fifth that Goldstein’s “20-odd dense pages of argument 
that will doubtless provide SEC staff and commissioners with hours of diversion from 
their current core mission of ducking Senate committee inquiries about how 
enthusiastically insider trading laws get enforced when the alleged miscreants are more 
important than, say, Business Week printing plant managers.”). 
 227. See Victorious Goldstein Aims For A Second Regulatory Win, 
FINALTERNATIVES.COM, Sept. 13, 2006, available at http://www.finalternatives.com/ 
node/403 (registration required—search “Victorious Goldstein” in the link frame) (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2007) 
The man who more or less single-handedly (with an assist from the federal courts) 
killed the Securities and Exchange Commission’s hedge fund registration requirement 
has seemingly developed a taste for blood.   Phillip Goldstein of Bulldog Investors, 
who filed the registration suit against the SEC, is taking aim at the regulator’s 
portfolio disclosure requirement. . . .  According to Goldstein, the rule forces funds to 
give up their trade secrets, and “investors are relying on your trade secrets to earn 
money.”  He said he would seek an exemption from the requirement as a pretext for a 
lawsuit, since the SEC is unlikely to take the bait and make his fund an exception. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 228. Morning Call, supra note 224. 
 229. Final Rule 1978, supra note 50, at 2. 
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public purposes, despite Mr. Goldstein’s oft-stated viewpoint that there 
is no legitimate reason for Section 13 disclosures.230  Comment letters 
on a variety of SEC proposed rules, for example, referenced 13F 
filings,231 while the legislative history strongly suggests that Form 13F 
data would improve the availability of “factual data about large 
investment managers,” to individuals, federal and state regulatory 
agencies, and other investment managers.232  In an ironic twist, some of 
the suggested uses for 13F filings quoted in the Goldstein Application 
were submitted to the SEC during the rule making process.233  Despite 
the uses he suggested, Goldstein’s statement argued that the “primary 
purpose was to fill the information gap about the activities of 
institutional investment managers that would enable the Commission to 
devise regulatory initiatives.”234
The Goldstein Application asserts that the legitimate government 
interest in advancing laws and regulations to augment the “integrity” of 
American securities markets is “not the objective of [Section] 13(f).”235  
 230. See  Pizzani, supra note 225, at 6. 
 231. Letter from WR Hambrecht & Co. to the Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers (NASD) 
to Request a Comment on the Proposed Rule Governing Allocations and Distributions 
of Shares in Initial Public Offerings (Jan. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/strategy/bill_pov/200401/index.html (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2006) (citing “WR Hambrecht & Co data, co-managed institutional pot lists 
and 13F filings” as a source for the chart presented). 
 232. Conference Report, supra note 27, at *85.  The report emphasizes the 
importance of collecting investment data to enable “reasoned discussion,” explaining 
that: 
The lack of such data has prevented and inhibited careful consideration by interested 
persons of the public policy implications. While expanding the reporting burden for 
certain institutional investment managers may result in some initial expense to some 
investment managers, it is nevertheless clear that it is now appropriate to begin to 
accumulate such a body of data to permit reasoned discussion and decisions about the 
influence and impact of the large institutional investment managers on the securities 
markets. 
Id. 
 233. Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 3 n.1 (statement of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission) (citing Hearings on Securities Act Amendments of 1975 Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Protection and Finance of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 545 (1977)) (suggesting 13(f) information be used for analysis of 
institutional holdings, the effect of institutional trading, etc.). 
 234. Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 3. 
 235. Id. at 4. 
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The legislative history, however, compels a different conclusion.  “The 
primary purpose of this section of the bill,” according to the conference 
report, “was to create a central depository of historical and current data 
about the investment activities of investment managers.  The Committee 
believes that subjecting certain institutional investment managers to the 
reporting requirements of the bill will advance two important public 
policy and regulatory objectives.”236  Thus, Congress specifically 
recognized that “with the dissemination of data about institutional 
investment managers, an institutional disclosure program should 
stimulate a higher degree of confidence among all investors in the 
integrity of our securities markets.”237
Another instance of Goldstein’s clever sleight-of-hand wordplay 
relates to the question of the “value” of Section 13(f) disclosures.  
Goldstein uses pretzel-logic when confronted with the issue of the 
“staleness” of Form 13F data as not posing any threat of significant 
harm to 13F filers, rhetorically noting that if the data is “worthless,” then 
its collection must certainly be nothing more than an “arbitrary 
exercise.”238  For whatever reason, Goldstein neglects to consider, 
facetiously or not, the many meanings of “value,” including, for 
example, the inherent utility of aggregated data to spot and forecast 
trends.  JPMorgan Chase & Co. apparently found value in 13F data 
when it recently announced that it “is the leading depositary bank in 
Latin America,” for ADRs (“American Depositary Receipts”), as did 
The Bank of New York when it announced the release of its annual 
year-end report and included remarks regarding the international ADR 
market.239  Both JP Morgan Chase & Co. and The Bank of New York’s 
 236. Conference Report, supra note 27, at *85. 
 237. Id. at *82. 
 238. John Carney, DealBreaker of the Year Candidate: Phil Goldstein, 
DEALBREAKER.COM, Dec. 13, 2006, available at http://www.dealbreaker.com/ 
2006/12/dealbreaker_of_the_year_candid_4.php (last visited Dec. 14, 2006). 
 239. Press Release, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Petrobras Selects JPMorgan for $25 
Billion ADR Program, (Jan. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/Satellite?c=JPM_Content_C&cid=1159304758690&pag
ename=JPM_redesign%2FJPM_Content_C%2FGeneric_Detail_Page_Template (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2007) (“JPMorgan is the leading depositary bank in Latin America, 
maintaining more than 65% of the Brazilian ADR market as measured by ADRs held 
by institutional investors (based on most recent Form 13F filings with the SEC).”); see 
also, Press Release, The Bank of New York, Depositary Receipt Trading Volume 
Increases Nearly 60%, Approaching Two Trillion Dollars in 2006, (Jan. 16, 2007), 
available at http://www.bankofny.com/htmlpages/npr_2007_2402.htm (last visited 
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recent ADR market-related statements were based upon 13F data. 
VII. WHETHER THE COCA-COLA FORMULA OR A KO LONG,  
WHAT IS A TRADE SECRET? 
The trade secret has been regarded as among “the most elusive and 
difficult concepts in the law to define.”240  Significant aspects of U.S. 
trade secret doctrine (including the prevailing definition that is still 
widely used today) can be, in part, traced back to the “New Deal” era 
and the introduction of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, which 
according to the definition of trade secrets found within its comment, 
may consist of: 
[A]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which 
is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to 
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.  It 
may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of 
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a 
machine or other device, or a list of customers.241
The drafters of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS firmly 
established the foundation of trade secret doctrine in the concept of a 
confidential relationship, and a corresponding duty of good faith owed 
by one to maintain the other’s entrusted confidences, regarding almost 
any conceivable sort of confidential proprietary commercial information.  
Of course, Goldstein has, for whatever reason, elected not to submit a 
confidential treatment application to the SEC on behalf of his “Bulldog” 
funds and, as a result, nothing even resembling a confidential 
relationship exists between the SEC and Goldstein as it relates to his 
Section 13(f) portfolio holdings. 
The U.S. Supreme Court followed the RESTATEMENT’s definition in 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. and specifically noted that the subject 
matter of any trade secret “must not be of public knowledge or of a 
general knowledge in the trade or business.”242  Common law precursors 
Mar. 25, 2007). 
 240. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 241. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939). 
 242. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974) (citing B.F. 
Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); Nat’l Tube 
Co. v. E. Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 459 (Muskingum County Ct. 1902), aff’d, 69 
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to the 1939 RESTATEMENT’s duty-based doctrine can also be found 
scattered throughout Industrial Revolution-era opinions, many of which 
still remain valid and controlling authority.243  Similarly, unfair 
competition law, from which much of modern trade secret protection is 
also derived, has a nearly two-century legacy in U.S. common law.244
It is the secrecy of the information itself that must create some sort 
of a competitive advantage (and a resultant economic value) for the 
“holder” of the secret, and “protection [is] accorded [to] the trade secret 
holder against the disclosure or unauthorized use of the trade secret by 
those to whom the secret has been confided under the express or implied 
restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse.”245  When one obtains the 
confidential proprietary information that qualifies as a trade secret of 
another through means that are deemed to be “improper,” the trade 
secret may be considered to have been misappropriated, and the holder 
of that trade secret may be able to prevent any further use (or disclosure) 
of the secret through injunctive relief, and can seek to be made whole for 
the misappropriation through a claim for damages.246  It is worth noting 
that what is considered “improper means” is typically determined on a 
case-by-case basis,247 and conduct by private actors that has been 
Ohio St. 560 (1903)). 
 243. See id.at 475 (citing Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. 
Reprint 154, 156 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1887) (“This necessary element of secrecy is not lost, 
however, if the holder of the trade secret reveals the trade secret to another in 
confidence, and under an implied obligation not to use or disclose it.”). 
 244. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164-68 
(1989); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (“A trade secret 
is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and 
that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic 
advantage over others.”).  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. d, 
however, includes the requirement that one must knowingly or recklessly possess (or 
disclose) another’s trade secret wrongfully, saying that “to subject an actor to 
liability . . . the owner [of trade secret] need not prove that the actor knew that its 
possession of the trade secret was wrongful, it is sufficient if the actor had reason to 
know.” Section 41 affirms the “duty of confidence” concept much like the doctrine 
developed based upon RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, supra note 241. 
 245. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 475. 
 246. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th 
Cir. 1970) (holding that a defendant who took aerial photographs of a plaintiff’s yet-to-
be-completed factory used improper means to obtain a trade secret). 
 247. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995) 
(updating the “improper means” definition to include “unauthorized interception of 
communications” and acts that are “either wrongful in themselves or wrongful under 
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construed as actionable trade secret misappropriation, has also been held 
to be completely proper (and constitutional) when committed by the 
government in the furtherance of regulatory or law enforcement 
objectives.248  The Goldstein Application conspicuously avoided any 
discussion of the traditional deference that is typically afforded to the 
government when performing regulatory functions. 
A. Are Trade Secrets Private Property? 
The Kewanee Oil Court opined that trade secrets have “no property 
dimension” and stated that the term property as applied to trade secrets, 
“is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the 
primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good 
faith.”249  The Kewanee Oil Court, however, also apparently 
contemplated the “theft of a trade secret,” which necessarily implies 
certain property attributes, and intertwined such a hypothetical “theft” 
with torts remedies and the breach of a contract.250  Similarly, civil 
 
the circumstances of the case”). 
 248. Compare Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (government 
(“EPA”) aerial surveillance is not considered to be an unconstitutional search or seizure 
in violation of U.S. CONST. amend. IV), with E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 431 F.2d 
1012 (5th Cir. 1970) (private aerial surveillance determined to be “improper means” in 
context of trade secret misappropriation claim).  Compare, California v. Greenwood 
486 U.S. 35 (1988) (no privacy interest is violated when the government obtains 
evidence from garbage placed at residential curbside), with Tennant v. Advanced 
Mach., 355 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (so-called “dumpster diving” to obtain 
competitive intelligence can constitute improper means in context of trade secret 
misappropriation claim). 
 249. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 497-98 (1974) (citing E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917)(stating that 
“[t]rade secrets often are unpatentable . . . [and in] that event there is no federal policy 
which is contravened when an injunction to bar disclosure of a trade secret is issued”)); 
see also id. at 497 n.3 (citing S. OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 264-65 (2d ed. 
1965); Milgrim, Trade Secret Protection and Licensing, 4 PAT. L. REV. 375 (1972) 
(discussing further contrasts between patents and trade secret doctrines)). 
 250. Id. at 498 (citing Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(“A suit to redress theft of a trade secret is grounded in tort damages for breach of a 
contract . . . .”).  Examples of other courts that have contemplated potential theft of a 
trade secret include: Christianson v. Colt Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 804-05 
(1988); Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir.1975); Tedder Boat 
Ramp Sys., Inc. v. Hillsborough Cty., 54 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1303 (D. Fla. 1999); 
Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C&P Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55, 63 (D. Fla. 1972). 
1146 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
causes of action exist for trade secret misappropriation, which further 
suggests that there must be some element of property at issue for such a 
tort to exist. 
What property rights, if any, are embodied in a trade secret?  
According to the intellectual property treatise MILGRIM ON TRADE 
SECRETS, the concept of a trade secret embraces, at a minimum, the 
holder’s right to exclude others and to dictate the manner in which the 
trade secret is used.251  Judge Taft (later President Taft, and later still, 
Chief Justice Taft of the United States Supreme Court) defined the 
ephemeral characteristic of the property rights embodied in trade secrets 
doctrine within his seminal Cincinnati Bell Foundry opinion: 
The property in a secret process is the power to make use of it to the 
exclusion of the world. If the world knows the process, then the 
property disappears. There can be no property in a process, and no 
right of protection if knowledge of it is common to the world.252
Professor Jonathan S. Shapiro has noted that trade secrets are “some 
of the most valuable property” in American companies’ possession,253 
and Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has commented that the very “future of the nation depends in no 
small part on the efficiency of industry, and the efficiency of industry 
depends in no small part on the protection of intellectual property.”254
An undisclosed trade secret could conceivably exist in perpetuity.255  
 251. 1-2 ROGER M. MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (Release No. 83 2006) 
(“[T]he right of the owner of the trade secret to use and disclose it to others subject to 
restrictions on their use and disclosure.”). 
 252. Nat’l Starch Prods. Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 357, 360 (1st 
Dept. 1948) (quoting Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 
(Ohio Super. Ct. 1887)). 
 253. Jonathan S. Shapiro, Protecting Trade Secrets in an IP Audit, 228 N.Y.L.J., 
Oct. 21, 2002, at S4 (col. 1). 
 254. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 
1991) (interpreting Illinois trade secret law to hold that a factual issue as to whether a 
manufacturer took reasonable precautions to protect its trade secrets in its piece part 
drawings used to manufacture replacement parts precluded summary judgment). 
 255. Cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 766 F. Supp. 670, 689 n.19 
(1991) (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)).  
Of course, confidential information that comprises a trade secret must also represent at 
least a modicum of economic value (e.g., a competitive advantage over actual or 
potential competitors) to the holder, and reasonable efforts to guard the secret must be 
expended by the holder in order for that confidential information to remain a protectable 
2007 HOGGING THE HEDGE? 1147 
 “BULLDOG’S” 13F THEORY MAY NOT BE SO LUCKY 
 
A trade secret can also exist in an almost Lockean combination of 
characteristics and components, each of which may well exist by itself 
within the public domain (and not independently constitute trade 
secrets), but the unified process, design and operation of which, in its 
unique and otherwise unknown combined whole, typically created by 
the efforts of the putative trade secret holder, affords the holder 
competitive advantages that are a protectable secret.256  The government 
has acknowledged that trade secrets can constitute property under state 
law, and the U.S. Supreme Court has found that a trade secret can be 
considered property, which under certain circumstances may be 
protected by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.257
Trade secrets have also been considered alienable property 
interests, according to transactional documents on file with the SEC.258  
trade secret.  Cf. id. at 679 (“In this case Colt has made several very plausible economic 
arguments that the protection of trade secrets through contractual obligations as they 
used in this case enhances overall efficiency . . . .”). 
 256. See, e.g., Integrated Cash Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Transactions, Inc., 920 
F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying New York law); see also 3M v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 
587, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A trade secret can exist in a combination of 
characteristics and components, each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but the 
unified process, design and operation of which, in unique combination, affords a 
competitive advantage and is a protectable secret.”); Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Nat’l 
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1965); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 
F.2d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 1953); Ferroline Corp. v. Gen. Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 
912, 921 (7th Cir. 1953); Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 
1958); Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 144 A.2d 306, 309 (Conn. 1958); Sun Dial Corp. v. 
Rideout, 108 A.2d 442, 445 (N.J. 1954); see generally JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON 
PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES, (1980). 
 257. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-03 (1984) (applying 
Missouri law and finding that a trade secret was property, and could consequently be 
protected from government confiscation pursuant to the “takings clause” of  U.S. 
CONST. amend. V); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riders, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1042 n.45 (2005) (citing Lynn C. Tyler, Trade Secrets in 
Indiana: Property vs. Relationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 339 (1998) (“Commentators have 
argued that the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, in force in forty-two states, adopts the view 
that trade secrets are property.”)). 
 258. See, e.g., Asset Purchase Agreement between Mayne Pharma, PLC and 
SuperGen, Inc., and Eurogen Pharms., Ltd., at § 1.31 (Nov. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/919722/000110465906078099/a06-
24665_1ex2d1.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) (filed Nov. 28, 2006 with the SEC via 
Edgar as “Exhibit 2.1” to SuperGen, Inc., Current Report of Material Events or Corp. 
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Not entirely unlike an expired leasehold, or a terminated easement, 
mineral profit, or a vacated ingress-egress license in the realm of real 
property (or for that matter, a software, film, photo, literary or music 
license in the intellectual property digital realm), trade secret property 
rights can also be terminated, typically by public disclosure.259  Once an 
applicant seeks patent protection with the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, in an application which details what was previously confidential 
proprietary information, the applicant loses any pre-existing trade secret 
status if a patent is granted and the application data is disclosed to the 
public.260  Other examples abound where a private actor seeks benefits 
from the government in exchange for certain social benefits (i.e., a 
limited monopoly is granted to the holder of a copyright in exchange for 
the copyrighted material joining the public domain at the conclusion of 
the copyright term).261  Intellectual property in general, and trade secret 
protection in particular, are not traditional property rights, but rather are 
a function of law.  Whether that protection is judge-made or legislated, 
Changes (Form 8-K) (Nov. 25, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/919722/000110465906078099/a06-24665_18k.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2007)).  
This agreement defines “Intangible” as: “[A]ny and all of the following and any and all 
rights and interests in, arising out of, or associated therewith, throughout the 
world, . . . all inventions (whether patentable or not), formulas, algorithms, methods, 
processes, discoveries, invention disclosures and trade secrets . . . .”  Id. 
 259. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985) (finding 
that a trade secret property right can be lost if the purported secrets are disclosed by the 
company to individuals who do not have a duty to preserve the information’s 
confidentiality and determining that because of the ruling in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 
467 U.S. 986 (1984), registrants who submitted data with notice of the disclosing 
scheme established by the 1978 amendments to FIBRA could no longer claim a 
property interest under state law in data subjected to mandatory disclosure by said 
Amendments). 
 260. See, e.g., Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding 
that disclosure of trade secrets in patent cuts off right to prevent disclosure or use by 
others); see also Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1050 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s determination that Missouri law properly treated 
trade secrets as a property right and, accordingly, once plaintiff published its patent in a 
patent publication, plaintiff lost future trade secret rights against a confidential 
disclosee).  However, the loss of trade secret property rights in such an instance are 
replaced with property rights in a limited patent monopoly over the invention, provided 
of course, that the related patent application is granted. 
 261. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”); see 
generally Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106, (2002). 
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the privileges afforded are largely dependent upon correlative public 
benefits, and perceived encroachments onto those privileges, such as a 
regulatory requirement to report certain securities holdings, are probably 
much closer to a rebalancing of that relationship than to any sort of 
unconstitutional “taking.” 
The Goldstein Application implicitly contended that in light of his 
investment acumen, the particular assemblage of securities gathered by 
Goldstein’s unspecified efforts are a protectable trade secret.  This is the 
case, despite the fact that the names and ticker symbols of each of the 
particular Section 13(f) securities contained in his hedge funds’ portfolio 
holdings are known and readily ascertainable to the investing public.262  
In the abstract, it would appear that closely guarded secret details of a 
portfolio might be considered a compilation of information that is 
appropriate for trade secret protection.  Whether Goldstein effectively 
established that his Section 13(f) equity holdings are in fact trade secrets 
worthy of exemption from public disclosure is certainly another question 
altogether. 
B. Trade Secrets Are Creatures of State Law 
The Goldstein Application was filed in the name of Full Value 
Advisors, LLC et al., apparently of Pleasantville, New York.263  
Goldstein reportedly moved his hedge fund operations to Saddleback, 
New Jersey, however, at least five weeks prior to filing the Application, 
and did not disclose the domicile of, or the laws under which, any of the 
entities on whose behalf the Goldstein Application seeks exemption 
relief were organized or registered.264  Presumably, the question of 
 
 262. See McCormack, supra note 22.  Goldstein told BUSINESSWEEK magazine, 
“I’m saying my investments, as a whole, are trade secrets.  It would be like we’re going 
to take one of your copyrighted articles, but we want to take this paragraph and take it 
out of the copyright.”  See also Integrated Cash Mgmt. Serv. v. Digital Transactions, 
920 F.2d 171, 174 (2d. Cir. 1990) (applying New York law and holding that “[the] way 
in which [the] various components fit together as building blocks in order to form the 
unique whole” is a trade secret). 
 263. Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 4-5. 
 264. See Goldstein Application, supra note 12.  The Goldstein Application initially 
identifies the applicants as “Full Value Advisors, LLC et al.”  Goldstein Application, 
supra note 12, at 1, 2.  Mr. Goldstein identified entities known as “Oak Value Fund,” 
“Full Value Partners, LP,” apparently as Co-Applicants, Goldstein Application, supra 
note 12 at 3, 4.  Nowhere in the Application are the domiciles of any of these 
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whether Goldstein holds a protectable property interest would be 
accordingly governed by New York trade secret law in that it is the only 
potential locus identified in the Application.265  The Third Circuit has 
addressed at least one matter where a question of Pennsylvania versus 
New Jersey conflict of trade secret law existed, and found little 
substantive difference.266  For the purposes of this discussion, New York 
trade secret principles are presumptively applied based upon the 
Application’s use of a New York address.  Both New Jersey and New 
York base their trade secret doctrines on principles set forth in the 
Applicants identified.  The New Jersey Secretary of State’s records do note, however, in 
filing No. 0600118277, that a “Full Value Advisors, LLC,” is registered as a New 
Jersey domestic business organization.  See New Jersey State Business Gateway 
Service Website, available at https://www.accessnet.state.nj.us/home.asp (business 
name search for “Full Value Advisors”) (last visited Jan. 21, 2007); see also, Goldstein 
Opening Brief, supra note 10, at *1; see also, Complaint, RMR Hospitality & Real 
Estate v. Bulldog Investors Gen. P’ship et al., Civ. Action No. 06-4054 (Middlesex 
County (Mass.) Super. Ct. 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1278038/000110465906076852/a06-23938_4ex99d1.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) 
(alleging that Goldstein’s hedge fund entities use Westchester County, New York and 
Bergen County, New Jersey addresses interchangeably and that various Goldstein-
controlled hedge fund entities were formed under either Ohio or New York law).  An 
entity known as “Bulldog Investors, LLC” is registered as a domestic Limited Liability 
Company with the Ohio Secretary of State.  See Bulldog Investors, LLC, Ohio Corp. 
Records & Bus. Registrations Identification No. 1167223 (filed June 1, 2000).  See also 
Bulldog Investors Gen. P’ship, Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Schedule 13D/A) 
(Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/897951/ 
000136477306000008/thirdamend.txt (last visited Dec. 2, 2006) (stating both the 
Pleasantville, N.Y. and Saddle Brook, N.J. addresses within the same disclosure 
document regarding Bulldog’s beneficial ownership and control of shares in the Mun. 
Advantage Fund, Inc.); Warren Boroson, Goldstein Beat SEC on Hedge Fund Rule, 
NEW JERSEY DAILYRECORD.COM, Sept. 17, 2006, (“Phil Goldstein, 61, just moved his 
offices from Pleasantville, N.Y., to Saddle Brook in Bergen County [New Jersey].  I 
heard him talk Monday at a press conference in New York and interviewed him 
Thursday.”). 
 265. Goldstein Application, supra note 12. 
 266. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas v. ADCO Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424 (3rd Cir. 1982).  
The applicability of Ohio trade secret law is also a possibility considering the ambiguity 
of the Goldstein Application.  General Ohio trade secret principles are thoroughly 
discussed in Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E. 2d 685 (Cuy. Cty. 
Common Pleas 1952).  See also Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 
(1974) (citing B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 498 (1963) and 
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hargadine, 392 F.2d 9, 14 (C.A. 6 1968)) (stating that “Ohio [like 
New York and New Jersey] has adopted the widely relied-upon definition of a trade 
secret found at RESTATEMENT [(FIRST)] OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939).”). 
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RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS.267
C. Trade Secret Ingredients 
The Goldstein Application conclusively declares that the 
component securities of his portfolio holdings are de facto trade 
secrets.268  Notwithstanding the glaring potential conflicts of law issues 
that might exist due to the absence of any identified domiciles of the 
various “Bulldog” entities that are the putative co-applicants, there is 
scant reference to any of the required elements for a prima facie trade 
secret claim.  Considering the paucity of any facts relating to the 
elements required pursuant to New York state law, if the rhetoric of the 
Goldstein Application were to be asserted as a civil claim, it would not 
likely survive a motion to dismiss due to its failure to state a claim for 
which relief could be granted.269  A successful civil claimant for trade 
secret misappropriation must establish that: (i) it possesses a trade 
secret, and (ii) the defendant(s) is using that trade secret “in breach of an 
agreement, confidence, or duty, or as a result of discovery by improper 
 
 267. J. Christopher Jensen et al., Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 4 N.Y. 
PRACTICE SERIES: COMMERCIAL LITIG. IN N.Y. STATE COURTS, § 81:4 (ROBERT L. HAIG 
ed., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Jensen] (citing Ashland Mgmt., Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 
395 (1993) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b)). See also; Wiener 
v. Lazard Freres & Co., 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (1st Dept. 1998); Softel, Inc. v. Dragon 
Med. & Scientific Commc’ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 968 (2d Cir. 1997); U.S. Reinsurance 
Corp. v. Humphreys, 618 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273 (1st Dept. 1994); Delta Filter Corp. v. 
Morin, 485 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (3d Dept. 1985); Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Pico, Inc., 
453 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (4th Dept. 1982).  The general definition explains which 
elements a plaintiff needs to establish in order to prove a misappropriation: 
The essential first step for a trade secret plaintiff is to prove that the information 
sought to be protected qualifies as a trade secret. The New York Court of Appeals has 
stated that, while there is no universally accepted definition of a trade secret, New 
York courts generally adopt the definition suggested by the 1939 RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS: “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which 
is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage 
over competitors who do not know or use it.” 
Id. 
 268. See, e.g., Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 4. (“Unless exempted from 
[Section] 13(f)(1), the Applicants would have to publicly disclose their trade secrets 
without compensation in violation of the Taking [sic] Clause of [U.S. CONST. amend. 
V]”). 
 269. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
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means.”270  Many New York state courts address the first element and 
premise decisions largely on whether the information at issue is 
considered a trade secret, without any reference to the second element of 
unlawful or “improper means” of appropriation.271  Of course exceptions 
exist,272 and it has typically been federal courts that have articulated a 
two-part analysis as the proper test for successful assertion of a trade 
secrets misappropriation claim while applying New York state trade 
secrets law.273
D. New York Definition of “Trade Secret” 
The threshold question in a New York civil trade secret claim is 
whether the information at issue is actually a trade secret, and the 
“single most important factor in determining whether particular 
information is a trade secret is whether the information is kept secret.”274  
While no one generally accepted definition of a trade secret exists in 
New York, according to the Court of Appeals, courts have traditionally 
employed the 1939 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS definition.275  The 
 
 270. Jensen supra note 267, at § 81:3, (citing Hudson Hotels Corp. v. Choice Hotels 
Int’l., 995 F.2d 1173, 1176 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Nadel v. 
Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2000); Integrated Cash 
Mgmt. Services., Inc. v. Digital Transactions, Inc., 920 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1990); 
Kadant, Inc. v. Seeley Machine, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 19, 35 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); LinkCo, 
Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 271. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 
(5th Cir. 1970) (stating that not all acts of “improper means” of acquiring a trade secret 
are necessarily illegal).  The DuPont court determined that aerial photo surveillance 
over a factory under construction was an “improper means” of acquiring a trade secret, 
despite the fact that the act of surveillance in no way constituted a trespass or any other 
illegal act.  Id. at 1016-17. 
 272. Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:3 (citing DoubleClick v. Henderson, 1997 WL 
731413 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1997). 
 273. Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:3. 
 274. Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 418 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Ivy Mar 
Co. v. C.R. Seasons, Ltd., 907 F. Supp. 547, 556 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
 275. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) TORTS § 757 (1939) (defining trade secrets as “any 
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, 
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do 
not know or use it”); see also, Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:4 (citing Softel, Inc. v. 
Dragon Med. and Scientific Commc’ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 968 (2d Cir. 1997); Wiener 
v. Lazard Freres & Co., 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (1st Dept. 1998); U.S. Reinsurance Corp. v. 
Humphreys, 618 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273 (1st Dept. 1994); Ashland Mgmt., Inc. v. Janien, 
604 N.Y.S.2d 912, 918 (1993); Delta Filter Corp. v. Morin, 485 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (3d 
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“New Deal” era definition was somewhat supplanted by a slightly 
modified modern description set forth in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, which is occasionally referenced by New York 
jurists, and characterizes a trade secret as “any information that can be 
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is 
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic 
advantage over others.”276  The modern definition does broaden the 
categories of potentially protectable subject matter to include “any 
information,” but limits the “do not know or use it” portion of the 
definition by requiring the information to be “secret” and further 
articulates that the secret must in fact be “sufficiently valuable.”277  
Multiple potentially outcome-determinative nuances exist within these 
broad definitions, in terms of eligible trade secret subject matter, and in 
terms of the required competitive advantage and secrecy components.278  
Dept. 1985); Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Pico, Inc., 453 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (4th Dept. 
1982)). 
 276. Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (1st Dept. 1998) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995)). 
 277. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995), with 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
 278. Jensen, supra note 267.  Secrecy is widely considered to be the “most 
important” and an “essential prerequisite” consideration in New York trade secret 
litigation.  See, e.g., Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 F. Supp. 1205, 1223 (W.D.N.Y. 
1994); Atmospherics, Ltd. v. Hansen, 702 N.Y.S.2d 385 (2d Dept. 2000).  Curiously, 
the Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 7, conclusively states, without citing any 
further factual or legal support, that “[t]he Applicants’ investments are trade secrets” 
and references the “trade secrets” definition in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 
cmt. a, as applied in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), and for some 
reason, the definition contained in The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1831.  See Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 7 n.7.  The Application further 
states that “[t]he entire value of a trade secret lies in its secrecy.  Once a trade secret is 
publicly disclosed, its entire economic value even though the owner can continue to use 
it.” Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 7.  See also Jensen, supra note 267, at 
§ 81:6 (citing Frink Am., Inc. v. Champion Road Mach., Ltd., 48 F. Supp. 2d 198 
(N.D.N.Y. 1999); Schriptek Mktg., Inc. v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., 589 N.Y.S.2d 
656, 658-59 (3d Dept. 1992); Delta Filter Corp. v. Morin, 485 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (3d 
Dept. 1985)).  The concept of secrecy in New York depends upon the standard of 
“substantial exclusivity of knowledge” and “the employment of precautionary measures 
to preserve such exclusive knowledge by limiting legitimate access by others.”  Jensen, 
supra note 267, at § 81:6.  By contrast, the Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 6 
makes little reference to the methods, policies, procedures and practices used (if any) to 
protect or “police” the purported trade secrets.  The application goes on to state that: 
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New York courts are likely to evaluate the relative ease with which a 
purported secret can be independently replicated by others in the field 
who possess reasonable knowledge,279 but often first employ the 
following six-factor threshold analysis to determine the question of 
whether a trade secret is even in dispute: 
(i) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the] 
business; (ii) the extent to which it is known by employees and 
others involved in [the] business; (iii) the extent of measures taken 
by [the business] to guard the secrecy of the information; (iv) the 
value of the information to [the business] and [its] competitors; (v) 
the amount of effort or money expended by [the business] in 
developing the information; (vi) the ease or difficulty with which the 
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.280
It is highly improbable that any New York tribunal would interpret 
the factual averments within the Goldstein Application as satisfying the 
six-prong burden, and neither should the SEC.281  Certain factual 
subtleties that must be addressed by a successful trade secrets claimant 
are altogether absent from the Goldstein Application and could 
conceivably thwart his latest campaign.  While no apparent framework 
Applicants generally do not publicly disclose their investments.  Moreover, the 
Applicants generally do not disclose their investments to investors in their funds nor 
do they provide a condensed schedule of such investments in their funds’ financial 
statements, much less a complete schedule, even though a condensed schedule is 
required to obtain an unqualified audit opinion.  Their funds’ financial statements 
contain [an] explanatory note. 
Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 6. 
 279. Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:8 (citing Ashland Mgmt., Inc. v. Janien, 82 
N.Y.2d 395 (1993) (stating that trade secret protection is not available for an investment 
strategy model that a financial analyst could reproduce from publicly disclosed 
information)); Garvin Guy Butler Corp. v. Cowen & Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 56, 59 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1992). 
 280. Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:8 (quoting Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & 
Scientific Commc’ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 968 (2d Cir. 1997);  Tactica Int’l., Inc. v. 
Atlantic Horizon Int’l., Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 586, 606 (S.D. N.Y. 2001); Ashland 
Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395, 404 (1993); Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 672 
N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (1st Dept. 1998); Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Pico, Inc., 453 N.Y.S.2d 
470, 472 (4th Dept. 1982)). 
 281. See Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 16-18 (ignoring in large part the 
first five prongs of the New York trade secret test, and placing almost all of its 
emphasis on the sixth, through cited excerpts from various financial publications that 
have featured articles regarding the past portfolio holdings of other “celebrity” 
investment managers). 
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for review of Goldstein’s request currently exists, it seems plausible that 
the SEC might apply an analysis similar to that employed with 
confidential treatment applications (as discussed above), only modified 
to evaluate whether a meritorious showing exists in support of the novel 
theory for exemption.  Such a finding would seem implausible based 
upon the facts. 
1. Trade Secrets Must Be Kept Secret—Reasonable Efforts  
and Improper Means 
New York courts evaluate the measures used to preserve exclusivity 
of information, and such measures must guard the secret from outsiders 
and within the workplace.282  Secrecy need not be “absolute,”283 but “a 
substantial element of secrecy,” must exist to the extent that it would be 
difficult to acquire the information absent “improper means.”284  
Unfortunately for the fate of the Goldstein Application, it contains 
almost nothing to demonstrate any measures used by the “Bulldog” to 
guard his purported “secret,” nor were any “improper means” 
attributable to conduct of the government cited.  A prudent trade secret 
holder would employ reasonable efforts to exclude others from the 
secret and guard against its public disclosure.285  Such reasonable efforts 
 
 282. Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:9 (citing Delta Filter Corp. v. Morin, 485 
N.Y.S.2d 143, 145 (3d Dept. 1985). 
 283. Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:9 (citing Inflight Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Magazines In-Flight, LLC, 990 F. Supp. 119, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Monovis, Inc. v. 
Aquino, 905 F. Supp. 1205, 1224 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)). 
 284. Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:9 (citing Schriptek Mktg., Inc. v. Columbus 
McKinnon Corp., 589 N.Y.S.2d 656, 659 (3d Dept. 1992); Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 
905 F. Supp. 1205, 1224 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)); see also E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Christopher, 431 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1970) (discussing “improper means”).  In Rockwell 
Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1991) 
Judge Posner expressed that “reasonability” is a function of the specific circumstances 
unique to the case at bar: 
[O]nly in an extreme case can what is a ‘reasonable’ precaution be 
determined on a motion for summary judgment, because the answer depends 
on a balancing of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case and so 
require estimation and measurement by persons knowledgeable in the 
particular field of endeavor involved . . . and therefore perfect security is not 
optimum security. 
Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d at 179-80. 
 285. See, e.g., Lori McLeod, Hedge fund fights to keep ‘trade secrets’ Disclosure 
challenge, FINANCIAL POST (Canada), Sept. 18, 2006, available at 
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would be likely to include, at a minimum: limiting employee access to 
any proprietary information;286 demanding that employees, agents, 
contractors and others with access to the information execute non-
disclosure agreements;287 avoiding access to the “secret” by outsiders; 
and allowing only those who “need to know” to gain access.288  This is 
http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=e7e8e234-0792-4cfe-95e8-
38099e84de8b (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).  The article, speaking of the merits of  
Goldstein’s argument, emphasize the manner and extent to which ‘secret information’ is 
kept secret, saying: 
Depending on how well-protected information about his holdings is, Mr. Goldstein’s 
argument may well have legal merit, said Talcott Franklin, an intellectual property 
lawyer at law firm Patton Boggs, and author of Protecting the Brand. 
“If he’s managed to keep this information completely secret until now, it could fit the 
definition of a trade secret,’ Mr. Franklin said.  ‘That definition is very broad, it can 
involve any formula, compilation, pattern or device whose use in business gives the 
operator a competitive advantage.” 
A protectable secret has to be well guarded by a company, difficult for the public to 
figure out, and a firm should have expended considerable resources on it, said another 
lawyer who asked not to be named. He agreed with Mr. Franklin’s view that a money 
manager’s holdings could fit the bill. 
Id. 
 286. Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:9 (citing Hancock v. Essential Res., Inc., 792 F. 
Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that customer materials did not constitute trade 
secret where “all personnel had access to” information and plaintiff “imposed no 
restrictions or guidelines” concerning the circulation of customer lists among 
employees); Downtown Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. Carron, 655 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dept. 
1997) (holding that a patient list was not a trade secret where it was left on a computer 
accessible to everyone in a medical suite)).  The Goldstein Application identified no 
specific procedures, policies, practices or methods employed (“reasonable efforts”) in 
order to preserve any purported “secret.”  See generally, Goldstein Application, supra 
note 12. 
 287. Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:9 (citing U.S. Reinsurance Corp. v. Humphreys, 
618 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272-73 (1st Dept. 1994)). 
 288. Contra Goldstein Application, supra note 12 (failing to cite any notable 
“reasonable efforts” specifically designed to “police” the purported portfolio trade 
secret(s) or to mention the risk of disclosure of its trade secrets if it had sought 
Confidential Treatment instead of exemption in the event that the SEC placed such a 
confidential treatment request on its computer network).  Ironically, a recent 
Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) study of the SEC’s information technology 
revealed potential inadequacies in the Commission’s efforts to maintain the 
confidentiality of “sensitive data,” explaining that: 
[The] SEC has not effectively implemented information system controls to protect the 
integrity, confidentiality, and availability of its financial and sensitive data, increasing 
the risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or loss of the data, possibly without 
detection. The risks created by these information security weaknesses are 
compounded because the SEC does not have a comprehensive monitoring program to 
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just one among many respects in which the Goldstein Application falls 
well short. 
The one prominent measure claimed by the Goldstein Application 
is that investors in the “Bulldog” funds are supposedly not privy to any 
of the funds’ holdings.289  Goldstein’s claimed secrecy, however, is 
contradicted by a variety of public documents, including a Memorandum 
and Order in a civil matter adjudicated in 2001 in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in a matter captioned Phillip Goldstein v. Lincoln National 
Convertible Securities Fund, Inc., in which Judge Dubois cited sworn 
testimony in her findings of fact, and clearly indicated that Goldstein 
had previously communicated specific information related to investment 
strategies and trading activities, and that he has actually consulted with 
certain of his hedge funds’ investor-limited partners about contemplated 
investments before the trades were actually executed.290
New York courts often assess a claimant’s conduct prior to seeking 
trade secret protection in order to discern whether, as a course of 
business, the putative holder considered and treated the information as a 
valuable secret, and would presumably take a dim view of Goldstein’s 
claims of secrecy because of the contradictory public records.291  New 
identify unusual or suspicious access activities. SEC is currently working to improve 
controls in all these areas. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FIN. AUDIT: SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N FIN. 
STATEMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, GAO-05-244 (2005) (quoting from the abstract, 
available at http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract. php?rptno=GAO-05-244).  See 
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d07134high.pdf for the highlights of the GAO’s audit 
for the fiscal years 2005 and 2006 (last visited Dec. 2, 2006).  See also Paul Tharp, 
GAO Audit: SEC Has Problems, N.Y. POST, Nov. 17, 2006, at 38, available at 
http://www.nypost.com/seven/11172006/business/ 
gao_audit__sec_has_problems_business_paul_tharp.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
 289. Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 6.  The Application alleges the extent 
to which investment confidentiality is maintained by saying: 
The Applicants generally do not publicly disclose their investments.  Moreover, the 
Applicants generally do not disclose their investments to investors in their funds nor 
do they provide a condensed schedule of such investments in their funds’ financial 
statements, much less a complete schedule, even though a condensed schedule is 
required to obtain an unqualified audit opinion. 
Goldstein Application, supra note 12 at 6. 
 290. Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat’l Convertible Secs. Fund, Inc., 140 F. Supp.2d 424, 
435 (E.D. Pa. 2001), vacated in part, appeal dismissed, Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat’l 
Convertible Secs. Fund, Inc., No. 01-2258, 2003 WL 1846095 (3rd Cir. Apr. 02, 2003). 
 291. See Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:9 (citing Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 
672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (1st Dept. 1998) (denying trade secret protection where “there are 
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York courts are also generally receptive to protecting proprietary 
information where considerable time and money was expended in 
developing the secret.292  The Goldstein Application, however, reveals 
almost nothing quantifiable about any reasonable secrecy efforts or 
funds expended to maintain the secrecy of, or to select “Bulldog’s” 
various Section 13(f) stock picks, nor anything relating to his 
buy/sell/hold decisions regarding those securities.293  Moreover, in 
addition to Judge Dubois’ Findings of Fact in the 2001 matter, less than 
a month prior to filing the Application, Goldstein spoke in detail in 
various media interviews, and in late September, 2006, Goldstein 
revealed aspects of his hedge fund investment strategies for generating 
“alpha” during a conference call.294  A judicial review of prior conduct 
related to any purported trade secrets, especially the testimony from the 
2001 civil matter, would hardly bode well for any supposed trade secret 
status of the “Bulldog” portfolios. 
Substantially more damaging to Goldstein’s purported trade secrets 
theory in terms of its glaring lack of any demonstrated “reasonable 
efforts,” is an administrative complaint filed January 31, 2007 by the 
Massachusetts Commonwealth Secretary, William F. Galvin.295  The 
Massachusetts administrative action charges Goldstein, his “Bulldog” 
funds, and his hedge fund lieutenants with what Reuters characterized as 
a failure “to restrict online access to the portfolios, which are considered 
a private offering,” and which the Financial Times noted, according to 
the complaint, that “Mr. Goldstein and Bulldog Investors failed to 
control access to fund information that should have been available only 
to password-holders screened by fund managers.”296  The complaint 
no factual allegations suggesting that, prior to negotiations with [a third party], 
measures were taken to treat information as secret.”)). 
 292. See Jensen, supra note 267, at § 81:10. 
 293. See generally, Goldstein Application, supra note 12 (alleging very few 
specifics regarding what was done to ensure confidentiality). 
 294. Conference Call with Phil Goldstein, at Millennium Media Consulting Money 
Manager Series Fall 2006: What’s Next for Phil Goldstein (Sept. 26, 2006), available 
at, http://www.vcall.com/CustomEvent/conferences/millenium_media/092606/agenda. 
asp.  For discussion of the hedge fund manager compensation known as “alpha,” see 
supra note 1. 
 295. See Admin. Complaint, In re Bulldog Investors Gen. P’ship et al., No. E-07-
0002 (Sec’y of the Commw., Secs. Div. Jan. 31, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/bulldogcomplaint.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) 
[hereinafter Admin. Complaint]. 
 296. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Mass. sues hedge fund manager who took on SEC, 
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further alleges violations of the Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act 
and related regulations, “based upon the Respondents’ failure to ensure 
that the offer or sale of its securities in the Commonwealth were 
properly registered or exempted in accordance with §301 of the 
[Massachusetts] Act.”297
The administrative complaint alleges that “Bulldog” also sent e-
mail investment solicitations to a Massachusetts resident, which in 
combination with the website materials, included: “investment 
strategies;” “specific examples of investments;” “assets and firm 
information . . . historical performance, latest period returns, statistical 
analysis;” as well as a “detailed monthly breakdown[s] of return 
estimates for the Full Value Fund.”298  The complaint further alleged 
that “[t]here are no controls on the Bulldog web site to prevent 
advertising and/or offering materials from being sent to Massachusetts 
investors.”299  A check of Bulldog’s website subsequent to the filing of 
the Massachusetts complaint confirmed that it did contain a “front page” 
message which indicated that the web site was “currently being 
updated,” however, the entire Bulldog website was readily available 
through the “Internet Archive,” despite the fact that relatively simple 
(and fairly well known) methods to avoid website archiving exist.300  
REUTERS, Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://today.reuters.com/news/articleinvesting. 
aspx?type=governmentFilingsNews&storyID=2007-01-31T195617Z_01_N31340761_ 
RTRIDST_0_MASSACHUSETTS-HEDGE-FUNDS-UPDATE-1.XML (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2007); see Anuj Gangahar, Regulators sue Goldstein over fund marketing, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, Companies International, at 16, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/f991070e-b199-11db-b901-0000779e2340.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2007); see also Bulldog Investors Website, available at 
http://www.bulldoginvestors.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (“Our website is currently 
being updated. Please check back soon. Thank you. Bulldog Investors 201-556-0092”). 
 297. See Admin. Complaint, In re Bulldog Investors Gen. P’ship et al., (No. E-07-
0002), supra note 295, at 1, ¶ 1. 
 298. See, e.g., Admin. Complaint, In re Bulldog Investors Gen. P’ship et al., (No. E-
07-0002), supra note 295, at 7-11, ¶¶ 26, 31, 45 (citing Exhibits B, C-2, C-5). 
 299. See Admin. Complaint, In re Bulldog Investors Gen. P’ship et al.,(No. E-07-
0002), supra note 295, at 11, ¶ 47. 
 300. See Bulldog Investors Website Archive, available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060116131029/http://www.bulldoginvestors.com/ (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2007).  The Internet Archive and its “Wayback Machine,” have 
maintained a conspicuous and long-standing liberal policy that easily accommodates 
website owners who do not desire to be included in the aggregated collection of website 
pages obtained by the Internet Archive’s “crawlers.”  In fact, the Internet Archive 
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The allegations within Secretary Galvin’s pleadings against “Bulldog” 
which relate to voluntary public disclosures of investments and 
strategies are among the many facts that call into serious question 
Goldstein’s claims of secrecy in his Application, and strongly suggest a 
lack of “reasonable efforts” expended to protect the confidentiality of his 
purported trade secrets.301
specifically notes in its “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQs) that a relatively simple 
method for website proprietors to avoid inclusion in the Internet Archive, and includes 
the following policies: 
[Question]: How can I remove my site’s pages from the Wayback Machine? 
[Answer]: The Internet Archive is not interested in preserving or offering access to 
Web sites or other Internet documents of persons who do not want their materials in 
the collection.  By placing a simple robots.txt file on your Web server, you can 
exclude your site from being crawled as well as exclude any historical pages from the 
Wayback Machine.  Internet Archive uses the exclusion policy intended for use by 
both academic and non-academic digital repositories and archivists.  See our 
exclusion policy.  You can find exclusion directions at exclude.php.  If you cannot 
place the robots.txt file, opt not to, or have further questions, email us at 
info@archive.org. 
Id.  (emphasis added); see also  Internet Archive: Frequently Asked Questions, 
available at http://www.archive.org/about/faqs.php#2; Internet Archive: Terms of Use, 
available at http://www.archive.org/about/terms.php; Internet Archive: Wayback 
Machine, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20050305142910/; The Oakland 
Archive Policy, available at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/conferences/aps/ 
removal-policy.html; Internet Archive: Removing Documents from the Wayback 
Machine, available at http://www.archive.org/about/exclude.php (each last visited Feb. 
6, 2007).  The Internet Archive also represents that it may “remove certain content or 
disable access to content that appears to infringe the copyright or other intellectual 
property rights of others.”  See Internet Archive: Terms of Use, available at  
http://www.archive.org/about/terms.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2007); see also, Jeffrey D. 
Neuberger, Technology, the Internet and Electronic Commerce: Staying Interactive in 
the High-Tech Environment, THELEN, REID, BROWN, RAYSMAN & STEINER, LLP 
PUBLICATION (Thelen, Reid, Brown, Raysman & Steiner LLP, New York, N.Y.) Dec. 
31, 2006 at 13, available at http://www.thelen.com/tlu/Technology_Law_White_ 
Paper_December_2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) (citing Field v. Google, Inc., 
No. 04-0413 (D. Nev. Jan. 19, 2006)) (“Consent to copying and caching of an author’s 
online works may be inferred from the author’s failure to use available technology to 
block search engine access to the works.). 
 301. See Admin. Complaint, In re Bulldog Investors Gen. P’ship et al., (No. E-07-
0002), supra note 295; Jay Fitzgerald, Galvin probes hedge fund: Web sales at issue, 
BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 1, 2007, Finance, at 33, available at http://business. 
bostonherald.com/businessNews/view.bg?articleid=180315&srvc=biz (last visited Feb. 
8, 2007) (“‘The usual manner to conduct such a private offering over the Internet 
requires the Web site to be password-protected,’ said Galvin in a statement.  But 
Bulldog had no such controls and, therefore, was effectively holding an unregistered 
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Goldstein has publicly rebuffed the Massachusetts regulator’s 
allegations; characterized the administrative lawsuit as “bizarre;” 
referred to Secretary Galvin as a “bully” and a “pompous ass;”302 
claimed Bulldog was subjected to “pretexting” and an innocent victim of 
a “sting operation;” and asserted during a CNBC televised interview and 
in periodicals such as the Boston Globe and The New York Times that 
unfettered online access to his hedge funds’ information is somehow 
constitutionally protected free speech.  “If someone asks for info and 
you give it to them, isn’t that First Amendment activity?  I’m not selling 
anything, I’m just providing information.”303  These remarks were all 
apparently foreshadowing Goldstein’s next high-profile regulatory 
windmill, a First Amendment-based challenge to long-standing state and 
federal prohibitions of general advertising or solicitations for private 
hedge fund offerings.304  These prohibitions include the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 that exempts certain private securities offerings 
from registration and disclosure if sold only to less than one hundred 
investors, and/or to so-called “qualified purchasers,” but which also 
require that any such offering not be made available to the public as a 
public offering, he said.”); see also Press Release, Bulldog Investors, Bulldog Investors 
General Partnership Makes Announcement Concerning RMR Hospitality & Real Estate 
Fund (Feb. 5, 2007), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/bulldog-
investors-general-partnership-makes/story.aspx?guid=%7B3D7A2A1E-4F3E-432C-
8C32-3B0A455AF8B2%7D (last visited Feb. 8, 2007) (disclosing publicly the fact that 
its funds recently sold a portion of one of its largest equity holdings: “BIGP has 
voluntarily reduced its position so that it and its affiliates do not collectively 
beneficially own more than 9.8% of RHR’s outstanding common stock”) (emphasis 
added). 
 302. Jay Fitzgerald, Bulldog Hedge Fund Manager Says Galvin ‘Is a Bully,’ 
BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://business.bostonherald. 
com/businessNews/view.bg?articleid=183048 (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). 
 303. Jenny Anderson, News Analysis: Taking the Muzzle Off Hedge Funds Is an 
Idea Whose Time Has Come, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 8, 2007, available at 
http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=4526541 (last visited Feb. 9, 2007); Steven Syre, 
Taking Aim at Hedge Funds, Feb. 1, 2007, BOSTON GLOBE, available at 
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2007/02/01/taking_aim_at_hedge_funds
?mode=PF (last visited Feb. 6, 2007). 
 304. See CNBC “On The Money” interview with Melissa Francis, Regulating Hedge 
Funds, CNBC.COM, Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/ 
15840232?video=186208585&play=1 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (stating that Mr. 
Goldstein claims he will take the Massachusetts administrative matter to the U.S. 
Supreme Court). 
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quid pro quo for the exemption.305
Goldstein told the Wall Street Journal “[w]e’re being punished for 
providing truthful information,” and added, “[i]t’s almost like mind 
control . . . [i]t’s what you would see in Communist China.”306  He has 
openly challenged the public “to find any First Amendment lawyer 
who’s not going to agree that this regulation, this attempt to strike down 
free communication, is going to be invalidated by a court” and even 
unsuccessfully dared an apparently unimpressed Connecticut Attorney 
General Richard Blumenthal, and former SEC Commissioner Laura 
Unger, to wager $100,000 with him regarding any judicial outcome of 
Goldstein’s tenuous First Amendment theory during a televised CNBC 
interview.307  It seems unlikely that Goldstein’s notions regarding the 
regulation of so-called “commercial speech”308 will persuade any court, 
and the revelations regarding the easy access to information about the 
 305. The Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 3(c)1, 3(c)7 (“qualified purchasers”) 
are construed as exempt “private” offerings pursuant to the Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
3(c)(1), -3(c)(7)).  William Natbony, Esq., senior partner with New York law firm, 
Katten, Muchin, Rosenman, LLP, explained: 
The question [in the Massachusetts administrative action against ‘Bulldog’ is] whether 
such Web site content constitutes an offering to the general public.  This question has 
been placed on the front burner by the Massachusetts complaint and it is likely that a 
number of hedge funds which are in the same position as Bulldog will be paying close 
attention to the resolution of this matter. 
Allegations Raise Questions on Marketing Hedge Funds to Public, JAFFE LEGAL NEWS 
SERVICE, Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://www.jlns.com/index.cfm?fuseaction 
=Home.ShowArticleDetail&ArticleID=5404&SectionTitle=Allegations%20Raise%20
Questions%20on%20Marketing%20 (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). 
 306. See Winstein, supra note 302. 
 307. See Goldstein Takes First Amendment Fight to CNBC, FINALTERNATIVES.COM, 
Feb. 22, 2007, available at http://www.finalternatives.com/node/1217 (last visited Feb. 
24, 2007); see generally Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  The Central Hudson Court noted that the U.S. 
Constitution provides a lesser First Amendment protection from governmental 
regulation for so-called “commercial speech,” than it does for other forms of 
expression.  The relevant analytical test for “commercial speech” derived from Central 
Hudson is: (1) whether the speech at issue concerns lawful activity and is not 
misleading; (2) whether the governmental interest served by the commercial speech 
restriction is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest; and, (4) whether the regulation at issue is more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that governmental interest.  Id. 
 308. See supra note 307; see generally Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (applying the so-called “commercial 
speech” test); cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985). 
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“Bulldog” funds on the Internet, that came to light as a result of the 
Massachusetts administrative action, may very well be the absolute 
undoing of Goldstein’s rather suspect Application. 
Subsequent to Secretary Galvin’s administrative action against 
“Bulldog,” a battle boiled over between the financial website 
DealBreaker.com and Solengo Capital, the new hedge fund start-up of 
former Amaranth trader Brian Hunter, over DealBreaker.com’s snarky 
and recalcitrant publication of the Solengo Capital initial investment 
brochure.309  The Solengo “imbroglio” led to public posturing between 
Mr. Hunter’s new hedge fund and the “Wall Street Tabloid,” threats of 
litigation, and a supposedly “loony-tunes confidentiality theory.”310  The 
disputed publication of Mr. Hunter’s new “confidential” hedge fund 
offering memorandum also acts to undermine the “Bulldog” trade 
secrets theory to some extent, notwithstanding the “loony-tunes” riposte, 
because Solengo’s “takedown” demand was predominantly premised 
upon a copyright infringement theory, and its lawyers did not include 
New York trade secrets law as an asserted ground for removal of the 
offering materials from the DealBreaker site.311  Moreover, 
DealBreaker’s expected affirmative First Amendment defense is entirely 
distinguishable from the facts of the Massachusetts administrative matter 
against “Bulldog.” The most notable distinction being, in the former 
scenario, the offering materials were apparently leaked by third parties 
to various financial news websites who, in turn, published reproductions 
 309. John Carney, Hedge Fund To DealBreaker: Please Shut Up! 
DEALBREAKER.COM, Mar. 29, 2007, available at  http://www.dealbreaker.com/2007/03 
/hedge_fund_to_dealbreaker_plea.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2007); see also Dane 
Hamilton, Ex-Amaranth traders ask blogs to remove materials, REUTERS, Mar. 28, 
2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USN283400432007 
0328 (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
 310. See Dane Hamilton, Solengo hedge fund threatens court action vs blog, 
REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?article 
Id=USN3034295020070330 (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
 311. See John Carney, Solengo’s Lawyers Strike Back: We Still Say Suck It., 
DEALBREAKER.COM, Mar. 29, 2007, available at  http://www.dealbreaker.com/ 
2007/03/solengos_lawyers_strike_back_w.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2007); and  a copy 
of the March 28, 2007 “takedown” letter, available at http://www.dealbreaker.com/ 
images/entries/letter_to_bess.jpg (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).  See also John Carney, 
Solengo Seeks Court Order To Strip DealBreaker Of Brochure, DEALBREAKER.COM, 
Mar. 30, 2007, available at http://www.dealbreaker.com/2007/03/solegno_ 
seeks_court_order_to_s.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
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of the Solengo brochure, whereas the latter is an alleged instance of a 
hedge fund who made marketing materials directly available to the 
public through its own website, without regard for whether access was 
restricted to accredited investors.312  As such, it seems implausible that 
“Bulldog” can affirmatively defend its alleged public disclosures as a 
member of the “fourth estate,” or anything else even remotely analogous 
to a financial newsletter publisher that successfully defended itself 
against an SEC investigation on First Amendment grounds.313
At least in theory, there initially appears to be nothing to 
necessarily preclude a trade secret misappropriation claim where the 
subject matter is a secret combination of equity holdings in a hedge fund 
portfolio, notwithstanding the apparent lack of any “reasonable efforts” 
to protect the supposed Bulldog “secrets.”  At least one New York hedge 
fund litigant has been successful in an equitable action related to the 
alleged “theft” of trade secrets.314  However, “isolated bits of useful 
competitive information are not likely to win protection in New York 
courts.”315  Goldstein’s collection of Section 13(f) securities, as a portion 
of a portfolio,316 would likely be construed by a New York court as mere 
 312. See supra note 295. 
 313. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).  Ironically, dicta in Lowe, 472 U.S. 181 
(1985), regarding the definition of “client” played a prominent role in the D.C. Circuit 
Court’s decision in Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  See Goldstein v. 
SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Pekarek, supra note 10; cf. Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (analyzing 
“commercial speech”). 
 314. See Quantitative Fin. Strategies, Inc. v. Gamma Capital Mgmt, No. 1:01-cv-
05088-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Terminated June 29, 200) (unreported) (issuing a two year 
injunction enjoining a former hedge fund research director from accepting employment 
with a competitor in theft of trade secrets action), available at 
http://ecf.nysd.uscourts.gov (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); see also B.C. Zeigler & Co. v. 
Ehren, 414 N.W.2d 48 (1987) (applying Wisconsin trade secret law to hold that a 
broker-dealer securities underwriter’s customer information, obtained by a former 
licensed broker via batches of scrap paper containing customer names and account 
summaries  and sold to a paper recycler was a trade secret and did not lose its property 
status by virtue of an inadvertent disclosure, because the title to the property conveyed 
included only the scrap paper, not the proprietary customer data printed on that paper). 
 315. HAIG, supra note 267, at § 81:4 (“Subject matter of trade secrets”). 
 316. Form 13F filings are due not less than forty-five (45) days after the end of the 
respective reporting period (“[M]ust file no later than 45 days after the end of the 
March, June, September, and December quarters.”).  See Exchange Act Rule 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13f-1(a)(1); see also Division of Investment Management: Frequently Asked 
Questions About Form 13F, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/ 
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“isolated bits” unworthy of trade secret status.317
New York jurisprudence has established the threshold trade secrets 
showing is simply not met by “information as to single or ephemeral 
events in the conduct of the business,” but instead requires the 
demonstration of “a process or device for continuous use in the 
operation of the business.”318  The composition of a hedge fund portfolio 
is likely to be as fluid and dynamic as the ebb and flow of market 
sentiment and individual stock picks are presumably not for “continuous 
use.”  Moreover, Form 13F data is only revealed after more than a six 
week time lag319 from the last day of a respective reporting period (and a 
greater than four (4) month time lag from the first day of a respective 
reporting period).  Such information could be reasonably construed as 
no longer possessing the qualities of “hot” news, and is perhaps 
unsuitable to receive the limited protection created by the doctrine of 
unfair competition by misappropriation.320
13ffaq.htm; see, e.g., Calendar of SEC Holidays and EDGAR Filing Deadlines (2006 
and 2007), available at http://www.secfile.net/SEC_calendar.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 
2007). 
 317. See, HAIG, supra note 267, at § 81:5.  Additionally, the parameters of the Form 
13F do not require disclosure of open short positions; bonds and other debt securities; 
various derivatives, including collateralized obligations, credit swaps, options (and 
various option strategies such as “collars;” “covered calls;” “straddles;” “strangles;” 
etc.); commodities; futures contracts; or portfolio and trading aspects and information 
such as block positioning; margin leverage; position cost-bases; allocation percentages; 
timing techniques; or other trading strategies. 
 318. See Bear Stearns Funding, Inc. v. Interface Group-Nevada, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 
2d 283, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 319. James Altucher, No Place to Hide in an Age of Transparency, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 7, 2006. 
The only real tangible benefit of viewing a 13F-HR filing is the knowledge that 45 
days earlier (the filing comes 45 days after the quarter’s end) the fund was not (or 
was) over-concentrated in any one set of positions. You also get to know if there was 
any style drift or if any of the statements the manager has made about his portfolio 
differ from what is revealed. 
Id. 
 320. See, e.g., Intl. News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236, 239-40 (1918) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (establishing the doctrine of unfair competition by 
misappropriation).  The Court provided limited protection to “hot” news, and only for a 
limited time, stating that “it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the 
rights of either as against the public,” and indicating that the private actor’s intellectual 
property protection benefits afforded by law are inherently subordinate to the co-
extensive social benefits.  The Court also noted “it was not the news events themselves 
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A New York tribunal could reasonably conclude that the subject 
matter of the Goldstein Application is something more akin to the 
aforementioned “ephemeral events,” than to any “process or device for 
continuous use,” and thus is not a trade secret at all.321  In fact, the 
drafters of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, §757 cmt. b specifically 
excluded “security investments made or contemplated” from its trade 
secret definition, and New York courts have traditionally followed the 
RESTATEMENT view.322  A potential Form 13F filer/petitioner located in 
a forum (e.g., California) that more closely follows the expansive 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”)323 might have been better 
positioned to challenge the Section 13(f) reporting regime in part 
because of the UTSA’s broad trade secret definition, which does not 
necessarily exclude arguably “ephemeral events” such as securities 
positions from trade secret status.324  Without a requisite showing of the 
necessary elements of a trade secret pursuant to New York law, it seems 
unlikely that Mr. Goldstein’s theory will triumph. 
which were being protected by the doctrine, but rather the proprietor’s effort and 
expense in obtaining them.”  Int’l. News Serv., 248 U.S. 239 (1918).  Similarly, 
Goldstein’s portfolio holdings do receive limited secrecy protection during the “time-
lag” period between his funds’ acquisitions (and/or dispositions) of the relevant § 13(f) 
securities and the respective Form 13F disclosure deadlines.  Moreover, where a non-
exempt investment adviser of a holder of § 13(f) securities seeks to avail itself of the 
confidential treatment administrative remedies (including those specifically available 
for trade secrets and other proprietary commercial information), a period of secrecy can 
be extended, at a minimum, during the bureaucratic delay of the processing of any 
confidential treatment application, which could conceivably extend in perpetuity if the 
confidential treatment Application is granted unconditionally. See, e.g., Part V.C.4, 
supra.  However, as discussed in this Note, Credit Suisse has obtained confidential 
treatment approvals for limited times, and thereafter amended the respective Forms 13F 
where secrecy was no longer necessary.  See Part V.C.6, supra; see e.g., supra notes 
213-14. 
 321. Id.; see also, Hudson Hotels Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, 995 F.2d 1173, 1176 
(2d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & 
Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2000); see also, LinkCo, Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 230 
F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 322. See, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (“Definition of a 
trade secret”).  However, a claimant might have a civil cause of action pursuant to 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 (1939) (“Procuring Information by Improper 
Means”). 
 323. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d  69, 78 (2003). 
 324. See id. 
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2. Alleged Harm of “Free-Rider” Trade Secret Stock Traders 
While the information at issue need not be “vital” to a claimant’s 
business operations, it must be adequately important to the extent that a 
misappropriation would unfairly benefit another in a competitive 
market.325  This issue appears to be the one on which the Goldstein 
Application focused much of its energy and rhetoric, by repeatedly 
noting that third parties can hypothetically “free-ride” the investment 
acumen of various “celebrity” investment managers.326  A prudent trade 
secrets claimant would presumably be well served to articulate precisely 
how the information at issue is used in its operations and exactly why it 
is a substantial factor in the continued functioning of the business.327  
Mr. Goldstein did sketch some broad strokes in media interviews, and 
within the Application itself, as to how others might hypothetically 
mimic his positions, but he did not describe with particularity the 
aforementioned “how” and “why” aspects of his purported trade 
secrets.328
While the Goldstein camp initially and inexplicably eschewed the 
available confidential treatment relief, and instead sought exemption 
from Section 13(f) reporting requirements, existing confidential 
treatment analysis may offer some guidance in terms of the likely SEC 
scrutiny of this unprecedented petition.  As discussed above, a 
confidential treatment application must convincingly demonstrate that a 
Form 13F disclosure would create a substantial likelihood of 
competitive harm, whereas confidential treatment requests presenting 
mere conjecture are summarily rejected.  The SEC could properly deny 
the Goldstein Application on numerous grounds, including the failure to 
specifically demonstrate a substantial likelihood of competitive harm by 
suspected “free riders.”329  The Goldstein Application also failed to 
 
 325. HAIG, supra note 267, at § 81:5. 
 326. See Goldstein Application, supra note 12; see also, Altucher, supra note 319 
(“To support his claim [Goldstein] quotes my worst-selling and most recent book, 
SuperCaDollars.  In particular, a chapter titled ‘Trade Like Jeff Berkowitz.’”); see also 
McCormack, supra note 22. 
 327. HAIG, supra note 267, at § 81:5. 
 328. See, e.g., Spotlight Post: Time for an Encore?, Oct. 19, 2006, 
http://thevalueblogs.com/valueblogger/spotlight-post-time-for-an-encore. 
 329. Perhaps as a result of Mr. Goldstein’s newfound notoriety, there is at least one 
investment-oriented website that now actively tracks the Bulldog Funds’ investments.  
This new fact does lend some measure of support to the Goldstein Application theory.  
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particularize exactly what is the claimed trade secret(s), which if the 
context was a civil claim for trade secret misappropriation, that 
conspicuous lack of detail could result in dismissal for failure to 
adequately provide notice of the subject matter to the opponent.330
Considering that the required Section 13(f) disclosures are limited 
to positions in exchange-listed or Nasdaq quoted equities and options,331 
it would seem that anyone who hypothetically sought to “free-ride” and 
mimic Goldstein’s positions would presumably provide some measure 
of bid support for those same equities (a potential detriment to an 
investment manager seeking to add to a long position).332  If a sufficient 
number of investors sought to mirror Goldstein’s “stale” disclosures,333 
that “free rider” buy-side pressure might even cause the prices of 
Goldstein’s positions to increase.334  In fact, a clever (and presumably 
See SECINVESTOR.COM, Bulldog Investors Takes on Open-end Mutual Funds, Mar. 23, 
2007, available at http://www.secinvestor.com/2007/03/23/Bulldog+Investors+Takes+ 
On+Openend+Mutual+Funds.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) (“Bulldog Investors is 
certainly a hedge fund worth tracking!”); see also SECINVESTOR.COM tracking index of 
Bulldog Funds’ Schedules 13D, available at  http://secfilings.com/sec-filings/ 
companies/1364773/Bulldog-Investors-General-Partnership.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 
2007). 
 330. See, e.g., Norbrook Labs. Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Mfg. Co., No. 5:03CV165 
(HGM/GLS), 2003 WL 1956214, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2003) (information sought 
to be protected as a trade secret must be identified and described with particularity). 
 331. See Section 13(f) securities list, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/investment/13flists.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Section 13(f) 
securities list]. 
 332. Warren Buffet’s, Letter to Berkshire-Hathaway Shareholders, available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1984.html (1984) (last visited Dec. 20, 
2006); see also, Warren Boroson, Goldstein Beat SEC on Hedge Fund Rule, DAILY 
RECORD, Sept. 17, 2006, available at http://www.dailyrecord.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20060917/COLUMNISTS04/609170312/1003/ENT05 (last visited Nov. 
12, 2006); see also generally Goldstein Application, supra note 12. 
 333. See Altucher, supra note 319. 
Goldstein assumes we can make use of his picks to avoid doing serious research and 
simply piggyback his positions.  However, for all we know, he is already out of those 
positions, or is scaling out of them (45 days is a long time), or he got in at much lower 
prices, or that his research is awful. . . .  Hedge funds take nice compensation already 
for winning stock picks like these.  I’m not sure we have to provide ‘just 
compensation’ on top of that for taking a peek behind the sacred wall. 
Id.  But see How To Trade Around a Billionaire, Oct. 9, 2006, available  at 
http://willsss.blogspot.com/2006/10/how-to-trade-around-billionaire.html (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2007). 
 334. See generally, Patrick J. Glen, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Chaos 
Theory, and Insider Filing Requirements of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The 
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highly cynical) “celebrity” hedge fund manager might even deliberately 
hold long positions in equities in order to sell them subsequent to the 
13F filing, and possibly even short-sell the issue into any “free-rider” 
fresh money buying.335
The Application misses the mark on a number of the 
aforementioned required elemental showings needed to establish a 
protected intellectual property trade secret interest in New York.  Based 
upon the factual statements of record in the Goldstein Application, 
standing alone, it seems highly improbable that Mr. Goldstein’s 
combination of Section 13(f) securities holdings would give rise to trade 
secret status in any court applying New York law.  As such, based on 
matters of public record and the statements within the Goldstein 
Application and given the absence of any competent showing of the 
necessary elements required, the SEC may properly deny Goldstein’s 
request as it lacks the necessary elements for a protected trade secret 
3. Inherently Unreasonable Expectations of a  
Regulated Market Participant? 
Mr. Goldstein has operated his funds in an era that demands Section 
13(f) disclosure.  He presumably could have elected to structure his 
funds and portfolios in a manner that would have remained below the 
$100 million reporting threshold, just as a company who desires to avoid 
the reporting requirements of the 1934 Exchange Act (and the Sarbanes-
 
Predictive Power of Form 4 Filings, 11 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 85 (2005) 
(analyzing a sample of greater than 100 issuers which had insider equity holdings 
disclosed in Forms 4 and found tendencies of equity price appreciation subsequent to 
the reporting of those insider holdings, observing that, based upon the public 
availability of insider holdings data, “a non-insider steps slightly closer to that point in 
time where profit becomes more accessible to the trader”). 
 335. See, e.g., Lori McLeod, Hedge Fund Fights to Keep ‘Trade Secrets’ Disclosure 
Challenge, FINANCIAL POST (Canada), Sept. 18, 2006, available at  
http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=e7e8e234-0792-4cfe-95e8-
38099e84de8b (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).  McLeod explains, 
But not everyone is put off by the [Section 13(f)] disclosure rules.  Peter Hodson, an 
investment strategist at Sprott Asset Management [Canada], said seeing his top 25 
won’t allow others to replicate his portfolio.  “We don’t have to declare shorts, for 
example, and there are no selling restrictions.  You can file on March 31 and sell 
everything on April 1.  That makes it pretty tough for someone else to follow what 
we’re doing,” he said. 
Id. 
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Oxley Act of 2002) can refrain from becoming an issuer of publicly 
traded securities pursuant to the 1933 Securities Act (or can take the 
company private if it is already a public issuer).336  It is inherently 
unreasonable for Goldstein to conduct his business based on public 
disclosure requirements, essential in a market system, then to contend 
his business information is protected by the Fifth Amendment.  This is 
an especially weak stance for Goldstein to take, considering portions of 
his “secret” information were allegedly made available to investors 
through solicitations on unsecured websites, pursuant to the First 
Amendment.337
There are numerous instances in U.S. commerce where public 
disclosure is an accepted requirement that is rationally related to 
legitimate government interests as part of a quid pro quo exchange for 
the privilege of conducting business in a regulated market.  The Section 
13(f) reporting regime is wholly consistent with that long-standing 
tradition.338  For example, a food manufacturer seeking to market a 
product in the U.S. would almost invariably fail to achieve trade secret 
protection for a list of ingredients (in contrast to a protectable and 
unique process or recipe, such as the “Coca Cola” formula) in a 
challenge to public disclosure regulations and the designation of 
ingredients (in descending order of predominance) via product labeling 
requirements.339  Unlike food products marketed in the U.S. (irrespective 
 336. See generally, Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 (1934); The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (“Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002”), 
15 U.S.C. §§ 7201; Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); and The Securities Act 
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 (1933). 
 337. See Syre, supra note 303 (quoting Mr. Goldstein as saying that “. . . just getting 
information is a First Amendment issue; people are allowed to have information.”).  But 
see Goldstein Application supra note 12. 
 338. See, e.g., supra note 139 (citing various federal agencies which require 
disclosure and provide similar confidential treatment under proscribed circumstances); 
see also Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1948) (prohibiting federal government 
employees from disclosure of confidential proprietary information). 
 339. See Chapter I—Food And Drug Admin., Dept. of Health and Human Services, 
Part 101 – Food Labeling, 21 C.F.R. §§ 101; but see Chapter I, Food And Drug Admin., 
Dept. of Health and Human Services, Part 720—Voluntary Filing of Cosmetic Product 
Ingredient Composition Statements, Confidentiality of statements, 21 C.F.R. § 720.8.  
This FDA provision (much like the Section 13(f) provisions discussed in Part VII 
supra) affords confidential treatment for trade secrets, provided the applicant makes a 
supportive statement that articulates the factual and legal grounds for confidentiality 
that satisfies a threshold six-factor test which is virtually identical to the six-factor New 
York trade secret test (discussed in Part VII.D, supra).  See also Zotos Int’l, Inc. v. 
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of the size of the marketer as there is nothing similar to the Section 13(f) 
$100 million threshold within the food labeling regime), Form 13F filers 
are only required to disclose Section 13(f) securities holdings (held on 
the last day of a respective reporting period), and as such, various hedge 
fund portfolio “ingredients” that are not included in the SEC’s Section 
13(f) securities list need not be disclosed.340
Goldstein’s seemingly quixotic Section 13(f) challenge appears 
especially unreasonable in light of the fact, as noted earlier, that his 
“Bulldog” funds have filed numerous Schedules 13D and 14 (without 
seeking exemption or compensation) that have publicly disclosed 
concentrated positions in certain equities.  Goldstein typically filed just 
before he launched an attempted putsch-by-proxy to overthrow a target 
issuer’s board of directors, install his confederates, and even force 
companies to sell off assets in order to supposedly unlock “value,” and 
apparently has used at least one of his targets’ servicemarks and 
trademarks without permission, in what seems to be a confusingly 
similar shareholder group name.341  The Schedule 13D reporting 
Young, 830 F.2d 350, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing the FDA’s confidential treatment 
denial to cosmetics manufacturer for hair care “secret ingredient” which had been 
present in products for decades).  The FDA required public disclosure of ingredient on 
product labels based on an agency determination that the product could be reverse 
engineered, but the agency could not explain how the products (including the “secret 
ingredient”) had been marketed for some twenty years and had still not been reverse 
engineered by competitors.  Id. 
 340. See Section 13(f) securities list, supra note 331. 
 341. See, e.g., Definitive Proxy Form DEFC14A filed by Bulldog Investors with the 
SEC on Feb. 12, 2007, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1278038/000136477307000005/defproxy.txt; see also, Form DEFA14A, filed Feb. 13, 
2007 with the SEC, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1278038/000110465907010000/a07-4369_1defa14a.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007; 
Form PREC14A filed with the SEC on Jan. 18, 2007 by Bulldog Investors General 
Partnership (“Bulldog”), a [Preliminary] Proxy Statement of Bulldog Investors General 
Partnership, a Stockholder of RMR Hospitality & Real Estate Fund in Opposition to the 
Solicitation by the Board of Trustees at the Annual Meeting of Shareholders on March 
8, 2007, available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1278038/00013647730 
7000003/prelimpro.txt (last visited Jan. 21, 2007); Amended Schedule 13D/A filed with 
the SEC on Nov. 17, 2006 by Bulldog, available at http://sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1278038/000136477306000013/third.txt (last visited Jan. 21, 2007); Attack 
of the Hungry Hedge Funds, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Feb. 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_08/b3972103.htm (last visited Feb. 
8, 2007). 
Once they’ve got their teeth into a company, the new activists usually won’t let go.  “I 
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requirement is also not unlike those within the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 
(“HSR”),342 which compels an investor attempting to acquire a 
concentrated equity stake to file a pre-merger report notification with the 
Federal Trade Commission, which also establishes the beginning of a 
thirty-day agency review period where a proposed acquisition is 
scrutinized for potential antitrust violations.343
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of New York Allan 
Gropper rejected similar unavailing non-disclosure arguments of an 
“unofficial equity committee” formed by hedge fund shareholders in the 
Norwest Airlines bankruptcy.  The shareholders had contended that 
disclosure of the details of their respective Northwest stock positions 
“would give competitors insight into the funds’ strategies,” and “argued 
that just as car dealers and home builders don’t tell potential buyers their 
actual costs, the funds shouldn’t have to reveal their investments.”344  
Judge Gropper responded to these contentions in a March 9, 2007 ruling 
that the first argument was an “improbable contention,” and quipped that 
“the committee members do not advance their position when they 
compare themselves to car or real estate salesmen.”345  The “Bulldog” 
claimed that Judge Gropper’s In re Northwest Airlines ruling was 
stand up for all I’m entitled to and will accept nothing less,” says Phillip Goldstein, 
founder of Bulldog Investors LLC, which fought a long battle to force Blair Corp. 
(BL), a Warren (Pa.)-based catalog retailer, to sell its $174 million portfolio of 
receivables.” 
Id. 
 342. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (“HSR”) (1976) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a (2000)).  HSR reporting requirements are generally 
triggered when an investor acquires securities of a particular issuer either valued at 
more than fifteen million dollars, or equivalent to fifteen percent of an issuer’s 
outstanding shares.  Closing acquisitions in violation of HSR can result in daily civil 
penalties of up to $11,000 for non-compliance, and the provision is actively enforced, 
even years after an acquisition has closed.  HSR is unlike aspects of Section 13(f), in 
that the exercises of conversion rights, options, warrants, etc., attached to any security 
are construed as acquisitions covered by HSR, however, much like Section 13(f), HSR 
does include certain “size of person” and “size of transaction” thresholds that are 
similar to the $100 million threshold of Section 13(f).  See 16 C.F.R. §§ 801.10-801.15; 
see also Valuation of Transactions Reportable under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsrvaluation.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2007). 
 343. See Federal Trade Commission regulations pursuant to HSR (16 C.F.R. §§ 801)
 344. Christopher Scinta and Jenny Strasburg, U.S. Judge Tells Hedge Funds: You 
Aren’t So Special (Update2), BLOOMBERG, Mar. 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ad6rHfnWzato (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2007).
 345. Scinta and Strasburg, supra note 344. 
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somehow “forcing the hedge funds to put information into the public 
domain that would allow their competitors to reverse-engineer the fund 
managers’ ideas.”346
Mr. Goldstein has not yet explained why he apparently deems 
public disclosure of equity holdings acceptable when he attempts to 
remove a target issuer’s board of directors (or when he allegedly makes 
selective private disclosures to investors, or alleged disclosures to 
prospective investors based on some unpersuasive First Amendment 
theory), but claims that the Section 13(f) disclosures at issue would 
somehow deprive him of trade secret property rights in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.  Goldstein advocates secrecy, even while many of 
those same “secret” equity positions have been previously disclosed in 
media articles touted on the Bulldog web site, in proxies and in 
Schedules 13D, and would presumably overlap with at least some of 
those required to be disclosed on Form 13F.347
Mr. Goldstein and his Bulldog outfit have not addressed a number 
of relevant issues still surrounding his Application, but a press release 
criticizing the Section 13 reporting requirements was issued on March 
28, 2007.348  Although the release did directly quote Phillip Goldstein, 
and one other hedge fund manager named Nelson Obus from a firm 
named Wynnefield Capital, it did not identify any specific issuer.349  The 
press release, titled Investment Managers Urge Repeal of Rule 13-F, was 
distributed via BusinessWire by a Madison Avenue public relations firm 
known as Kekst and Company, which specifically notes on its website 
that as “a matter of policy, Kekst does not publish a list of its clients.”350  
Perhaps the identity of the press release issuer is another theoretical 
trade secret? 
The Goldstein Application included no substantive discussion of 
 346. Id. 
 347. See, e.g., supra notes 289 and 299. 
 348. See March 28, 2007 press release, Investment Managers Urge Repeal of Rule 
13-F, available at http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndm 
ViewId=news_view&newsId=20070328005586&newsLang=en (last visited Mar. 30, 
2007). 
 349. See Id.  The only identified contact in this press release was a Kekst & Co. 
staffer named Eric Berman.  Id. 
 350. See the Kekst & Co. website—Overview, available at http://www.kekst.com 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007), (stating that its client list is not disclosed, and which also 
uses URL “masking” technology to conceal all so-called “deep links” on its site). 
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the many instances where disclosures are required in order to participate 
in a regulated market, nor did it distinguish any meaningful differences 
between the disclosures made within Forms 13F and those within 
Schedules 13D and Proxy solicitations.351  The cumulative effect of the 
many shortcomings of the Goldstein Application, coupled with the 
numerous inconsistencies and contradictions within the Bulldog Fund’s 
words and deeds regarding portfolio disclosures, invariably leads to the 
conclusion that the “Bulldog’s” expectations as a participant in a 
regulated market are highly unreasonable, and that the request for 
exemption should be denied. 
VIII. MUCH ADO352 ABOUT DUE PROCESS? 
When otherwise protectable trade secret property is subjected to 
government regulation, often related to health and safety concerns, the 
“constitutional dimensions of trade secret law are important,” and the 
regulation potentially implicates the Fifth Amendment’s “takings 
clause.”353  Typical examples of takings frequently involve a 
government occupation of realty or personalty, which have generally 
been considered per se invalid.354
Where regulatory activity touches a trade secret in a manner that 
might result in the public disclosure of the secret, such as the disclosure 
requirements contemplated in Section 13 of the 1934 Act, one should be 
cautious to not “overestimate the distinctive nature of intellectual 
property,” nor to “underestimate its continuity with tangible forms of 
property.”355  University of Chicago Professor Richard Epstein 
characterized the common law in this area as “a back-handed vindication 
of this thesis by its excessive reliance on and misapplication of the now-
canonical but intellectually indefensible distinction between physical 
and regulatory takings.”356
 351. See generally, Goldstein Application, supra note 12. 
 352. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING. 
 353. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under the 
Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (2004). 
 354. See, e.g., id. at 61 n.14 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)). 
 355. See id. at 58. 
 356. Id.  Professor Epstein observed: 
[A] complete understanding of the clause requires a court to address four questions: 
[(1)] Has private property been taken? [(2)] If so, was there some justification for that 
taking under the police power [(3)] If not, was the taking for a public use?  And [(4)] 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that the main design of 
the Takings Clause is “to bar Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.”357  Courts have characterized this 
concept as the “notion of reciprocal benefit, or, in Justice Holmes’ 
words, the ‘average reciprocity of advantage.’”358  There are certainly 
different ways to process Holmes’ concept of “average reciprocity of 
advantage,” and a number of prominent cases in the Supreme Court’s 
takings jurisprudence find that “reciprocal benefit renders a 
governmental seizure of assets not a taking.”359  The Goldstein 
Application neglected to address this critical issue.360
A public benefit can arise indirectly, such as a municipal zoning 
ordinance that restricts or eliminates an undesirable property use.361  
Where use restrictions are imposed, the “far lower standard[] of judicial 
review,” essentially a rational basis standard, is applied.362  The Section 
13(f) reporting regime appears to pose certain restrictions, but leaves the 
if so, has just compensation been provided? The actual articulation of each of these 
elements bristles with difficulties in ordinary cases associated with land. We should 
not be surprised to find that these problems will surface in the more specific context 
of trade secrets, where the intangible nature of the right adds yet another layer of 
interpretive uncertainty. 
Id. at 58. 
 357. Colorado Springs Prod. Credit Assoc. v. Farm Credit Admin., 967 F.2d 648, 
654 (D.C.Cir. 1992); accord Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988); First 
English Lutheran Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 
(1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986); Webb’s 
Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). 
 358. Colorado Springs, supra note 357, at 654 (quoting Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). 
 359. Id. at 654 n.5 (citing U.S. v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 (1989)). 
 360. See generally, Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 5-19. 
 361. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 362. Epstein, supra note 353, at 58 (quoting Penn Central v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 105 (1978)) (“The standard formulation indicates that so long as the regulated user 
retains some viable economic use of the property in question, he cannot complain of the 
loss of the right to use because he keeps many other ‘sticks’ in the bundle of property 
rights.”).  Professor Epstein also noted that “all legislation that pertains to trade secrets 
is treated as use restrictions, the lower rational basis test that derives its power from the 
Penn Central case will be used in connection with every system of regulation that 
deviates in any particular manner from the common law rules (or their codifications) 
that govern the subject.”  Id. 
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non-exempt investment adviser in possession of the information.  The 
Supreme Court has “identified several factors that should be taken into 
account when determining whether a governmental action has gone 
beyond ‘regulation’ and effects a ‘taking’: ‘[1] the character of the 
governmental action, [2] its economic impact, and [3] its interference 
with reasonable investment-backed expectations.’”363  Professor Epstein 
characterized this test as “dubious,” and the first prong to be “most 
uninformative because it does not explain why different treatments 
ought to be attached in the end to coercive government behavior.  
Coercive government behavior is the same no matter what form it 
takes.”364
Despite the academic excoriating of the Penn Central standard, no 
one factor controls the outcome.  The character of the government’s 
action is designed to provide transparency through disclosure by major 
market participants.  Any adverse economic impact to the Form 13F is 
potentially de minimus for investment managers who properly seek 
confidential treatment from the SEC,365 and the reasonable investment-
backed expectations366 of investment managers cannot be credibly 
characterized as incurring interference, as the disclosure requirement has 
been in place for roughly three decades.  Goldstein was certainly aware 
 363. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (citing PruneYard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)); see also id. at 1007 (quoting 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979)). 
 364. Epstein, supra note 353, at 65; see also Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 
F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1998); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 267 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(holding Massachusetts disclosure law was facially unconstitutional where cigarette 
companies were required to provide information as to all of the additives in their 
cigarettes, and where additives were distinct and different for various cigarettes and 
hence constituted the “stuff of competitive value,” was an uncompensated regulatory 
taking of the cigarette companies’ trade secret property). 
 365. See Part V.A, supra discussion of confidential treatment requests and FOIA 
exemption basis No. 4.  But see, Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in 
Information, and Securities Regulation, 75 Wash. U.L.Q. 815, 817-18 (1997).  One 
author explained, 
The cost of transmitting data to regulators and investors, however, is only one 
component of the cost of disclosure. Two other important components are what I will 
call opportunity cost and liability cost. Opportunity cost is the difference between the 
value of the information to the company if kept secret and its value to the company if 
publicly disclosed.  Many forms of corporate information are more valuable if they 
are kept secret. 
Id. 
 366. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011-12 (1984). 
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of this prior to his funds having greater than $100 million under 
management. 
The spirit and function of the federal securities laws has always 
been to provide a “level playing field” and promote public confidence in 
the equity markets through disclosure, and whether an individual is a 
stock investor or not, certain benefits invariably flow to all Americans367 
by virtue of a healthy, reliable and trustworthy securities market.368  As 
discussed above, one of the primary objectives of the Section 13(f) 
reporting requirement is “to improve the availability of ‘factual data 
about large investment managers’ to individuals, federal and state 
regulatory agencies, and other institutional managers.”369  Arguably the 
public as a whole benefits from this sort of populist regulatory function, 
as well as from its by-products, at least indirectly.370
The thrust of the legal substance and analysis contained in the 
Goldstein Application was in large part an almost rote recitation of 
authority consistent with constitutional interpretation of the takings 
clause in regulatory settings, with few exceptions.371  The Goldstein 
 367. See, e.g., Milton H. Cohen, ‘Truth in Securities’ Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 
1340 (1966) (“The tendency of some commentators to refer to the Securities Act as the 
“Truth in Securities” law is a deliberate link to consumer protection law.”). 
 368. David Wighton and Peter Thal Larsen, Hedge funds may need to be regulated, 
says NY Fed Chief, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, available at  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/818c42c4-4456-11db-8965-0000779e2340.html (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2007). 
Timothy Geithner, president of the New York Fed, said supervision of core banks and 
investment banks had encouraged the transfer of risk to unregulated institutions such 
as hedge funds. . . .  The effectiveness of this market discipline may be compromised 
by “market failures” such as lack of information, incentive conflicts and moral hazard. 
Id. 
 369. See Parts III and IV, supra. 
 370. See Part IV, supra, for additional public benefits discussion; see also 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (citing Richard A. 
Epstein, Takings, at 195 (1985)).  Epstein explains, 
It might be more accurate, however, to say that a reciprocal benefit amounts to 
‘implicit in-kind compensation’ for governmental action that is a taking.  [citation 
omitted]  Nothing of substance hinges on this characterization, because the seemingly 
distinct questions whether something is a taking and whether compensation must be 
required are, in reality, a single inquiry. 
Id. [emphasis in original]. 
 371. See Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 5-15.  Significant portions of the 
Application appear to be extensive “cut and paste” language consisting of pages and 
pages of single-spaced block quotes extracted from opinions.  See also id. at 9-12. 
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Application, however, apparently overlooked adverse relevant authority 
where the Supreme Court held that the termination of a trade secret did 
not warrant compensation to the holder because there was no actual 
“property taken.”372
As an investment manager, Goldstein is compelled to disclose 
certain holdings exceeding $100 million in 13(f) securities (absent an 
approved confidential treatment application373 or a full exemption 
pursuant to Section 13(f)(2)), and as the holder of that information, 
Goldstein still possesses it, but he no longer holds the exclusion right 
when that information becomes a public record (such as a Form 13F 
filing accessible at the SEC website).  According to Professor Epstein, 
the “residual right to use [the information] along with others is not 
wholly worthless;” however, he contends it should still be considered a 
loss of property at the hands of a state actor.374  Courts have addressed 
this partial taking concept (although it is arguably a complete taking of 
the right to exclude others)375 and have applied the traditional takings 
analytical approach, holding the state action (without proper 
compensation) to be per se invalid, with the key test being “whether 
other individuals are allowed to go where before they were 
 372. See Epstein, supra note 353, at n.15 (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 
U.S. 1, 5 (1949).  But see Epstein, supra note 353, at n.15 (citing Richard A. Epstein, In 
and Out of Public Solution, In Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law, 307, 
317-21 (Terry L. Anderson and Fred S. McChesney eds. (2003)). 
 373. See Part V, supra, for additional discussion regarding confidential treatment 
requests. 
 374. See Epstein, supra note 353, at 62.  The author explains, 
Parity is preferable to exclusion: it is better to be able to use the process even when 
others use it than it is to be barred from its use altogether. But it hardly follows that 
the reduction from a position of dominance to one of parity does not count as a loss, 
simply because state action could have reduced that position to one of absolute 
inferiority. 
Id. 
 375. Id. at 63 (“The hallmark of property is found in the right to exclude.”).  See 
also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. 
U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).  The Court held: 
The right to exclude others is generally “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle 
of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”  With respect to a trade secret, 
the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the property interest.  
Once the data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are 
allowed to use those data, the holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest in 
the data. 
Id. 
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prohibited.”376
Mr. Goldstein’s “Bulldog” funds were not previously required to 
file a Form 13F,377 as the $100 million assets under management 
threshold had not yet been reached by his funds, and as such, it would 
seem credible that others, by having a peak into a portion of his portfolio 
holdings, would now be allowed to tread where they had formerly been 
restricted.378  The Goldstein Application does not appear to expressly 
assert, or even suggest, that this conceptual framework merits any 
consideration.  However, the effect of the Form 13F disclosure could 
also certainly be reasonably construed as a mere diminution of 
Goldstein’s property value, which would not be considered a regulatory 
taking and would not offend the “Takings Clause” of the Fifth 
Amendment.379  The language in Goldstein’s Application is long on 
conclusory declarations380 and short on any factual support favoring 
exemption from the disclosure requirements of Section 13 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as a bona fide trade secret.  Thus, 
where the reporting requirement is determined to be a regulation that is 
 376. Epstein, supra note 353, at 62 (citing Kaiser-Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164 
(1979)). 
 377. See Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 4-5, (“The Applicants [are] . . . a 
private investment fund that holds equity securities with an aggregate fair market value 
on March 31, 2006 of more than $100 million.  Therefore, absent the requested relief, 
Full Value Advisors, LLC will be required to file a Form 13F by February 14, 2007.”). 
 378. Contra Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat’l Convertible Secs. Fund, Inc., 140 F. Supp.2d 
424, 435 (E.D. Pa. 2001), vacated in part, appeal dismissed, Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat’l 
Convertible Secs. Fund, Inc., No. 01-2258, 2003 WL 1846095 (3rd Cir. Apr. 02, 2003). 
 379. In re Eagletech Comm., Inc., SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11832, 2006 SEC 
Lexis 1534 n.12 (July 5, 2006) (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (stating that courts “uniformly reject the proposition that 
diminution in property value” is a regulatory taking)); see also Wm. Barr, Henry 
Weissmann, and John Frantz, The Gild That Is Killing the Lily: How Confusion over 
Regulatory Takings Doctrine Is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings 
Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 487 n.259-64 (2005) (citing Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-08, 1011 n.15; and 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) (2000)).  
The court held: 
Regulation of intellectual property can be viewed in the same terms. Intellectual and 
other intangible forms of property are entitled to the protection of the Takings 
Clause. . . .  A government regulation that reduces the value of intellectual property by 
limiting the owner’s use would not amount to a taking, except perhaps in an extreme 
case. 
Id. 
 380. See generally Goldstein Application, supra note 12. 
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rationally related to a legitimate government interest, the Application 
can be reasonably denied as a result. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Goldstein Application is certainly a creative and colorful 
document filled with the sort of irascible rhetoric that made Phillip 
Goldstein a recognized market maverick in 2006.  However, when one 
delves deeper than what is in some instances little more than baseless 
bluster, the Application falls short at a number of levels.  When 
plumbing the depth of the Application’s substance, it becomes apparent 
that its factual support is as sparse as the legal analysis is self-serving 
and shallow.  Particularly unavailing is the absence of any factual 
showing that the information regarding his Section 13(f) securities 
holdings are protectable intellectual property under New York state 
trade secret law (or any other state law).  The Goldstein Application 
makes no attempt to establish the required elements of a trade secret 
under any cognizable legal standard, and leaps into a conclusory due 
process diatribe that avoided adverse authority that may well spell the 
undoing of his regulatory reformist agenda.  And just as the SEC had to 
endure its unfortunate historical use of the term “client” in the Goldstein 
v. SEC matter, this time the “Bulldog” is stuck with a variety of adverse 
facts that substantially undermine his trade secret theory. 
The rational basis standard that is almost certainly the pertinent 
analytical framework for the issue of Section 13(f) disclosure is 
curiously missing in action from Mr. Goldstein’s manifesto,381 which is 
instead supplanted with naked assertions that all economic value is lost 
through disclosure (though the investment manager admittedly still 
possesses the information).  Given the considerable deference that is 
traditionally afforded to the rule, regulation or statute in any judicial 
review following a rational basis analysis, surprisingly scant attention 
was dedicated to an attempted demonstration that the Section 13(f) 
disclosure rule is not rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest.  The Goldstein Application conspicuously avoided any 
discussion of the litany of public purposes and populist benefits that 
flow from the Section 13 regulatory framework, just as it evaded any 
 381. See Goldstein Application, supra note 12, at 3 (declaring that “[a]s 
administered there is no rational relationship between the disclosure scheme of 
§ 13(f)(1) and any legitimate government interest”). 
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discussion of diminution of value considerations. 
The Goldstein Application also largely skirted the issue of the 
alternate (and appropriate) confidential treatment remedy available to 
investment advisers.  At a minimum, as Warren Buffet has demonstrated 
on an almost quarterly basis, the bureaucratic process involved in a 
confidential treatment application delays the public disclosure of the 
contents of a Form 13F for months, and substantially reduces what little 
(if any) economic harm might arise as a function of the disclosure of 
Section 13(f) securities holdings, as the data becomes increasingly 
“stale” with every additional day of delayed disclosure. 
While the theoretical basis for the Goldstein Application is indeed 
novel in some respects, and certainly does raise some important 
implications regarding private property rights and due process, the 
approach taken rings hollow, and the result is probably more missed 
opportunity than anything else.  Had the Application methodically 
addressed the necessary aspects required to properly establish an 
intellectual property right in trade secrets, and empirically demonstrated 
a substantial likelihood of the alleged economic harm resulting from the 
compulsory disclosure scheme, this issue may have fostered a 
Libertarian private property rights discourse and debate within the 
securities industry. 
Instead, what is absent from the Application is far more notable 
than what is present, and it seems improbable that the SEC will grant 
“Bulldog” an exemption based upon the inadequate Application.  It 
seems equally improbably that any subsequent reviewing tribunal would 
resuscitate the lackluster attempt.  However, Mr. Goldstein’s creative 
theory does lay some groundwork for a future enterprising investment 
adviser who might seek to advance a regulatory reformist agenda by 
filling in some of the many legal and factual gaps of the Goldstein 
Application.  On the other hand, the Application was reportedly just a 
“pretext for a lawsuit,”382 and perhaps a return to the spotlight was 
always the “Bulldog’s” underlying objective. 
 
 382. See Victorious Goldstein, supra note 13. 
